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Gulf War: Veterans

My Lords, we are met to debate the importance of the landmark findings of US congressionally-mandated research on Gulf War illnesses for many thousands of British veterans of the conflict now in broken health, many of them terminally ill, who were prepared to lay down their lives in the most toxic war in western military history, and the bereaved families of those who did so. I have interests to declare, not pecuniary, as honorary parliamentary adviser to the Royal British Legion, the authentic voice of the ex-service community; as vice-president of the War Widows’ Association; and, uniquely for a non-American, as a co-opted member of the United States Congressional Committee of Inquiry into Gulf War Illnesses, whose deliberations led to federal funding of the Research Advisory Committee whose findings we are here to debate. I want also at the outset today to thank most warmly the noble Lords who will follow me in this debate. I know that they share my deep sadness at the passing of Lady Park of Monmouth, who spoke in almost all our debates on Gulf War illnesses before today. We have lost a valiant and much loved friend. The House knows of my regard for my noble friend Lord Tunnicliffe and for my noble friend Lady Taylor, who would be here but for a ministerial commitment abroad. She was described by veterans as the first Defence Minster ever to make an unreserved apology for unacceptable treatment of a Gulf War veteran after I had put it to her on 10 December 2007: "““Is it not shaming that wrangling with veterans over pensions still drags on, 17 years after the conflict, and that it has now engulfed so grievously Terry Walker, who had his pension cut from 100 per cent to 40 per cent shortly before he died, leaving his two orphaned children in poverty? How can any apology ameliorate the depth of distress caused by the handling of his case?””." My noble friend’s response was immediate and forthright. She said, "““no apology can make amends for what happened. Great distress was caused to the family””—[Official Report, 10/12/07; cols. 5-6.]—" and she went on to speak of interim help the family could be given, including payment for Terry’s funeral expenses. Yet the anguish and often anger of Gulf War veterans trying to cope with medically unexplained illnesses was not assuaged. A great many of them backed the remonstration of Flight Lieutenant John Nicol, whose bravery under torture in Iraq in 1991 was seen on TV screens across the world when he protested, "““we weren’t the enemy but that’s exactly how Gulf veterans have been made to feel by the MoD””." Samantha Thompson, the widow of a Gulf War veteran was no less pointed in stating that she and her seven year-old daughter would have been, "““far better treated had her husband been in the United States and not the British Armed Forces””," and she was strongly backed by Brigadier Ian Townsend, the then secretary-general of the Royal British Legion, who told the Legion’s annual conference in 2004 that, "““14 years on Gulf veterans with medically unexplained illnesses and the dependants of those who have died are still cruelly locked in a long hard battle with the MoD””." Just as British troops now serving with such valour in Afghanistan knew before they were deployed of the hazards that they would face, so too their predecessors in the Gulf War were aware of dangers facing them in 1990-91. They were the first British troops since 1918 to confront an enemy known not only to possess but to have used chemical weapons, as Saddam Hussein had done both in Iran and against many thousands of his own citizens in the massacre at Halabja. What our troops deploying to the Gulf did not know was that many thousands of them would be exposed to sarin from the fall-out when Hussein's chemical weapons storage plant at Khamisiyah in southern Iraq was totally destroyed by US bombing in March 1991. Nor did they know the health consequences of the pyridostigmine bromide used in the NAPS tablets they were given as an antidote to biological agents; or of the heavy use of organophosphates in spraying their tents to prevent fly-borne diseases. Professor Malcolm Cooper, president of the National Gulf Veterans and Families Association, set out in a recent paper hazards faced by our troops deploying to the first Gulf conflict. Time restriction makes it impossible for me to refer to all of them in this debate, but I will copy the paper to my noble friend for a reply in writing to points not addressed this afternoon. Nor is there time now to quote all the ministerial replies to questions tabled by noble Lords about the MoD's refusal to consider the implications of the RAC's report for British veterans, even its damning findings on the real, serious and potentially deadly effects of neurotoxic exposures. What all the replies amounted to was a claim that in November 2008, the then US Secretary of Veterans Affairs referred the RAC's report to the US Institute of Medicine for peer review; that the IoM would be publishing the outcome of the review in February 2010; and a repetitive insistence that the MoD could not consider any possible implications of the RAC's findings until then. This was the constant refrain despite my having quoted to Defence Ministers a letter sent to me last June by Roberta Wedge, the IoM's senior programs officer, stating that the Secretary of Veterans Affairs had not referred the RAC's report to the IoM. She has since made this utterly clear also in evidence on the record to the US Congressional Sub-committee on Oversights and Investigations, chaired by Congressman Harry Mitchell, with whom I have corresponded directly. Roberta Wedge’s letter also stated categorically that the IoM had not been, and would not be, peer-reviewing the RAC's report; and that it was grossly misleading to contradict this and to claim that the IoM would be publishing the outcome in February 2010. What in fact happened in November 2008 was that, while the then Secretary of Veterans Affairs in the Bush Administration announced that he was referring the RAC's report to the IoM for peer review, he did no such thing. In any case, it would have been both absurd and constitutionally highly questionable for the IoM to review a report from the congressionally-mandated committee described on high medical authority as, "““packed with eminent medical scientists, all leaders in their fields, and based on 1,840 scientific communications, the vast majority of which had appeared in peer-reviewed journals, most of the remainder having been included because of the high repute and eminence of their authors””." What is hard for veterans to forgive now is the repetition of errors that a single telephone call could have corrected. Of course, February 2010 has come and gone, and time has falsified the replies given to noble Lords over the 18 months since the RAC's report was published. This is why there is such determination now, all across the ex-service community, to prevent further delay in addressing the implications of the RAC's report for British veterans. Thus, it would be helpful if my noble friend could make a start today by providing the MoD’s figures for the number of British veterans exposed to organophosphates and to Sarin from the fall-out at Khamisiyah; how many were given NAPS tablets, and how many in each case have still undiagnosed illnesses. In sharp contrast to how British veterans fared in striving to have the RAC’s findings considered, the new US Administration have taken major initiatives to start giving them effect. General Eric Shinseki, the new Secretary of Veterans Affairs, ordered an urgent review of the files of thousands of Gulf War veterans to see whether their claims for disability pensions were wrongfully decided. He published a statement entitled Comprehensive Approach to Delivering Care and Benefits for Veterans and spoke of, "““challenging all the assumptions made for 20 years””." More recently, he announced recognition by the Department of Veterans Affairs of presumptive illnesses and said: "““This will be the beginning of historic change for how the VA considers Gulf War veterans’ illnesses””." In an authoritative message from Washington yesterday, I was told that while the IoM will release a comment on 9 April, it will not review the RAC’s report, and Secretary Shinseki has made clear that he has not been and is not waiting for any comments from the IoM. Rather, he has carefully studied the RAC’s findings and has acted. So must we. None of us here, least of all my noble friend, wants to see the afflicted and bereaved of the first Gulf conflict made to suffer the strain and hurtful and demeaning indignities of still further delay in reaching closure on their anxious concerns. Of all the duties that fall to parliamentarians, their priority of priorities must be to act justly to those who, alone in this country, contract with the state to lay down their lives in its service. There was no delay in the response of our troops to the call of duty in 1991, nor must there be any further delay now, in this 20th year since the conflict, in discharging in full our debt of honour to them. No one has done more to honour that debt than James Binns, who chaired the RAC with such humanity, excelling integrity and unswerving dedication. He deserves well of service and ex-service communities everywhere and stands high in my gallery of heroes and heroines, among them my noble and learned friend Lord Lloyd, my noble and gallant friend Lord Craig, and the late Daphne Park.