Proceeding contribution from Lord Hague of Richmond (Conservative) in the House of Commons on Tuesday, 25 March 2008. It occurred during Opposition day on Iraq Inquiry.
Iraq Inquiry
Let me proceed a little way. I will give way to hon. Members in due course, but we have to remember that others will wish to speak. The case in principle for an inquiry should, therefore, be agreed across the political spectrum. It was agreed after the last debate. For those of us who supported the invasion of March 2003, recent signs of hope in Iraq are welcome indeed. The security situation has improved, the Iraqi economy is growing, stumbling but genuine steps towards political reconciliation have taken place and optimism among the people of the country has risen. But we all have to recognise that the path to this renewal of hope has lain through a painful trauma, including the deaths of 175 members of our armed forces. While the 23 days of the initial military campaign to overthrow Saddam were astonishingly successful, the constant theme of those who have written about their involvement in subsequent events is that things went seriously wrong in the preparation for, and execution of, the occupation of the country. Sir Hilary Synnott, who was in charge of southern Iraq under the coalition provisional authority, puts very well in his book the need to draw practical lessons from the events. That is part of the case for an inquiry beginning now. He says that, of course, the highest-level political decisions in the run-up to the war need to be examined, but that many practical issues also need to be considered. I shall quote him at some length. He mentions:"““The deficiencies of process and planning need to be examined in detail: the inability quickly to mobilise adequate numbers of appropriate experts or sufficient financial resources…The bureaucratic accounting and contracting procedures; the failures of communication and understanding—between the hub in Baghdad and the regional and provincial spokes…the failure to motivate and organise the Coalition Central Government Departments so that they were…able to contribute their particular skills and resources to an effort which needed to be a truly comprehensive one.””" He continues:"““Only by careful analysis of such failings will it be possible to decide to what extent changes need to be made and then…ensure they are brought about.””"
Secondary information
- Type
- Proceeding contribution
- Reference
- 474 c41-2
- Session
- 2007-08
- Chamber / Committee
- House of Commons chamber
- Subjects
- Armed forces Armed conflict Deployment Inquiries Intelligence services Iraq Military alliances Terrorism Security Iraq conflict
- Link
- View this Proceeding contribution on www.publications.parliament.uk
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