Skip to main content

Proceeding contribution from Lord Davies of Stamford (Labour) in the House of Commons on Wednesday, 12 December 2007. It occurred during Opposition day on Northern Rock.


Northern Rock

I do not know how much light this evening's debate has been able to throw on the problems in the interbank market or the problem of Northern Rock. It has shed a lot of light on the state of the Front-Bench teams of the Conservatives and Liberal Democrats. Once again, it has shown that the Conservatives have no original ideas. As has become blatantly apparent this evening, they are not even prepared to answer their own questions. They are in the business of saying contradictory things to different people, of gesticulating in different directions, and of hinting that their policy line is one thing and then, when that becomes inconvenient, simply saying that it was not party policy when it was stated after all. We have seen through them this evening. The Liberal Democrats, who called for this debate, have also shown that they are all over the place, even though they have a concrete proposal in the form of nationalisation—it is surely the wrong one. It makes no sense for the hon. Member for Twickenham (Dr. Cable) to say that he is extremely worried about the exposure of taxpayers' money through the Bank of England deposits with Northern Rock and a second later to say that he thinks the taxpayer should not just have the deposit risk of a defined amount of money, but should take on the equity risk too by nationalising the bank. That equity risk will not only be the existing equity risk, because, as has been pointed out by the right hon. Member for Wokingham (Mr. Redwood), who made a sensible intervention for once, future liabilities in the form of redundancy liabilities and so forth can crystallise subsequently. The hon. Member for Twickenham said two other odd things this evening. One was that there has not been a comparable banking collapse since Creditanstalt in 1931. A range of banking collapses have occurred since then—there were a number in the 1970s involving the secondary banking crisis. One such collapse happened to London and County Securities bank, which had as its director at the time Jeremy Thorpe, then leader of the Liberal party. It is little wonder that the hon. Gentleman does not want to remember that one. That situation had to be solved by the famous lifeboat, which turned out to be a successful support operation. The leader of the Conservative party is even more ignorant than the temporary leader of the Liberal Democrats, because he said, at Prime Minister's questions, that there had not been a comparable bank crisis or run on a bank for 140 years. He was even further from the mark than the Liberal Democrats are. Another extraordinary thing took place. The hon. Member for Twickenham knows quite a lot about economics, but he allowed himself to be completely seduced into demagogy of the most irresponsible and superficial kind this evening. He started comparing £30 billion-worth of deposits placed by the Bank of England with Northern Rock—if that is what the real figure is—with the cost of high-speed trains or hospitals. He knows as well as anyone, and perhaps better than most, that if one buys high-speed trains or hospitals, one loses the cash because it will have been definitively given away. If one places money on deposit with a bank, one has it there. Unless any further write-offs, in addition to existing provisions on the book of Northern Rock, prove to be more than the value of the equity, all the deposits will be repayable, and it is inconceivable that more than a very small proportion of those would be the target of subsequent provisions. The hon. Gentleman knows that. He was merely trying to play to the gallery and to be demagogic when to do so is thoroughly irresponsible. What should we do in this situation? The Government are doing the right thing. It was right for the Bank of England to intervene, because that is what lenders of last resort are for. It would be disastrous to have a banking collapse when the interbank market is in a considerable psychological crisis, and we are right to prevent that from happening. We should continue with the present arrangements—that may be for much longer than next February, and that does not matter—until we can find a suitable trade sale. Ultimately, if that did approach not work, we would have to opt for administration. I hope that the Government bear one point in mind: the enormous moral hazard involved if there were any attempt—I am sure that the Government would not be tempted to do this—to bail out shareholders. That would be wrong. They bear the equity risk of the business and they would have been the beneficiaries had the high-risk strategy of funding the bank up to 70 per cent. on the interbank market worked, so they must take responsibility for that strategy that their management adopted. We cannot have the moral hazard of shareholders in that situation being bailed out, otherwise every bank will think that it can adopt the highest-risk strategies, whether on the asset side or the liabilities side, because if it works they will get the reward and if it does not, the taxpayer will pick up the tab. The result of that would be corruption of good banking standards throughout the country. I welcome today's important news that the regulators and lenders of last resort here in the European Union and in the United States have got together to provide liquidity for up to three months for the world banking system. What we need in this crisis is exactly what the Government have displayed—calmness, strong nerves and consistency. It is clear that the only Front Benchers displaying those qualities tonight are my right hon. and hon. Friends.


Secondary information

Type
Proceeding contribution
Reference
469 c411-2 
Session
2007-08
Chamber / Committee
House of Commons chamber
Subjects
Assets Banks Deposits Protection Loans Nationalisation Sales North East Government guaranteed credit Northern Rock
Link
View this Proceeding contribution on www.publications.parliament.uk