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Proceeding contribution from Ann Winterton (Conservative) in the House of Commons on Tuesday, 16 October 2007. It occurred during Adjournment debate on Defence Policy.


Defence Policy

The hon. Gentleman expresses his opinion. We will have to wait and see who is right. I hope that we are both in the House in 2012, and that we will recall this conversation on the Floor of the House. In the meantime, the real needs of the present have been overlooked, and the hard-learned lessons of the past appear to have been forgotten. So many people thought that Iraq would be another Northern Ireland, where the use of Snatch Land Rovers was appropriate, but they were completely wrong, and many people have lost their lives or been maimed as a result. I have always given the Government credit for the provision of, and improvements to, equipment such as helmets and body armour, and surveillance equipment and electronic countermeasures that use the latest technology. That is in addition to armoury for the infantry. It is in the provision of larger equipment that things have gone horribly wrong. I totally agree with the comments made by the Minister for the Armed Forces a week ago concerning the Mastiff vehicle:"““there must be a range of vehicles suitable for all occasions and available for commanders to use as and when they need to do so.””—[Official Report, 9 October 2007; Vol. 464, c. 200.]" The Secretary of State is now back in the Chamber, and I ask him a direct question: did the Army fully support the original purchase of Mastiffs, or was its support given only on the condition that they were purchased outside the Army budget? I should be grateful if he responded, perhaps by letter. If necessary, I will come and see him behind the Speaker’s Chair, so that we can have a chat, but I would like a response to that query. Let us look at the Army’s new vehicles. The Panther command and liaison vehicle is a very expensive runabout, not to be used on operations. The inadequately protected Tellar bomb disposal vehicle, the Pinzgauer Vector, is an excellent off-road vehicle, but any engineer knows that a mine blast turns it into a death-trap. The so-called Supacat mobility weapon-mounted installation kit is super for the special forces, but why have 130 of them, when they are a liability for normal patrols and convoys, as an infantryman can take them out with one bullet? Who is to say that the first round of FRES for the utility vehicle will be any better? Given the recent track record, we can have little confidence in getting that right. The vehicles can be transported, one at a time, only by the A400Ms—an aircraft that we might never get. What sort of a rapid reaction force will that be? The military seem to be obsessed with fast jets, yet history has proved that small and slow is far superior for close air support. For the price of one Eurofighter we could have a squadron of Super Tucanos. They can carry the same ordnance as a Harrier, with its loud bang, but unlike the Harrier, which can be over the battlefield for no more than 20 minutes, Tucanos can loiter overhead for hours on end, ready for use in a ground attack at a moment’s notice. We also tend to go in for expensive and complicated helicopters, which soak up manpower, like all complicated equipment. There appears to be little understanding of how light helicopters can be used effectively for ground attack. In the book review section of the August edition of Soldier magazine, which I am sure that most people read avidly, there is a tribute to one of the"““most effective counter insurgency units of all time””." The reference is to a book entitled ““The Saints: The Rhodesian Light Infantry”” by Alexandre Binda, which should be required reading for all top brass, so that they can appreciate how the Rhodesians used their limited helicopter resources to devastating effect. There are plenty of helicopters on the market today that can be hired at one fifth of the cost of our own aircraft, so there really is no excuse for helicopter shortages. [Interruption.] I notice that Labour Members are amused by that statement. In all counter-insurgency situations we have complete control of the airspace, so why cannot we have total air surveillance on all key routes?


Secondary information

Type
Proceeding contribution
Reference
464 c743-4 
Session
2006-07
Chamber / Committee
House of Commons chamber
Subjects
Armed forces Defence Deployment Defence equipment Iraq Recruitment Peacekeeping operations Ministry of Defence Afghanistan NATO
Link
View this Proceeding contribution on www.publications.parliament.uk