Proceeding contribution from Lord Thomas of Gresford (Liberal Democrat) in the House of Lords on Thursday, 29 January 2009. It occurred during Debates on delegated legislation on Civil Procedure (Amendment No. 2) Rules 2009.
Civil Procedure (Amendment No. 2) Rules 2009
My Lords, President Obama, in his inauguration speech two weeks ago, said: "““As for our common defense, we reject as false the choice between our safety and our ideals. Our founding fathers, faced with perils that we can scarcely imagine, drafted a charter to assure the rule of law and the rights of man, a charter expanded by the blood of generations. Those ideals still light the world, and we will not give them up for expedience’s sake””." The rule of law and the rights of man, to which President Obama referred, are expressed in our concept of justice, which is central to procedural fairness. Under the Civil Procedure Rules 1998, paragraph (1) of Rule 1.1 states that the overriding objective of the rules is to enable, "““the court to deal with cases justly””." That is defined in paragraph (2)(a) as, "““ensuring that the parties are on an equal footing””." Therefore, it is not surprising that when these rules are brought before the House we see that the objective has to be modified. Rule 79.2 of the new rules states that, "““the overriding objective in Part 1, and so far as relevant any other rule, must be read and given effect in a way which is compatible with the duty set out in paragraph (2)””." That duty is: "““The court will ensure that information is not disclosed contrary to the public interest””." In other words, the rules recognise that there will be inequality between the person against whom the order is made and Her Majesty’s Treasury, which makes it. It is not a technicality. It demonstrates how far this Government have moved away from those ideals, which President Obama declared that he would not give up for the sake of expedience. It is a matter of regret that the special advocate procedure has now been extended to this area. It is an area where a person may be paralysed by having his assets frozen. I just ask your Lordships to consider what it would be like if your bank account was frozen, if you could get no cash out of the cash machine downstairs and if your credit cards were worthless. How would you get home tonight? A person can be paralysed by an order made by the Treasury without any recourse to the courts. It will be observed that nothing in these new rules requires the Treasury to go to court to obtain an order to freeze assets; it can do it of its own volition. This is concerned with an application to set aside a financial restrictions decision that is made by the Treasury, which can be, in an utterly arbitrary way, based on information that it refused to disclose when making the order and will resist in disclosing when an application is made to set aside that order. We on these Benches have opposed the whole concept of special advocates from the moment they were introduced about eight years ago. What are special advocates? Lord Justice Sedley, in a decision on 12 September 2008 in Murungaru v the Secretary of State for the Home Department, says: "““A special advocate system is thus not a substitute for the common law principle that everyone facing an accusation made by the state is entitled to a fair chance to know the evidence in support of it and to test and answer it in a public hearing””." He continues: "““The help of the special advocate is to be sought if, but only if, the interests of justice require it: it is a last resort if all other means of doing justice fail””." He then refers to the judgment of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Bingham, in the case of H in the Judicial Committee of this House, and to that of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Woolf, in the case of Roberts v the Parole Board. He states: "““The availability of a special advocate can never be a reason for reducing the procedural protections which the law otherwise guarantees””." The Minister referred in his opening remarks to the subsequent Court of Appeal decision, A, K, M, Q and G v HM Treasury, where Lord Justice Sedley repeated those observations and was supported by the Master of the Rolls in so doing. As I say, we have opposed the principle of special advocates throughout. In 2003, my noble friend Lord Goodhart said: "““First, both my noble friend Lord Carlile of Berriew and the Joint Committee””—" the Joint Committee on Human Rights— "““have pointed out the profoundly unsatisfactory nature of the special advocate procedure. It is most unsatisfactory, for example, that an advocate cannot question the person on whose behalf he or she is acting. We recognise that there may be exceptional cases where that is justified because of the importance of protection of sources and not disclosing too much about what we know. However, the closed procedure, as it is called, should only be adopted where it is absolutely necessary and evidence should wherever possible be open””.—[Official Report, 11/3/03; col. 1296.]" He repeated those views in 2005, when he said: "““It is a very unsatisfactory procedure. It has been considered by a report of the Constitutional Affairs Committee of the House of Commons that was published just before the Recess. That stated that the special advocate system should be operated only under the most exceptional circumstances. I wholeheartedly agree. One of the most objectionable features of the special advocate procedure is the ban on contact between the controlled person and the special advocate following the disclosure of closed material to the special advocate””.—[Official Report, 7/4/05; col. 790.]" The system has developed in such a way that a special advocate who has been appointed is then allowed to see what is being withheld, but he may not take instructions on it. He cannot go back to the person concerned and say, ““They are saying this about you. What is your response?””