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Future of the Territorial Army

I first alerted Mr. Speaker that I would seek to catch his eye in this debate on Monday evening, after listening to the hon. Member for North-East Milton Keynes (Mr. Lancaster) and having had my own thoughts as I was doing so. However, developments have shot a major hole in the arguments that I had in my heart and mind at that time. Being a simple man—I am not stupid—I shall salvage what I was going to say and make a couple of simple points. I hope that it will take nothing like 15 minutes to do so, Mr. Deputy Speaker. Before those developments, I had intended to begin my speech by referring to a report entitled, "New Roles for the Reserve Forces" and I shall do so now. I wrote the report in November 1994 and presented it to the NATO Parliamentary Assembly, which accepted it in full. I pointed out a number of things in the report: that there were jobs that the reserves and Territorials could do that were not being done at the time; how they could fill in for the regular Army; the difficulty that reserve forces had in obtaining their release because employers were less than happy to let them go, for however short a period; and what a good job they could do. The report has been picked up over the years—not because I wrote it, but because it made sense. They have proved themselves well worth the confidence that has been placed in them. At that time, there was a major gap between the Terriers and the regulars. Many regulars looked on them as part-timers who would be more of a liability than an asset. Many of the part-time commissioned ranks were not readily allowed to take command of regular units. That has all changed. I have been to Afghanistan five times, and on three of those occasions the driving and protection units that took care of us were so-called part-timers, there for three or four months. They were so professional that it is difficult to describe. There was no difference between the full-time regulars and the Terriers. That happens because confidence has been built up throughout the units. It happens because those so-called part-timers have had the time to do the bonding necessary for the esprit de corps that we emphasise so strongly in all our regular units. They become regular units of their own kind. When the suggestion was made to reduce the ability to continue that bonding, I thought that it was bordering on the insane. I received an e-mail today from a constituent. His name is Ken Milner. I do not know him, but he lives in Lutton crescent in Billingham. He says:""Dear Sir"—" I do not know why he calls me sir, as most people do not afford me that kind of courtesy—""now the PM has done a u turn on this, if in fact he was ever driving it forward. You have to feel sorry for him at times? Could I ask you to still keep pushing the Government/MOD to be sensible!""The original decision affected 19,000 casual workers, if we were categorised as part time they would not have attempted it. But that will never happen, too expensive for the Country and then our Generals and Ministers would be restricted by employment Law.""We already do a lot in our own time at our own expense from the top to the bottom, from an Officer to a Recruit. But to expect a system to maintain a standard but not train is plain daft."" He then makes a nice point, saying:""A 5 a side football team would not lay off for six months and then be ready to play in a final."" That is an effective way of describing the situation that we were facing. I am pleased that the reversal has been made, but I want to consider why it came about. Who first dreamed up the idea, and for what motive? At first glance, it has the paw prints of accountants all over it—those who know the cost of everything and the value of nothing. For that reason, I look in the direction of the Treasury. Even if someone on the general staff made a detailed suggestion, it must have been motivated by pressure from elsewhere. That is not a healthy way to approach our defence. I make an appeal for all these matters to be considered in a non-partisan fashion. Defence is not a party political issue. When we consider defence, we are talking about lives—the lives of those whom we send to do our bidding, whether in this country or someone else's; the lives of those associated with them, their parents and kindred; and the lives of those with whom they might come into conflict. Our whole consideration should concern the degree to which we incur the cost of life, the spending of life and the wasting of life. I know that the Secretary of State must consider the economics of the situation. He talked today about options, and I listened to him, but although cash considerations might be important, they must be secondary. There is another matter that I must bring to the Government's attention. It is not a personal matter, but I must put it in almost personal terms: we heard of the importance of Afghanistan, and it is important that we achieve our goal there, although I am not talking about victories; there will be no victory in Afghanistan. There might be gain, and we might allow the Afghan Government to get their security forces into such a position and state that they can look after their own affairs—and the sooner that we can do that the better—but we will not do that by cutting the dedicated resources that we put into it. We need to increase, rather than reduce. We must ensure that we provide sufficient equipment and personnel. I had the privilege only five weeks ago of listening to Stanley McChrystal, who brought out his new ideas on how to attend to the Afghanistan problem. When he told me his ideas about treating the Afghan people, rather than the Afghan territory, and when he outlined the additional risk to our personnel that will be experienced there, I pointed out to him that I had been going there for some years and that I had heard David Richards, then McNeill when he took over from Richards, and then McKiernan when he took over from McNeill. I said, "Look General, it's all right you giving us this. You're selling this to me, and I can buy it. It makes sense. But what happens in 12 months' time when somebody else comes in with some new ideas?" He said, "No, that won't be the case. I'm going to be here in 12 months' time." I said, "But you've got a family to take care of." He said, "No, I'm here for as long as it takes, and so is Rodriguez," —one of his No. 2s—and so was his civilian aide, apparently. The whole situation there is changing in a crucial way. Initially, the risks will be higher. Our resources need to be stronger. More personnel are needed—and the determination must be more resolute. I tell the Ministry of Defence not to make again the same mistake it made this time. That mistake was in looking only at its fiscal assessments and what money it had to play with, rather than at the lives dependent on the money. Do not make that mistake. That is what accountants get paid for—and that is what they get cashiered for.