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Human Fertilisation and Embryology Bill [HL]

This has been an excellent and hugely well informed debate and I am sure that it will be the first of many in Committee. Before I respond to the various amendments I should make it clear to the noble Lord, Lord Alton, in response to his question about the conscience clause, that Section 38 of the 1990 Act continues to apply and is not affected by the Bill. The first clause in the Bill amends Section 1 of the 1990 Act. This section is key to many other provisions in the Bill, and indeed the remit of the HFEA, as it contains the meanings of key terms, including embryo, gamete, sperm and eggs. While we are often clear about what these terms mean from a biological point of view, definitions may be capable of being interpreted quite differently within the context of legislation. For this reason definitions are vital and we must have legal clarity: we are legislators. On Amendment No. 1, moved by the noble Lord, Lord Patel, the meaning of the term ““egg”” in the Bill was drafted to include cells of the female germ line at any stage of maturity. It should be noted that the wording of this provision followed the precedent of a provision in the 1990 Act, as amended by the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994. It was drafted in this way to ensure that any egg precursor cell would be subject to all the same provisions in the Bill and the 1990 Act as an egg itself. Cells of the germ line develop in stages. For example, eggs start life as a primordial germ cell, then become a primary oocyte, a secondary oocyte and, ultimately, a definitive oocyte or egg. The Bill ensures, for example, that to store ovarian tissue containing cells of the female germ line, such as immature eggs for future use in treatment, a storage licence would be required in addition to the consent of the woman whose cells were being stored. In new Section 3ZA of the 1990 Act, as inserted by Clause 3, permitted eggs are defined. It is prohibited to place anything other than a permitted egg, sperm or embryo into a woman. Another reason for having a definition of ““egg”” that would include immature cells of a female germ line is to ensure that use of in vitro maturation within the context of assisted conception treatment is regulated, as would be the possible future use of in vitro growth of gametes for treatment. These techniques involve taking cells of the female germ line from the ovaries, which will clearly be eggs under the definition in the Bill, and maturing them in vitro. If the reference to ““egg”” did not include immature cells, there would be uncertainty that the cells removed and matured would have been an egg in legal terms. Importantly from the point of view of researchers in particular, unless eggs, including with the wider definition, are to be used for HFEA-licensed research, currently no licence for storage would be required. That is because the Human Fertilisation and Embryology (Special Exemptions) Regulations 1991 exempt gametes from requiring a storage licence if, for example, they are intended for the purpose of research on gametes alone without the creation of an embryo. Amendment No. 1, as part of the group of amendments with similar effects, amends the definition of ““eggs”” in proposed new Section 1(4) of the 1990 Act. It removes the words, ““including cells of the female germ line at any stage of maturity””. That has the effect of altering the meaning of ““egg”” in the Bill to live human eggs but does not include eggs that are in the process of fertilisation or are undergoing any other process capable of resulting in an embryo. Amendment No. 1 removes certainty from the Bill as to the type of human cells that will be regulated as eggs. For example, it would no longer be clear that immature cells of the female germ line would be covered by this definition. Amendment No. 1 would also have the effect of casting doubt on the meaning of ““egg”” in this context. The effect would be that, because some immature egg cells would not fall clearly within the definition of an egg, they may not be able to be implanted in a woman. For example, if an ovarian tissue was stored for a cancer patient who then required IVF, it might not be possible to use immature cells of the female germ line with the ovarian tissue for the purpose of creating an embryo in her treatment, as the egg used to create the embryo may not be considered to be a permitted egg. In response to the questions asked by the noble Baroness, Lady O’Cathain, if Amendment No. 1 were agreed to, a licence would not be required to store immature gametes for research or treatment, and it would be unclear whether consent would be required to create embryos. Amendment No. 2 has a similar effect—