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Constitutional Reform and Governance Bill

My Lords, this Bill falls way below its advance billing with which we were provided in July 2007. It fails to address the most important constitutional questions: funding of political parties, which I do not think has been mentioned today; strengthening the ability of the legislature to hold the Executive to account; the anomalies left by the devolution settlement; the composition and role of this House; and many more issues. Picking up the Shakespearean theme started originally by the noble Lord, Lord McNally, I compare this to the witches’ cauldron in Macbeth—lots of disparate things like, ""Eye of newt and toe of frog"," thrown into the pot, some of which will deserve to survive the wash-up, and some of which will not. However, this debate has served an important purpose: it has allowed those of us who will not be in the metaphorically smoke-filled rooms to mark the card of those who will be. I hope they will listen to the views we have expressed in deciding whether to allow something to go through or to perish. Like the noble Lord, Lord Maclennan of Rogart, I support a referendum on our voting system, but like him I also question the timing. The public have not been taken through the process in which we get to AV. There are many systems; people need to be taken through them more, and this process has been skipped. In my view, it would be better if after the election someone is commissioned to analyse the results and produce some view of what might have happened under these different systems, then people would have a clearer idea of what these different systems offer. I support the shortening of the 30-year rule. I suggested to the Dacre committee two years of release every year until the target time was hit. However, something has gone wrong with the drafting of Clauses 85 and 86 which even Andrew Phillips MHL has not spotted. There are in fact two 30-year rules: the time for transferring documents to the Public Record Office, and the time for which the FOI exemptions apply. In their response to Dacre, the Government said that the two procedures should be "concurrent"—in paragraph 36—but that the first moves to 20 years after a phased transition and the second moves to 20 years immediately. I think that it is a case of two different parts of Whitehall having got into muddle and needing to sort it out. An important proposal, about which many noble Lords have spoken, is placing the Civil Service on a legislative basis. The Northcote-Trevelyan report recommended this 150 or so years ago, saying that it could be accomplished in a "few clauses". This is precisely what we have. I would describe what is proposed as minimalist. That description should be regarded as a compliment, as it is precisely what the approach should be. It leaves most of the status quo unchanged. The Civil Service remains a professional career service recruited on merit and through competition. It serves the Government of the day, but stands ready to serve with equal commitment the Government of the next day. It is managed by a Minister for the Civil Service—a role which in practice is delegated to the Permanent Secretaries—and not by either Parliament or, as some have suggested, a board of governors of the great and the good. The Civil Service Commissioners are independent, appointed by the Queen. The Civil Service Code is not enshrined in the statute, but the statute lays down certain fundamental principles which it must embody. It describes in a better way than has been done previously the role that special advisers are allowed to play, but it does not set a limit on their numbers. That is the right approach, because I absolutely guarantee that, whatever limit one has set, there will that many special advisers immediately afterwards, and it would become an obstacle to efforts to reduce their number. Virtually all this is in the present understanding. If the Bill changes very little, what, some may ask, is the point? The point is that it entrenches the existing arrangements which have served this country well for 150 years. It does not, however, freeze the development of the Civil Service. If the Government want to make a change— for example, and I would not recommend it, to allow Ministers to appoint their own senior officials—they can do so, but only by bringing that proposal to Parliament and seeking approval. It is often said that the Civil Service is being politicised. Could it mean that people are being appointed for their political views? There is no evidence of this; indeed, the Civil Service Commissioners are involved in more senior appointments than used to be the case. Does it mean that civil servants have become too pally, too partisan? They are occasionally, but usually such cases are addressed, as in the case of Damian McBride, who was basically thrown out of the Civil Service and told to become a "spad". The real issue is that some of the work of the Civil Service, particularly policy advice and communications, has been diverted down political channels; that is, Ministers and their special advisers. We have an opportunity to reaffirm the long-standing relationships and safeguards around the Civil Service. Should we take it, even it is not perfect? The principle of legislation has been on the agenda for 150 years. Specific drafts of these clauses to put it into effect have been in the public domain and been discussed, particularly in the Public Administration Select Committee in another place, for more than a decade. So this is not of those Johnny-come-lately proposals. There are issues to refine in the proposals, some of which my noble friend Lord Wilson listed. I would support such refinements if opportunity allowed. However, my advice is to capture and enact what is before us, even if much of the rest of the Bill is jettisoned, because I fear that it may be some time before we have another opportunity.