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EU: Codecision (EUC Report)

My Lords, the first page of the report notes that, ""interest in this House in our report may well be limited to those serving on our Committee and sub-committees"." That is unnecessarily modest. We in UKIP, at least, are always interested in evidence-based demonstrations of how weakened Parliament has become, and how power has drained, is draining and will continue to drain away from Westminster to the EU apparat in Brussels. This is confirmed repeatedly in the report, which goes into considerable detail to show how frustrating and difficult it is for the EU Select Committee and its sub-committees to fulfil their mandate. One brief illustration of this amused me: Sub-Committee E’s submission in answer to question 3: ""How does the Sub-Committee keep updated on progress in negotiations at each stage in the codecision procedure? We would normally do this informally, through contact at officials level, but also through the aforementioned requests to be kept informed … Is this effective? No"." Its answer to question 4— ""At each stage of the codecision procedure, does the Sub-Committee have access to the right documents to ensure that it is able to scrutinise effectively?"—" was, "No". Obviously there is a serious problem here. The report takes us through some of the tortuous procedures of Brussels bureaucracy that give rise to these problems. It has useful jargon-buster boxes to tell us how to navigate our way through the labyrinth and what is meant by first and second readings and by the oddly named "trialogues". These trialogues seem to consist of a representative of the relevant European Parliament committee, a member of the Commission and the presidency: a sort of mini politburo. Here I draw on the report of the European Scrutiny Committee of another place. Its most recent report, which was published on 6 January this year after the report by the noble Lord, Lord Roper, underlines the fact that no other member state is present at the "trialogue", so not only is it difficult for Governments to follow the course of trialogue negotiations and to express their views but: ""it is well nigh impossible for national parliaments to do so at any appropriate point"." The report goes on to say that neither the Council nor the European Parliament may change a text once it is agreed at one of these informal trialogues, and that the European Scrutiny Committee is not informed of trialogue changes until it is too late: once the negotiations are complete. This is no doubt what the Government refer to when, in their letter to the report, they unblushingly write: ""The report ... will I hope dispel some of the myths that the EU is not democratically accountable"." Quite. On democratic accountability, perhaps the Government should have looked at some of the evidence in the report. The noble Baroness, Lady Symons, took part in the examination of Richard Corbett MEP. I have always had a rather soft spot for the noble Baroness and I am sorry that she is not here. She once gave a poker-faced defence of the right of the Commission to legislate on the height and specifications of rocking horses. She was very good at that and she is very good now. On page 68 of the evidence, she said: ""We have gone through this enormously complex edifice and at every point my heart sinks as I recognise the dilution of the relationship between the electors and the decision takers ... but my goodness, you can see why people look at it and think "This is just not representing me. When I put my cross in that box, this was not what I meant, that this whole edifice would be elected"." The noble Baroness, Lady Symons, is absolutely right and has got it in one. People in this country want their elected MPs to make the laws that they have to obey, the laws that govern them. Elected MPs at least can be held to account by parliamentary scrutiny and at the ballot box. But that just cannot happen with European legislation which is born in Brussels, as the EU Select Committee and the Commons Scrutiny Committee make painfully clear. Is it surprising that people are getting increasingly and demonstrably frustrated and fed up with that sort of legislative process? That is one of the reasons—not the only reason, of course—why UKIP did so well in the European elections when it defeated the Government and the Liberal Democrats. Let us be clear: even if all the requests of the Government made in the report and in the speech made by the noble Lord, Lord Roper, were met—if documents arrived earlier, if committees were kept abreast of the secretive behind-the-doors deal-making in the trialogues, and if they were allowed sight of the limité documents—it would make very little difference. Scrutiny is only worth while if the scrutineers have teeth. But national parliaments and their scrutiny committees are toothless tabbies. They cannot do anything about EU legislation. As the Commons Scrutiny Committee report makes clear, reminding those of us who need reminding that the so-called extra power for national parliaments under the Lisbon treaty will make no practical difference whatever to the current position—that is, impotence. The report also points out that under the Lisbon treaty’s yellow and orange card procedures, ""the legislative decision on subsidiarity would continue to rest with the EU institutions"." The noble Lord, Lord Sewel, was rather optimistic about that. So far, so bad; but it gets worse. The scrutiny reserve is the bluntest of blunt knives. Eighteen months ago, in response to my Oral Question on the scrutiny reserve, the Government admitted to using the scrutiny override 435 times in four years. In spite of their promises to do better, according to the Commons report, the scrutiny override is still alive and well and living at Westminster. I am left with the conclusion that this report and the Commons report are just bleating about the consequences of Parliament’s deliberate actions. After all, successive Governments and successive Parliaments have repeatedly signed away powers to Brussels—the Single European Act, the Maastricht treaty, the Amsterdam treaty, the Nice treaty and the Lisbon treaty masquerading as the constitution. They all had parliamentary approval. There was an opportunity for a referendum on the Maastricht treaty, but it was lost. There was a promise of a referendum on the constitution, but when that was brought back as the Lisbon treaty the Government welched on their promise. So if Parliament and its scrutiny committees have a problem with parliamentary scrutiny, they must look in the mirror to see the source of that problem. Until Parliament reclaims its full powers these problems, which are set out clearly in this report, will remain and, I believe, will get worse. Your Lordships know that there is only one way to reclaim these powers. As a Eurorealist thorn in this bed of Europhile roses, they will know what that course is. I commend it most warmly to them.