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Defence in the UK

I do not quite take the same view as the hon. Gentleman. I do not know how much of my speech I will get through in my 15 minutes, but the view that the American Government took in the middle east was, ““We can establish western democracy, over a period, in the middle east, and then these guys will know how to play the game; they'll be on our side and everything will be stable.”” America argued that that should be the case in Russia, but what it predicted did not take place. If that argument were successful, the logic would be that the Russians should be part of the NATO pact. That is the ultimate logic of that foreign policy doctrine. We—and the hon. Gentleman—need to be clear in our mind on whether we agree with that doctrine. He needs to be clear on whether he accepts my view that there is a logical conclusion to the argument. If he does not accept that, and he thinks that Russia will always be on the other side, and therefore not linked up with our interests, other aspects of defence policy will need to be considered. I want to come back to that point later in my speech, assuming that I am able to do so. I shall have to speed up a bit to try to make my points. The question is whether one believes that the world has changed. I think that there is a need for another review of defence policy; the main thrust of that work should be done after the next general election, but in the interim, all of us have to do a bit of thinking on the subject. I completely agree with the view expressed by the Liberal Democrat spokesman, the hon. Member for North Devon (Nick Harvey), on that point. I am sure that many other colleagues, on both sides of the Chamber, see the need for such a review. Let me set out some of the issues that arise from the changing international picture. Have we got the emphasis right when it comes to counter-terrorism? Should counter-terrorism be the main thrust of British defence and foreign policy? It is clearly a very important issue, and we must counter terrorism wherever we can, in whatever way is most effective, both militarily and in the civil sphere; civil action is needed too, as I think is widely recognised. However, is that the main issue? In 10 or 20 years, will that be the main priority for the nation? That question has to be examined, whatever our view. My view is that the world has changed, that new power groups are emerging and that an assessment of the impact of those groups must be a key part of British foreign and defence policy. The second question that I want to address relates back to the point made by the hon. Member for The Wrekin (Mark Pritchard) about NATO policy in relation to Russia. The Cheney doctrine, which was adopted in the middle east, could never be successful—in a sense, it was the absence of a doctrine after the end of the cold war. The doctrine during the cold war was that we had to have sufficient political and military power to make sure that potential enemies did not do anything stupid and that they recognised that. There had to be a balance of power to achieve that. That doctrine achieved relative stability for 30 or 40 years after the end of the second world war. After the fall of communism and the end of the cold war, what was the doctrine? What was NATO's purpose? A lot of us were asking that question, but we never successfully addressed it. That is why when there was a proliferation of terrorist attacks in different parts of the world over a period of 10 years, culminating in the attacks in New York and followed through by the attacks in Spain, Britain and elsewhere, we said that we must focus on countering those atrocities, but forgot about the doctrine of foreign policy and defence policy beyond that. We must return to those now, as we again see the emergence of major power blocks. That is a key issue. We cannot persuade Russia, the middle east, the Indian subcontinent, China or other Asian countries to be like western Europe or north America. What can we persuade them to do? We can persuade them to co-exist, and it is in everybody's interest that that stability is re-established. That should be the central part of our foreign policy; it follows that defence policy must reinforce that. I may be wrong on the issue. Some say that my view is over-pessimistic. However, I do not believe that in 10, 20, 30, 40 or 50 years' time, China, Russia and the Indian subcontinent will look anything like what Marxists used to call ““bourgeois democracy”” in western Europe and north America. The danger is that those countries will end up in the hands of aggressive dictators; it is also possible that they will divide into different groupings. Our policies must be capable of dealing with that issue. Are our current alliances appropriate to deal with those threats? Any review needs to consider these different issues. I am absolutely clear that NATO needs to move forward and change to adapt to new circumstances, but it has to be the cornerstone of British, European and north American defence. However, I also think that the European Union will play an ever-increasing role. I know that there are differences of view in the House about this, but I am thinking from a military point of view. As a member of the Defence Committee of the European Security and Defence Assembly, also known as the Western European Union, I frequently meet military commanders. It is amazing—even military commanders who are broadly hostile to the European Union want more linkage with their colleagues and the organisations in Europe with which they associate. The EU needs a better defined defence policy and to work more closely with NATO. NATO and the EU need to know how they can get the best out of their strengths and eliminate their weaknesses. That has to be the core of the structure of future political organisation to counter the other power groups emerging in the world. NATO member countries must, under article 5, come to the assistance of another member country that is under threat, but the European Union does not have that provision—at least constitutionally, although it does have it implicitly in many other ways. That is inconsistent, and the extent to which the EU provides such cover needs to be clarified over the period ahead. If we all have the same values, we should have the same protection. Then we need to consider the more practical questions as to whether we are properly equipped to face this situation. Intelligence—the foundation of successful military operations—is one of the key areas where there will be a need for a wide debate. There has recently been a move away from our intelligence services being focused on knowing what opponents—or enemies in the cold war era—are up to towards what terrorist organisations are up to. The ultimate conclusion must be that we need more resources and expenditure to defend the nation, and we might well end up in that position in the years ahead. The key issue is the need to decide on the allocation and direction of our intelligence forces. We need to re-examine our sea power, which was mentioned by my hon. Friend the Member for Plymouth, Sutton (Linda Gilroy), as well as our air power. We need to think about our lift. Is it realistic for each country within Europe to have its own lift? Are we to be dependent on private sector contractors from Ukraine in that respect, and if so for how long? What are the implications of any changes in the relationship between Russia and the UK? What about our ground troops capability? We have already heard about the dilemma between air cover from helicopters and forward movements on the ground where local populations are closer. Then there is the role of nuclear weapons. I support the modernisation of Britain's nuclear deterrent, which must be considered in this context as well. Let me conclude with two points. First, I am a rapporteur at the ESDA on the question of how European operations should be headquartered, where there is a need for less duplication. Secondly, we need to examine the whole issue of aircraft carriers, including cover in the air and frigate defence. Can France and Britain continue to try to provide everything? Can some of the other countries in Europe help to contribute to the European capability? How does that link into the United States, where it is a NATO operation? The new Front Benchers will be very busy dealing with day-to-day matters, but I hope that they will have a little time to reflect on some of the issues that I have mentioned. I agree that after the next general election there will inevitably be a defence review. Given the consensus in the House on that, progress should be made.