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Proceeding contribution from John Baron (Conservative) in the House of Commons on Wednesday, 25 March 2009. It occurred during Opposition day on Iraq War Inquiry.


Iraq War Inquiry

I am sorry that the hon. Gentleman has only recently come into the Chamber. As one of those six who voted against the war, I will not bother answering that. I am trying to build up a case as to why the intelligence was misrepresented to the House. That is one good reason why we were misled. I have no problem with any Member who voted for the war, because the Prime Minister was fundamentally misleading the House in presenting the intelligence that he did. It was very excusable to support the war at that time, when we were being told by our Prime Minister that the intelligence available to him had built up such a strong case for war. But I accept that we as a Chamber and as a Parliament failed in our duty to question that Prime Minister strongly enough, which is why the inquiry should have available to it all the Cabinet papers leading up to that decision, because that will reveal that the decision was taken in July 2002 to go to war, the precondition being that public opinion had to be prepared in this country. That is why the dodgy dossier had such an important role. Time is short and I know that others want to get in, so let me summarise. There is clear indication that spin doctors played a fundamental role in the production of that intelligence, and that it had a mission to persuade a sceptical House and a sceptical public of the need for war. As I have suggested, the decision to go to war had been taken well before. There is a leaked Cabinet Office memo of 21 July 2002, which the Government have refused to dismiss as untrue and which was published in The Sunday Times. It makes the point that the decision had been taken, but a precondition was that the then Prime Minister had to persuade a sceptical public that war was needed. That was the importance of the dodge dossier. In conclusion, speaking from Iraq in June 2007, the Prime Minister said that lessons must be learned on the use of intelligence in the run-up to the war. Almost two years after that, the troops are returning home. Now is the time for action, not words.


Secondary information

Type
Proceeding contribution
Reference
490 c341 
Session
2008-09
Chamber / Committee
House of Commons chamber
Subjects
Armed forces Deployment Inquiries Intelligence services Iraq USA Iraq conflict Hussein, Saddam
Link
View this Proceeding contribution on www.publications.parliament.uk