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Proceeding contribution from Keith Simpson (Conservative) in the House of Commons on Wednesday, 12 December 2007. It occurred during Opposition day on Military Covenant.


Military Covenant

It is a great pleasure to follow the hon. Member for Blackpool, South (Mr. Marsden) and to echo his sentiments. He was a distinguished editor of History Today. I should like to look at a different aspect of the military covenant that I think parliamentary colleagues will regard as crucial, even if they disagree with some of my interpretations. It is the breakdown of the military covenant between Ministers and senior officers. I declare an interest in that I taught military history to service personnel for many years. I also did two and a half years as a special adviser in the Ministry of Defence. I have therefore seen these issues from both sides. I think we all agree, although we might place our emphasis in different areas, that public disquiet is increasingly being expressed not only by regiments of retired officers—to whom some serving officers refer as ““the dead Army””—but by serving officers themselves. I am thinking particularly of the comments made by General Sir Richard Dannatt and the perhaps more discreet comments from Air Marshall Stirrup, the present Chief of the Defence Staff, about a range of issues that have also been mentioned today. There is nothing new about tensions between politicians and senior officers. It comes down to personalities, politics, budgets, resources and, of course, policies. Our history is littered with robust individuals in the military, including Nelson and Wellington, and Roberts and Wolsey in the late 19th century. Relations between politicians and the military during the first world war were often appalling—between Lloyd George and Haig, for example. There was also a robust relationship between Churchill and senior officers in the second world war. People such as Mountbatten and ““Shan”” Hackett also spring to mind. There have been faults on both sides. I suggest, however, that it is unusual to have had such an outpouring of feeling not only from retired officers—to have all the former Chiefs of the Defence Staff speaking as one is quite unusual—but from serving officers. We should accept the fact that, although most military personnel have a deep interest in political issues and will argue strongly not only about military matters but about matters that concern them as ordinary voters, including the environment, the police and that kind of thing, they tend to have a pretty low opinion of politicians. I suspect that we come just above child molesters and journalists in their rating system. When the former Chiefs of the Defence Staff spoke out, the hon. Member for Sunderland, South (Mr. Mullin) suggested that they were all part of a Tory plot. I do not think that that is the case at all. I suspect that many of them have never voted Conservative; some might not vote at all. The fact is that these serving and retired military men believe that the stresses and strains that the armed forces have been under for the past two or three years are unprecedented. The fact that Richard Dannatt, who is normally a most cautious and discreet man, spoke publicly strikes me as significant. I believe that the military covenant is in danger of breaking down because the chain of command itself is under such enormous pressure. Many middle-ranking and senior officers believe that their men and women—and, more importantly, their families—do not believe that the chiefs of staff are accurately and forcefully representing their concerns to Ministers; hence they feel forced to speak out. Anyone familiar with the array of military blogs will know the reactions of servicemen and women to this matter. One of the problems that the Government face is that their strategic defence review in 1998—which was warmly welcomed by the military establishment, which participated fully in it—was, sadly, never properly funded. Indeed, the man who drove it through, Admiral Essenheim, ended up retiring early from the Navy in disgust. For decades, as we all know, the military appear to the Treasury to have cried wolf on resources. On so many occasions—be it the Falklands, the Gulf war, Kosovo, Sierra Leone, Iraq or Afghanistan—they have said before those conflicts, ““We have insufficient resources.”” Invariably, they deliver. Why? At the end of the day, they do so because they cannibalise their resources; because, as former Prime Minister Blair knew, they have a can-do mentality; and, more recently, because we have been borrowers from the Americans. Without being able literally to borrow kit in Afghanistan, the armed forces would not be able to operate. The military fear that eventually the armed forces will be irreparably damaged if this current tempo continues, and that there will be, in the words of General the Lord Guthrie, some degree of ““operational failure””. What is the attitude of Ministers to this? I do not accept the criticism of some colleagues that the problem is that none of the defence Ministers has any military experience. That is the norm and is likely to be the future norm, and it does not mean that they cannot perform their functions properly. After all, one does not have to be a train driver to be Secretary of State for Transport, or to be a teacher to be Education Secretary. What those in the professions that operate within those Ministries look for is Ministers who are competent and forceful and can explain the case and, where necessary, take responsibility for failures and inadequacies that they are ultimately responsible for. I am afraid to say that one of the Government's problems is that the Prime Minister has a reputation, unlike his predecessor, for not being particularly interested in defence. He has almost a Gladstonian attitude to defence, and it has not been helped by spinning. Many comments have been made about the fact that the current Secretary of State is double-hatted. I do not cast any aspersions on his hard work—he is a very committed man and I suspect that privately, he is deeply embarrassed about being double-hatted. However, the message that that sends to the servicemen and their families is entirely negative. It does not matter if he is only doing one hour a week on that other job; what matters is the perception, as much as anything else. That has contributed in part to what I believe is the erosion of the military covenant. The crucial element missing from any debate about the military covenant and relations between Ministers and the military is the role of the policy-making civil servants, who are absolutely crucial. In my day at the MOD, they were quite formidable. Sir Michael Quinlan, the permanent under-secretary, was a man who made the Chief of the Defence Staff automatically put an exercise book down the back of his trousers and my noble Friend Lord King start hiccupping nervously. He was a formidable man. I am not sure whether the policy-making civil servants of today are of the same calibre, but they are crucial in developing many policy areas and in maintaining the military covenant. We need to look more carefully at their role. If the House at least accepts my contention that there are problems—even if they do not accept that there is a breakdown of the military covenant—how do we repair them? First, Ministers just have to try harder and not spin. They have the responsibility of repairing mutual confidence. Equally, the military should not leak. They should not go to the media because if they do, why should their ordinary soldiers, sailors and airmen not do the same thing if they happen to disagree with the operational orders of a senior officer? This is going to depend on robust personal relationships. I see nothing wrong in the fact that there will be robust discussions between the military and Ministers. Finally, we need to look at the whole question of our national security strategy and institutions. If we do not get this right, we will have future conflicts in which the relationship will break down completely, and we will revert to a position in which politicians and the military have mutual antipathy, as they did during the first world war, when the military were referred to as ““brass hats”” and civilians were referred to as ““frocks”” because of their frock-coats. We need to get this right.


Secondary information

Type
Proceeding contribution
Reference
469 c352-5 
Session
2007-08
Chamber / Committee
House of Commons chamber
Subjects
Armed forces Deployment Coroners Defence equipment Housing Health services Finance Mental health services Standards Repairs and maintenance
Link
View this Proceeding contribution on www.publications.parliament.uk