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Privileges Committee: First Report

My Lords, the advice of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mackay of Clashfern, is of great constitutional significance, and, having heard the speech of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Lloyd of Berwick, it would be presumptuous of me to say anything more than that I respectfully agree. I therefore need say nothing more about the first report of the Committee for Privileges, except that I hope the House will agree with it and endorse the advice of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mackay. The second report deals with the conduct of the four Members of the House. I shall deal in a few moments with the plea in mitigation which the noble Baroness, Lady Mallalieu, has just made and with which I profoundly disagree. That report deals with the fairness of the procedures of the sub-committee’s report, with the interpretation of the code and with the conduct of the Members found to have breached the code. The sub-committee is not a court of law and has not determined any criminal charge. Nor has it determined any civil right. It has performed its role as a disciplinary body acting on behalf of the committee and the House under the House’s extensive and essential powers of self-regulation. In doing so, the sub-committee and the committee as a whole have acted independently and impartially, with conspicuous fairness, in accordance with the fundamental principles of natural justice, and with scrupulous care as to the evidence. Because the committee and the sub-committee have not determined a criminal charge or a civil right of any Member of the House, it is quite clear that there is no question of any breach of the European convention. If the noble Lords, Lord Truscott or Lord Taylor, were to complain to the European Court of Human Rights of any alleged violation of their convention rights, their complaints would undoubtedly be declared inadmissible. The sub-committee and the committee decided, in the light of the seriousness of the allegations, that particularly strong evidence was required before they could be satisfied that the allegations were proved. The four Members were fairly informed of the case against each of them. They each received legal advice. They each had a fair opportunity to answer what had been put to them, both in writing and orally. The record of their interviews, which is now before the House, shows the conspicuous, courteous and fair way in which the sub-committee questioned them. However, the noble Lord, Lord Truscott, a former Minister of the Crown, who had the benefit of the advice both of a partner of the firm Bindman and Partners and apparently of the former DPP Sir Ken Macdonald QC, treated attack as his best line of defence. He alleged in his letter before the House of 4 May to the chairman of the Committee for Privileges, that the sub-committee’s report bore very little relation to the evidence he had given at the hearing. He described the sub-committee’s conclusions as, ""a crude attempt to arrive at a predetermined judgement"—" an allegation of actual bias on the part of the members of the sub-committee. He also claimed that the report was, ""surprisingly and disappointingly intellectually flawed"." The noble Lord’s letter of appeal continues even more bizarrely: ""At the Hearing itself I felt like a Guantanamo inmate. I was continually interrupted, with one Member in particular being aggressive and descending at times into sarcasm. I at once felt that my ‘guilt’ had been prejudged. My wife, whose uncle spent time in the Gulag, can't escape a feeling of déjà vu. 1930s Russia. Stalin is in power. Political committees decide an individual's fate on the basis of ill-founded allegations and without any evidence of actual wrongdoing"." I have read and reread the entire record and the sub-committee’s full report. There is no basis for the extraordinary attack that was mounted by the noble Lord, which aggravates his misconduct and demonstrates a total lack of judgment or self-knowledge. As for the noble Lord, Lord Taylor of Blackburn, his lawyers alleged in his appeal that the finding against him could not stand, ""because it was reached through an unfair process"," and that he was, ""denied basic procedural safeguards guaranteed by domestic and international law, and by the House of Lords own rules. Not least of these is the right to know the charges against you and to test the evidence against you through cross-examination … and the right to confront your accuser"." Like the noble Lord, Lord Truscott, the noble Lord, Lord Taylor, declined the invitation to present his appeal in person to the Committee for Privileges. Unlike the noble Lord, Lord Truscott, the noble Lord, Lord Taylor, also refused to appear before the sub-committee. Instead, he submitted a statutory declaration. As a result, the sub-committee at no stage had the opportunity to question him on the detail of his defence. However, the evidence against him was cogent and compelling. The noble Lord, Lord Taylor, was advised throughout by Finers Stephens Innocent. His lawyers raised procedural and legal objections based on what the sub-committee rightly described as a "fundamental misconception" of its role. In my view, they were also based on a fundamental misconception of both domestic law and international human rights law. In his letter of 17 February, Mr Mark Stephens alleged that the sub-committee, ""appear to wish to proceed by flouting both the letter and spirit of the right to a fair trial, guaranteed under Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights"." In his letter of 12 March, he referred to what he described as the "pretence in the code" about the fairness of the procedures. These and other criticisms were entirely misguided. A further point is now made in an attempt, I think, to persuade the House not to suspend either noble Lord, Lord Truscott or Lord Taylor, from the service of the House until the end of the current Session. It is apparently said by Mark Stephens, the lawyer of the noble Lord, Lord Taylor, and repeated fairly and properly by the noble Baroness, Lady Mallalieu, that they were not warned that the House had the power to suspend and that the guidance sent to them clearly stated clearly—as it did—that the House had no power to suspend, so they will face a retrospective penalty. That might be a good argument if it could be shown that it would have made any difference to their conduct or their dealings with the sub-committee or committee if they had known that there was a power to suspend. However, that has not been suggested by Mr Stephens or the noble Baroness, Lady Mallalieu. It would be entirely unrealistic to suppose that if the noble Lords had known of the possible penalty, they would have advanced any defence of their conduct that has not already been considered by the committee. Accordingly, that does not constitute a good and sufficient reason for this House to reject the committee’s recommendation as to the sanction of suspension that it has proposed. I really respect the commitment of the noble Baroness, Lady Mallalieu, to natural justice and fairness; I entirely share it as a human rights lawyer and a public lawyer. However, I do not consider that there is a breach of the principles of natural justice or fairness, which are flexible principles. They are not conceivably breached in this case, and the penalties are in my judgment entirely proportionate.