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Human Fertilisation and Embryology Bill

Avoiding any controversy, may I begin with six unquestioned and unquestionable truths? First, it is uncertain whether important therapies will come from embryonic stem cell research. Secondly, if they come, it is probable that they are a long way off. Thirdly, no substantial therapies have so far come from embryonic stem cell research but, fourthly, many therapies have come from adult stem cell research. Fifthly, it is ultimately adult stem cell research—this point has not yet been made—that holds the key to mass-producing and industrialising the production of stem cells. Sixthly, adult stem cell research—cord blood use and so on—is morally problematic. Despite all that, the research community wants to continue to extend the embryonic stem cell research programme, although clearly some in that community would give it up if it turned out to be futile and a dead end, or if such research proved to have no demonstrable advantage over adult stem cell research. Parliament is asked to extend the programme. At the meeting referred to by the hon. Member for Buckingham (John Bercow), Professor Colin Blakemore, a former head of the Medical Research Council, asked me to have faith. Why should we not? Well, the main, fundamental reason is the possible encouragement that the research gives to a casual attitude to, or a lack of respect for, human life. The ethical position would have been so much easier in the middle ages, when an embryo was seen as unformed matter, but in the 21st century we know better. We know that every embryo is the blueprint of an individual and the code of a human life no different from ours. Of course, an embryo is not actually an individual, and we could argue that its destruction and its treatment do not matter—that it is mere human material. That has already been argued in this debate. However, that is not the view of the existing law. It requires good reasons for experimenting on, or tampering with, embryos. If that was not the case, we would be comfortable with embryos being used in cosmetics, foodstuffs and so on. We require good reasons, namely the hope of scientific advance or medical therapy. The potential risks and harms are set against the potential goods in a utilitarian fashion. In the House of Lords, Baroness Warnock made it clear that this is a utilitarian debate. Utilitarianism seldom works, because people weigh risks and harms differently. But assuming it does, we are asked to consider the benefits of extending the research programme to allow cybrids—cloned admixed embryos—human-animal embryos, chimeras and transgenic beings. Arguably, although it has not been said in the debate, the Bill allows a loophole for human reproductive cloning. All these permissions are not quite subject to the 14-day rule or the no-implantation rule. If one looks for a clear principle that explains the boundary between the permissible and the impermissible, one does not find it in the Bill. The real limit is the imagination and endeavour of the scientific community—the ad hoc, post hoc baptising of what decent scientists do, as opposed to rogue, usually foreign, scientists. There is no rule that can be provided to differentiate the two categories, other than the claims that the decent scientists have good ethical reasons, that their work may minimally advance understanding, and may, but not will in all probability, lead to therapy. What research programme, when one thinks about it, could not meet that standard? Perhaps that is why the HFEA has refused none hitherto. If we have no clear idea what we want to rule out, we can have no clear idea what we want to rule in. We are a society in moral and intellectual confusion, and that is embodied in the debate, drawing ad hoc, post hoc temporary limits, and wrapping legislation round existing practice. I take seriously the claim that embryonic stem cell research will be fundamental to the cure of Parkinson's disease, motor neurone disease and so on. I am uncomfortable setting the gain to society of a reverence for human life against the clear pain and suffering of individuals with those terrible diseases, but I am not yet persuaded that extending the embryonic stem cell research programme is essential to a speedy cure of those terrible afflictions. I have been urged to have faith on the issue, but I would like to have my faith in this context based on rationality. The case for cybrids, admixed embryos, is based not on a drive for better experiments, because animal mitochondria will be mixed in, which will be a problem, but on a drive for more experiments. Perhaps that work will produce a gain that cord blood, aborted gonads and adult stem cells cannot provide. Perhaps it will produce something to fill the gap, but perhaps not. The case for extending human-animal hybrids is based not on existing research objectives but on the possibility that someone might have a research objective. The Royal Society says the provision may have been drafted because"““the emergence of a scientifically valid reason cannot be ruled out””" and we must ““future-proof”” the legislation. Aside from the moral issues and the possible waste of time and money, I am genuinely at a loss to know what scientific research programme cannot be justified by saying"““the emergence of a scientifically valid reason cannot be ruled out””." This is blank cheque legislation.