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Constitutional Reform

My Lords, it is a pleasure to follow my former colleague at the University of Hull, the noble Lord, Lord Parekh. Like him, I wish to call attention to a particular dichotomy. I have previously identified two types of constitutional changes: changes made to our constitutional framework and changes made within that framework. Changes made to our constitutional framework have been pronounced in recent years. They have been several and substantial. From the perspective of the constitution, they have also been incoherent: that is, they have derived from no clear view of the type of constitution deemed appropriate for the United Kingdom. Each has been justified on its individual merits and not set in a broader, intellectually coherent approach to constitutional change. We are therefore in something of a constitutional wilderness. I have previously made the case for the creation of a commission, or a committee, on the constitution, not for the purpose of crafting a new constitution for the United Kingdom but rather for making sense of where we are and for ensuring that proposals for further change are consistent with the essential principles that underpin our constitution. Reform should not be divorced from first principles. We keep hearing about the reform of your Lordships’ House—this has already been touched on—but reform is usually couched in specific terms, focusing primarily on composition, with no reference to first principles. We need to discuss this House in the context of Parliament and what we expect of Parliament in our constitutional arrangements. Discussing composition should be the end point, not the starting point, of a discussion about Parliament’s place in our polity. We should thus view with extreme caution calls for further major changes to the framework of the constitution. In many cases, they are contestable on their own merits. Some are lemon meringue reforms: that is, they appear superficially attractive, but when you bite into them, there is very little there. That applies not least to the arguments for electoral reform. What is more, demands for reform tend to divert us from the real, often messy, problems that face us and that permit of no clear-cut answers. There is scope for change in our existing constitutional framework. Our system is premised on a number of vital relationships, not least between the Executive and the legislature and between the legislature and the individual. For reasons of time, I shall focus on the former. We have seen a number of changes in recent years, which have been designed to enhance parliamentary scrutiny of legislation. Some of them have been very welcome, but Parliament, as the noble Lord, Lord Tyler, has already said, remains limited in the extent to which it can scrutinise legislation and call government to account. The Constitution Committee, in its 2004 report on Parliament and the Legislative Process, examined the process under the headings of pre-legislative scrutiny, legislative scrutiny and post-legislative scrutiny. Let me briefly identify some of the changes that we should pursue. For pre-legislative scrutiny, the publication of Bills in draft should be the norm and not the exception. It should be a matter for Parliament as to which are then subject to pre-legislative scrutiny. Once legislation is introduced, there are changes that we should make in this House. We are in danger of being left behind by the other place. Any Bill that starts its passage in this House and that is not subject to pre-legislative scrutiny should be referred to a special Public Bill Committee or a Select Committee. We already have provision for both; we should make greater use of it. For post-legislative scrutiny, there is case for a Joint Committee to ensure that no important review is overlooked—I very much welcome the movement now for post-legislative scrutiny—and to encourage best practice in the way in which reviews are conducted. Several other reforms could be made to strengthen Parliament in scrutinising legislation and calling government to account. The noble Lord, Lord Rooker, identified them in his splendid speech at the start of the Session; the noble Lord, Lord Tyler, has already referred to some of them. We should also review the processes by which we determine our own structures and procedures. There is a long way to go, but my point is that we can at least make progress in strengthening Parliament. Implementing reform to achieve that is both desirable and achievable. Let us focus on that, where there is a clear case to act, rather than be side-tracked by demands for wider constitutional change that detract from addressing the real issues that face this country. Let us craft the means to enable Parliament to call government to account in tackling those issues.