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EU: Codecision (EUC Report)

My Lords, I have huge fellow feeling with the noble Lord, Lord Sewel. He explained the difficulty of following the noble Lord, Lord Roper; I have the difficulty of following the noble Lord, Lord Hannay of Chiswick. It is Scylla and Charybdis: repetition is boring, but by definition anything not said by the noble Lord, Lord Hannay, cannot be worth saying. I want to make three analytical points, which I think are quite big points, and then three small ones at the end. The nature of the European Parliament is changing quite fast. It began as a debating chamber, a place of resolutions, often on issues in which the then European Community had no role. It is turning rather rapidly into a serious legislature. The next step is what is just happening now with agriculture, fisheries and most of the Third Pillar—the interior, justice, law and home affairs sections—coming under codecision. Codecision is becoming the normal method, applying to 90 per cent of EU legislation. That is a good thing. Loose talk about the democratic deficits was never more than loose talk; the Council consists of the representatives of the elected Governments of the member states and is entirely democratically legitimate. Yet the democratic legitimacy of the process is undoubtedly enhanced by having the results of their negotiations tested by a directly elected and efficient parliamentary legislature. That is my first point; it is good news. We are dealing with the consequences for us of a development which is benign. I am determined to be both brief and benign in these remarks; benign will be my watchword throughout. It is a good development, but it all takes rather a long time. In the report there is an authoritative table, on page 87, provided by the Council Secretariat, which shows that the average time taken for a legislative proposal to move from the Commission’s original proposal through to a final agreement is about three years—years, not months. That must make the EU legislative process one of the most measured and deliberate in the world, which is probably a good thing in principle, but hardly practical. It does not make for efficiency. There is a sort of balance to be struck here, and three years seems a bit too long. It is not surprising, then, that dialogue between the Council and Parliament and an abbreviated procedure, with agreement at First Reading after about only one year, is increasingly being used. The same table shows about one year for legislation that goes through codecision and is agreed at First Reading. One year is not ludicrously rapid, and we need not criticise the European Parliament and the Council for speeding up the process in that way. Indeed, it seems to me to be a second good thing. The Council Secretariat’s table suggests that more than half—indeed, more than two-thirds—of legislation is now being settled in that way, by a deal between the institutions at First Reading. That seems to me very good. So, as we look at the complications for our process of scrutiny, we need to bear in mind that they arise as the result of two major advances: a democratic advance and an efficiency advance. My third point—which is, again, strictly analytical—is that as the European Parliament becomes a mature legislature, it is clear that it is not going to follow our Westminster model, but one much closer to the American model, the US Congress. On Capitol Hill, legislative debate in plenary session in the Senate or the House is set-piece theatre, for the most part. The real political work is done in committees. So it is at Strasbourg. Plenary debate is becoming much less important in the Parliament, and it is the committees that count. On Capitol Hill, the key to legislative influence is to capture the chairmanship of the key committees. So it is at Strasbourg: the rapporteurs who represent the Parliament in the trialogue with the Council and the Commission hold the real legislative power. It follows that there is a strong United Kingdom interest in British MEPs holding those jobs, which tend to be allocated in discussions between the big political families—the EDG, the EPP, the Liberals. Personally, as an analyst, I am puzzled that any great UK political party should choose to break its family ties at Strasbourg. Break-up means losing influence on EU legislation. I observe—again, in a wholly analytical, benign and apolitical spirit—that the reasons appear to be ideological, or perhaps theological, and therefore impervious to practical arguments of the kind I am advancing. I have to say, as benignly as I can manage, that such a rigid commitment to legislative impotence seems inimical to the UK interest. I quite understand why UKIP would not want to play much part in EU legislation. The noble Lord, Lord Willoughby de Broke, was eloquent in his disdain for the process and the product. I find it harder to see why the party of Plumb, Brittan, Howell, Soames, Major or Thatcher should adopt a position which, in effect if not in intention, seems to go in the same direction. That is the end of my apolitical, benign analysis. I now turn to three minor issues, on two of which I can be brief because they have already been well covered. First, the limité issue is a nonsense. I hope that the Minister will confirm that the House will be allowed to see limité documents. Secondly, we lag behind the Scandinavian parliaments, the French Sénat, the French Assemblée, the Bundestag and the Bundesrat in access to Council documents on the progress of codecision negotiations. These are quite important if we are going to hold the Government to their promise to keep us informed about the progress of a codecision negotiation. Our report suggests at paragraph 88 that this should be remedied. I hope that the Minister can tell us tonight that it will be. Finally, on the rules of the scrutiny game, there is an existential absurdity in not publishing the guidance. The purpose of scrutiny is to ensure that our interpretation of the public interest is fed into the Government at all stages. The Government have nothing to hide. The rules of the game are being improved. We are content that, provided the rules are properly applied, our concerns will be set at rest. I cannot see why it should be difficult to publish the guidance. It is a small absurdity, but I am sure that it is absurd. I hope that the Minister will agree tonight that it can be put right.