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Budget Responsibility and National Audit Bill [Lords]

I welcome that helpful intervention. My hon. Friend will no doubt be aware that the Treasury Committee inquiry into the OBR described Sir Alan Budd as an ““exemplary”” witness. In putting together this Bill, we took on board the Committee's points, and I am sure my hon. Friend will be happy about the unprecedented role the Committee will play in appointments to the OBR. The final task of the interim office was to provide advice on how the permanent, statutory OBR should be established. I am happy to report to the House that the Bill is designed in line with the detailed recommendations made by Sir Alan Budd in his letter to my right hon. Friend the Chancellor. We have now moved to permanent arrangements. This Bill enshrines in statute provisions to ensure the OBR's independence. Robert Chote has been appointed as the OBR's first permanent chair. His appointment was confirmed by the Treasury Committee. He is supported by Graham Parker and Steven Nickell, whose appointments were also confirmed by the Committee. The permanent Budget responsibility committee led on the production of the OBR's economic and fiscal outlook, published in November. In addition, the resources made available to the OBR have been increased. There has been a transfer of technical forecasting capacity from the Treasury to the OBR, and a transparent, multi-year funding settlement has been agreed for the spending review period. The OBR has also moved to a new external location outside the Treasury building. Let me now turn to the detail of the Bill. We debate this Bill after the constructive scrutiny the other place has given it. The other place welcomed the Bill. Part 1 includes provisions on the new framework for fiscal policy. Clause 1 sets out the need for the Treasury to produce a charter for Budget responsibility setting out the formulation and implementation of fiscal policy. In particular, the charter will set out the Government's fiscal objectives and the fiscal mandate, and a draft of the charter is available to Members alongside the Bill. Clause 2 requires the Treasury to produce a Budget document on an annual basis. The detail of exactly what needs to be covered within the annual Budget document is set out in the charter. The Bill also repeals the legislative aspects of previous Governments' fiscal frameworks, including the Fiscal Responsibility Act 2010, a pointless piece of declaratory legislation that would have made no improvement in fiscal planning, instead merely setting up another set of targets that Ministers would assure us they were going to meet right up until they missed them. Clause 3 provides for the existence of a statutory body called the Office for Budget Responsibility. Clause 4 sets out the main duty of the OBR, which is to examine and report on the sustainability of the public finances. This is a broad remit, which means that the OBR will not be limited to forecasting alone. At a minimum, the remit of the OBR means it must produce the following: assessments of the likelihood that the Government will meet their fiscal mandate alongside each forecast; a sustainability report at least once a year; a report on the accuracy of its forecasts at least once a year; and full economic and fiscal forecasts at least twice each year. Beyond these tasks, the OBR will be able to undertake any research and analysis pursuant to its remit. Clause 5 describes how the OBR is to fulfil its duties. Crucially, it includes a set of principles—objectivity, impartiality and transparency—to guide the OBR in fulfilling its remit. It also requires that the OBR must not analyse or develop non-Government policies. Analysis is rightly the domain of the OBR, but, as I have said, policy making is the responsibility of publicly elected Ministers. These principles protect independence. Clauses 5 and 9 also put in place explicit provisions for the OBR to have complete discretion over the way it carries out its statutory duties, giving it full access to the information it requires to do so. The remaining clauses in part 1, as well as schedule 1, set out further detail of the operation and governance of the OBR. We have sought to reflect the theme of independence in the constitution and governance of the OBR. In line with the recommendation of the International Monetary Fund, the OBR is established with its own legal personality and will operate at arm's length from Ministers as an executive non-departmental public body. The OBR's executive functions will be undertaken by a three-person Budget responsibility committee. The members of this committee will be appointed by the Chancellor. To support independence, the Bill makes provision for the Treasury Committee to veto all appointments and dismissals. That statutory veto bestows on the Committee more power than it has over any other public appointment. The Chancellor has said that he is giving the Committee this veto to ensure that there is no doubt that the individuals leading the OBR are independent and have the support and approval of the Committee. A chairman will lead the BRC and run the OBR. All staff will report to the chair, and that person will control the ““hiring and firing”” of the staff. The staff will be civil servants, ensuring the OBR can recruit from the widest possible pool of expertise. There will also be at least two non-executive members, to provide support and challenge to the OBR. The non-execs will report on how the OBR performs its duty. They will also commission expert peer review of the OBR's forecast and analysis. The OBR will report directly to Parliament, with its forecasts and reports laid directly in the House, as was the case with the autumn forecast in November 2010. Written questions from Members will be passed to the OBR to respond to, and the members of the BRC will be available for Select Committee scrutiny. The provisions in part 1 represent a permanent improvement to economic policy making and the transparency of government. Britain is now one of the first advanced economies to have an independent fiscal agency that produces official fiscal and economic forecasts. It is therefore no surprise that these reforms have attracted praise from the IMF, and they put us at the cutting edge of international best practice. I hope that the world will look with interest at our policy innovations. Part 2 modernises the governance of the National Audit Office. The goal of the NAO is to maintain effective independent oversight of spending. The Bill's provisions will strengthen the NAO at this critical time of scarce public resources. Members will be aware that very similar provisions were included in the previous Government's Constitutional Reform and Governance Bill, which passed through this House with cross-party support. However, there was no time for the other place to consider those provisions at the end of the last Parliament, and this Bill represents the earliest opportunity to bring them back before Parliament. The provisions are aimed at implementing the recommendations made by the Public Accounts Commission following its review of NAO corporate governance. As a result of this Bill, the office of the Comptroller and Auditor General will continue to exist; the CAG will be an independent officer of this House and will be limited to a single 10-year term. The NAO will be established as a new corporate body in its own right. I do not propose to go into great detail on those provisions, given that when they were discussed during the passage of the Constitutional Reform and Governance Bill the then Chairs of both the Public Accounts Commission and the Public Accounts Committee supported them. I also understand that the new Chair of the Public Accounts Committee has indicated that she is content. In summary, the provisions in this Bill will bring confidence and responsibility back to our country's fiscal framework, with stronger institutions and improved governance. They are as crucial for the long term as they are for the short term, and I commend the Bill to the House.