---

Future of the Territorial Army

This commitment to the armed forces, and the expenditure, have continued to increase, and I want to see that continue, to ensure that these proposals do not return once we get into the next financial year. The challenge that we are now leaving with the Ministers and the Treasury is to ensure that that does not happen. This was also a problem in the 1990s, and people might say that they did not like what happened in the '90s. This experiment was tried by the previous Government at that time, and it failed. It failed miserably because, as far as the TA is concerned, we cannot turn the tap on and off. To say, "We don't want you today, but we'll come back for you in six months" is totally unacceptable. We should have looked at the history and realised that, if the experiment did not work in the '90s, it will certainly not work now. There is a lesson for us all, especially the Ministers, to learn here. When these matters are put before us, let us just dust them down and remember what happened previously. I will explain what happened previously. A colleague of mine, Major Tom Ronagan, who is retiring a week on Thursday is the longest-serving major in the British Army. He joined as a boy soldier in 1962; he served in Aden right through to the Balkans; he is a major of 64th Sea Squadron Chorley Medical Regiment, formerly the King's Own Borderers, which has a great proud history. He said, "I saw this happen in the '90s. It was decimation. When the notice went out to say the TA cut was taking place, you could not keep up with the kit that was being thrown through the door at us." The then Government said, "We have got this wrong. We are changing our minds. We are going to put the money back into the TA." They ended up getting on the phone, ringing round to say "Please rejoin. Don't give up on the TA." Mistakes have been made in the past; those mistakes must never ever be made again. That is what we have to learn from this exercise; that is why it is so important to overcome political points scoring. I rightly challenged the Prime Minister to intervene personally; in fairness, the Prime Minister did. I pay my thanks to him, as he took the right decision. It is always interesting to look back in the light of mistakes. The late 1990s and the first decade of the 21st century have seen the TA assume an exceptionally high profile. It has moved from being a force of last resort to becoming the reserve of first choice in support of the regular Army. That is the key. The support the TA gives to the regular Army makes the concept of one Army so important: there is no difference between the Army in uniform and others training side by side. That concept has been badly dented, although I do not say destroyed. It has been badly affected. That is why it has to be rebuilt. Land Command has to realise that it is not a cheap shot to take on the TA when tough decisions have to be taken; it must not take this easy option again.