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National Security Strategy

My Lords, as always, I thank the Minister for repeating the Statement. We agree with the Government that there is no more important responsibility for government than national security, so we find it extraordinary that this Government have published the country’s first cybersecurity strategy and the 2009 update to the national security strategy by way of a Written Ministerial Statement. These have come after the strategies had first been trailed in the press in an extraordinary way. Indeed, I understand that in another place yesterday Mr Speaker made a Statement, his first after being elected, pointing out the importance of Ministers presenting to both Houses of Parliament changes in policy on important matters before trailing them in the press. It is only as a result of an Urgent Question from our Benches in another place that the Minister is before our House today and we have this somewhat limited opportunity to debate the strategies. By using a Written Ministerial Statement, the Government were, in effect, trying to ensure that both Houses of Parliament did not have the appropriate opportunity to discuss or debate the strategies. The Government are making much of their new cybersecurity strategy. Action in this crucial domain is due—indeed, long overdue. And what does it amount to? It includes the establishment of an office for cybersecurity in the Cabinet Office and the upgrading of an already existing unit in Cheltenham, which is to be called the cybersecurity operations centre. It is impossible to know, however, how significant these changes are, because we are not told what funding is being made available to enhance our ability to tackle cyberthreats. The Government’s special supplement on cybersecurity contains some figures as to the costs of cyberinsecurity to the nation, but we will have to wait until the autumn to know how much money the Government will devote to the tasks set out in the Statement. The Government also tell us that they are now giving leadership to this issue. But how does that square with using the gag of a D notice to stop us knowing who the new director is? I understand that, regardless of that, the name has been leaked. Cybercrime proceeds apace in the absence of cybersecurity. There is significant cybercrime in the United Kingdom. Many in this House will have had experience of it in relation to bank accounts, but the strategy has virtually nothing to say about the response. It simply tells us that the Association of Chief Police Officers will produce an anti-e-crime strategy later. I might say that at present the Metropolitan Police has a unit of 12 officers devoted to national e-crime. It is hardly surprising that it is difficult to get action when an e-crime is committed. We have a long way to go on this matter. There is some confusion about the way in which these structures will work and whether or not there is overlapping and overbureaucracy in all of this. Can the Minister assure this House that the Government have not set in place structures that will duplicate existing work on cybersecurity and information assurance? There seems to be a real risk of duplication, since other units appear to continue to do work in this area without being tied properly into the new structures. There are no efficiency savings here, it would seem. What do the Government mean when they say that the office for cybersecurity will be based initially in the Cabinet Office? What are the longer-term intentions? Clearly, the Government have missed an opportunity here to review more widely and make sense of the very muddled security structures that exist across Whitehall. The need to produce a substantial update to the national security strategy just over a year after publishing the first version is an admission that the Government’s first attempt was not actually a strategy, as it did not adequately set long-term direction for different departments and agencies. It remains to be seen what effect this update will have in the absence of a proper national security council with a dedicated staff and a proper national security budget. Indeed, we are also left waiting for a lot of detail on organised crime, maritime security and energy security, which are promised for later. Instead of saying what will be announced later, as the Minister repeating the Statement made clear, and coming back to the House again and again on other matters, the Government should have done the work first and should have been be able to tell us now how we are to proceed. Will there perhaps be a third update next year? In particular, will the Minister be more specific on when the energy strategy will be published? Will he say when the reviews of the organised crime strategy and the maritime threat will be completed and whether they will be published? In this House we have the opportunity by way of a Statement to have a few more minutes than were available in another place. It was regrettable that this matter could be debated in another place only by way of an Urgent Question, which is all too brief. I should be grateful if the Minister indicated that the Government would welcome an approach from the usual channels to ensure that there is a fuller opportunity to debate these matters on another day.