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Equality Bill

My Lords, I hope that the noble Baroness will not think me discourteous in saying that I think that her amendment is an oxymoron. It declares for the avoidance of doubt, but if it were enacted, although I know that it is only probing, it would increase rather than avoid doubt about the meaning of "religious", "philosophical" and "cult". Words are not like crystals, brittle, rigid and hard-edged. They are soft and flexible and convey shades of meaning that alter according to the context in which they are used. That is especially true of words such as "religion", "belief" and "philosophical belief", derived from international and European human rights instruments and our own constitutional and legal heritage. When those words are used in legislation, they have to be read and given effect in accordance with their proper meaning and effect and they have to be read compatibly with European law. It is for the courts and not politicians to interpret and apply them. Parliament could, of course, attempt to define their meaning, but it would have to do so in a way that did not violate the fundamental human right to freedom of religion and belief. That would be a hazardous undertaking, fraught with difficulty. Every established traditional religion was once regarded pejoratively as a cult by its opponents from other religions when it was struggling for recognition and acceptance for its beliefs and practices, whether the three Abrahamic religions of Judaism, Christianity and Islam, or non-theistic religions, such as Buddhism. Every organisation, religious as well as non-religious, may abuse its powers and tolerate or conceal evil and criminal practices, as recognised by Pope Benedict XVI’s pastoral letter of apology to the Catholics of Ireland about the abuse of children and vulnerable young people by priests and others. One person’s religion and belief may be another’s blasphemy or evil cult. According to medieval Roman Catholic doctrine, those who did not believe in the divinity of Jesus, or who contradicted Catholic dogma, or had not been baptised, were "infidels", put to death during the Crusades and the Spanish and Portuguese Inquisitions. There is still much intolerance within and across religions of all types. Those of us who are fortunate to live in modern democratic societies, whatever our faith or lack of it, are committed to a generous view of equality and personal liberty. The Strasbourg court explained in the case Kokkinakis v Greece: ""Freedom of thought, conscience and religion is one of the foundations of a democratic society within the meaning of the Convention. It is, in its religious dimension, one of the most vital elements that go to make up the identity of believers and their conception of life, but it is also a precious asset for atheists, agnostics, sceptics and the unconcerned. The pluralism indissociable from a democratic society, which has clearly been won over the centuries, depends on it"." In another case with an unpronounceable name, Leela Förderkreis EV v Germany, the Strasbourg court decided that the conception of the world of the Osho movement, formerly known as the Bhagwan Shree Rajneesh movement, founded by the Indian mystic Rajneesh Chandra Mohan, based on the idea of achieving transcendence, fell within the ambit of Article 9 of the convention, even though the group was commonly referred to as a sect. Of course, that did not mean that the group had absolute rights. The court upheld the German Government’s right to verify whether a movement or association carries on, ostensibly in pursuit of religious aims, activities that are harmful to the population or public safety; the Government were entitled, in Germany, to draw public attention to dangers emanating form such a group. The UN Human Rights Committee has explained, in its general comment on the equivalent of Article 9 of the convention that is in Article 18 of the covenant, that it, ""views with concern any tendency to discriminate against any religion or belief for any reason, including the fact that they are newly established, or represent religious minorities that may be the subject of hostility on the part of a predominant religious community"." Concepts such as—I say this humbly in the presence of the Lords spiritual—"religion" and "philosophical belief" are not capable of precise definition and the differences between them are not clear-cut. The Concise Oxford English Dictionary defines as the first meaning of "cult", ""a system of religious worship especially as expressed in ritual"." It defines "religion" as, ""belief in a superhuman controlling power, especially in a personal God or gods entitled to obedience and worship"." Buddhism, which falls outside that definition, is defined as, ""a widespread Asian religion or philosophy ... which teaches that elimination of the self and earthly desires is the highest goal"." Scientology is defined in the same dictionary as, ""a religious system based on self-improvement and promotion through grades of self-knowledge"." I have acted for the Church of Scientology, which is recognised as a religion in some European countries, such as Spain and Portugal, and some Commonwealth countries, such as Australia and New Zealand, and rejected by others. In this country it is treated at present, as a result of the decision of the Court of Appeal in Segerdal in 1970, not as a religion but as a system of philosophical belief. The word "cult" is not in the Bill. If the reference to "cult" in the amendment is meant to make it clear that the Bill does not protect organisations and their followers who engage in criminal or anti-social misconduct, that goes without saying, whether the organisation is Jewish or Muslim, the Catholic Church or, I dare say, the Church of Scientology. Using the word "cult" merely raises the question whether those who follow a particular creed or share a common belief are entitled to be protected from discriminatory treatment because they share a common religion or philosophical belief. That involves questions of fact to be decided not by politicians or Parliament but by courts in particular cases. For all those reasons, the amendment would not achieve the aim of its proposers, although I understand them. Whether one agrees with what is in the code is not what I am on about; I am concerned to establish that, were the amendment to be enacted, it would be a source of great uncertainty and would not fulfil the aim of its proposers. We would therefore be opposed to it.