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Proceeding contribution from Robert Marshall-Andrews (Labour) in the House of Commons on Tuesday, 25 March 2008. It occurred during Opposition day on Iraq Inquiry.


Iraq Inquiry

That is undoubtedly right. Indeed, beside that decision, all our other achievements and deficiencies—and there have been many of both—pale into insignificance. The circumstances and repercussions of what we did then have swept well past Iraq. As Tacitus noted, one victory can create a thousand enemies, and that is precisely what happened. I shall dwell briefly on the second matter, which is the written advice given by the Attorney-General to the Prime Minister on 7 March 2003. We are able to look at that advice now, even though it was obtained only in the teeth of those at the time who wished to keep it secret. Those people produced every form of spurious argument, based on dubious or non-existent precedent, that such advice should never be shown. When we saw it, we found out why they wanted to keep it hidden. The advice was hedged around with doubt: it said that it was possible to argue that the invasion of Iraq was illegal but, two paragraphs later, that it was equally possible to argue that it was not. The advice then pointed out the number of challenges that could be brought, and the people who would bring them, if it turned out to be wrong. One week later, on 14 March, the Attorney-General went to the Cabinet and to the House of Lords. Not one word of those doubts was set out to either. The House of Lords and the Cabinet received a completely different opinion. Furthermore, and even worse, the Attorney-General's written opinion was buried. It was never shown or volunteered to the Cabinet—of course, its members should have asked for it, but they did not—or to the House of Lords. The advice was not given to this Chamber or made available to the British people. That must be made the subject of an inquiry, although I suspect that no such inquiry will be held during my time in the House. However, if the inquiry that is eventually held concludes that deception and deceit led us into an illegal war, then I hope that Parliament will deliver up to justice those who are responsible. That is inescapable. I am a humanist. I do not believe in a final judgment, when our sins and misdemeanours will be read out of a great book. I suggest that this is the place for such things. However, if I did believe in judgment day—and particularly if I was a Catholic—and if I had been responsible for the deceit and duplicity that led to the slaughter in Iraq, I would be saying my Ave Marias as fast as diction would allow. It may be a pity that I do not believe in the final judgment, as I should like to be there to see it. However, I believe that we here must arrive at a quicker judgment, and that we, the British people and those who have suffered as a result of our actions, are entitled to that judgment sooner—much sooner—than later.


Secondary information

Type
Proceeding contribution
Reference
474 c97-8 
Session
2007-08
Chamber / Committee
House of Commons chamber
Subjects
Armed forces Armed conflict Deployment Inquiries Intelligence services Iraq Military alliances Terrorism Security Iraq conflict
Link
View this Proceeding contribution on www.publications.parliament.uk