. That is bad enough in the sort of procedures for which special advocates have been employed. In this case, the Treasury has itself made a decision and imposed a freezing order but has refused to say why and has refused to disclose anything to the person concerned, who may have a full explanation of why he is in possession of certain assets. This area creates even greater injustice than was the case before. It is interesting to look at the views that have been expressed by special advocates in the past. Mr Ian Macdonald QC resigned as a special advocate on 1 November 2004, saying that he had taken the job because he thought that he might be able to make a difference and so that he could see how everything worked from the inside. But he concluded: "““I now feel that whatever difference I might make as a special advocate on the inside is outweighed by the operation of a law fundamentally flawed and contrary to our deepest notions of justice. My role has been altered to provide a false legitimacy to indefinite detention””—" he was talking, of course, about indefinite detention at that time— "““without knowledge of the accusations being made and without any kind of criminal charge or trial. For me this is untenable. No other country in Europe has felt it necessary to follow this course … Such a law is an odious blot on our legal landscape””." That is a special advocate speaking from his own experience. In its report of 2006-07, the Joint Committee on Human Rights, having interviewed special advocates and listened to their evidence, said: "““After listening to the evidence of the Special Advocates, we found it hard not to reach for well worn descriptions of it as ‘Kafkaesque’ or like the Star Chamber. The Special Advocates agreed when it was put to them that, in the light of the concerns ""they had raised, ‘the public should be left in absolutely no doubt that what is happening … has absolutely nothing to do with the traditions of adversarial justice as we have come to understand them in the British legal system’””." It went on: "““Indeed, we were left with the very strong feeling that this is a process which is not just offensive to the basic principles of adversarial justice in which lawyers are steeped, but it is very much against basic notions of fair play as the lay public would understand them””." It has returned to this issue on a number of occasions and, in particular, commented on the decision in MB v the Secretary of State for the Home Department. Your Lordships have had the views of the Joint Committee, the views of the special advocate and the views of my noble friend Lord Goodhart, but what has the judicial arm of this House said? The noble and learned Lord, Lord Bingham, said in the case of MB v the Secretary of State: "““In any ordinary case, a client instructs his advocate what his defence is to the charges made against him, briefs the advocate on the weaknesses and vulnerability of the adverse witnesses, and indicates whatever evidence is available by way of rebuttal. This is a process which it may be impossible to adopt if the controlled person does not know the allegations made against him and cannot therefore give meaningful instructions, and the special advocate, once he knows what the allegations are, cannot tell the controlled person or seek instructions without permission, which in practice (as I understand) is not given. ‘Grave disadvantage’ is not, I think, an exaggerated description of the controlled person’s position””." I made some comments at that time but I shall not weary your Lordships with what I said on a previous occasion. Indeed, the Joint Committee on Human Rights commented on it later. These rules are an extension of the special advocate system and, according to what the Minister said, they will be extended in most of these cases. These financial restriction orders freezing assets are to be made by the Treasury on undisclosed material. The special advocate will not be able to take instructions except, under the terms of the rules, by making an application to the court, to which the Treasury may object. The rules set out in detail what the special advocate has to do if he wishes to communicate any of the allegations on which the orders are made to his client. He has to go to court. But, as the noble and learned Lord, Lord Bingham, said in the judgment in MB, the court rarely gives permission. It is moved by the submissions that are made and by the fact that all is very secret and must not be disclosed and so on. The system is wholly unsatisfactory. Instead of resolving it in the way that has been recommended by the Joint Committee on Human Rights, by the Constitutional Affairs Committee, by submissions that are made and judgments that are given, the Government have done nothing about it and in these rules are simply continuing an unacceptable and unjust system. I come back to where I started, with President Obama’s words: we should ourselves reject as false the choice between our safety and our ideals.
Secondary information
- Type
- Proceeding contribution
- Reference
- 707 c434-7
- Session
- 2008-09
- Chamber / Committee
- House of Lords chamber
- Subjects
- Disclosure of information Appeals Courts Assets Civil proceedings Advocacy Fees and charges Documents Legal costs Northern Ireland Public interest Vetting Terrorism Small businesses Supreme Court Rules of procedure High Court Small claims Special advocates Freezing of assets
- Legislation
- Rules of the Supreme Court (Northern Ireland) (Amendment No. 3) 2008
- Civil Procedure (Amendment No. 2) Rules 2008
- Link
- View this Proceeding contribution on www.publications.parliament.uk
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