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Iraq

My Lords, I thank the noble Baroness for repeating the Statement. I, at the outset, join her in sending condolences to the families of the men who have so recently lost their lives in service to our nation. Of course, the Statement is welcome in many ways. Under four years ago, a British woman was arrested in the heart of London for reading out names of those who had died. Now at last we have some admission that the truth cannot be indefinitely covered up. The ranks of the dead and injured of all nations, including Iraqis, have the right to demand that. The war provoked the largest public demonstration seen in London in modern times. Many people were deceived—I put no finer point on it—into thinking that the Saddam Hussein regime presented a direct threat to regional security and, specifically, to this country’s security with weapons of mass destruction. Thanks to the report of the noble Lord, Lord Butler of Brockwell, we now know that the intelligence was not as extensive, detailed and authoritative as Mr Blair told Parliament that it was. Why did he do that? I very much hope that the inquiry will tell us. If not, it will have failed. The noble Lord’s skilful inquiry into the use—some might say abuse—of intelligence was one of several into limited aspects of the events surrounding the war, but we have never had a comprehensive review into how this massive foreign policy disaster occurred. What were our war aims? Was regime change, now frequently cited as an alleged benefit of the war, a covert objective from the outset? When and in what detail was this discussed with the US Administration and other coalition allies? Why did we have no proper post-conflict plan? Will all these sorts of questions be covered in the inquiry? Should the terms of reference not be the widest possible, to enable the inquiry to go wherever it needs and to see whatever document it requires to get at the truth? The report by the noble Lord, Lord Butler, did not address the diplomatic exchanges preceding the war and the international commitments that our Government may or may not have given at that time. It did not focus on the legal case for war or the structure or motivation of the political decision-making that led to it. It threw a troubling sidelight on sofa government and its consequences and on the involvement of the No. 10 spin team in these events, but these have never been fully probed. As for the infamous "dodgy dossier", two former Cabinet Ministers, the late Robin Cook and Clare Short, have asserted that the public were misled, while Mr Straw called the dossier, "a complete Horlicks". These are shameful admissions of serious government incompetence and need to be examined with the greatest care. It would not be to criticise the report of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hutton, into the death of Dr David Kelly—one man who told the truth—to say that the spin machine’s role needs rigorous re-examination. Can the Minister assure us that senior politicians—the Franks committee included two senior former Cabinet Ministers from the Opposition—will be involved in the inquiry, people familiar with the nature of political decisions? If she cannot give those assurances, will she tell us why not? On the legal background, the advice of the Attorney-General and the mysterious political meetings and conversations noted in paragraphs 366 to 387 of the report of the noble Lord, Lord Butler, surely deserve further scrutiny. The availability and use of diplomatic reports and policy advice by experienced officials need to be examined. In 1982, following the invasion of the Falklands, there was a prompt inquiry by Lord Franks and six privy counsellors into the way in which the Government had carried out their responsibilities in the run-up to the war. The inquiry reported in six months. It made recommendations and commented on blame. Why is this inquiry not reporting on a similar timescale and with similar powers? Is it because the Prime Minister intends to drag out this Parliament for another year and has decided in advance that no one was to blame? In the Franks inquiry, the Prime Minister—the noble Baroness, Lady Thatcher—three other Prime Ministers, many Cabinet Ministers, civil servants, intelligence officers, MPs and journalists all gave evidence. Will this inquiry have legal powers to subpoena witnesses and submit them to detailed examination? I acknowledge that the Franks committee met in secret, but that was over 25 years ago. Some participants have published memoirs, some have signed lucrative contracts to publish memoirs and others have spoken freely to journalists and authors. In this age of so-called democratic renewal, should the presumption not be that, except where national security is involved, the inquiry should be in public? It would be churlish not to welcome this inquiry simply because it is overdue. Its terms of reference need further work and the Statement leaves questions still to answer. My noble friend Lord Fowler has tabled an important Motion for debate on Iraq on Thursday and I very much hope that the Minister who replies to that debate may be able to shed even more light on this process than can be done in the short time available today.