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Parliamentary Voting System and Constituencies Bill

My Lords, these amendments relate to amendments that were moved by the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, on Report. The House will be aware that the Members of the other place disagreed with them. The purpose of the amendments is to allow the Boundary Commissions to propose constituencies at plus or minus 7.5 per cent of the electoral quota where they consider that there are exceptionally compelling geographical circumstances or local ties. The Government remain of the view that these amendments should not form part of the Bill. A clear and unequivocal view was expressed in the other place on the matter, which is fundamentally about arrangements for elections to that House. The argument advanced by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Lloyd of Berwick, in the previous debate has an equally persuasive force in this debate, too. The issue of variation from absolute parity dominated many of our debates throughout our deliberations and in quite a lot of other discussions. I believe that the House has performed an important role in focusing on the issue and indeed in trying to find some way that might command support on all sides of the House. The House made an exception in the case of the Isle of Wight and the Government have accepted that. However, it is important to make a distinction between the exceptions to the parity rule in the Bill that Parliament has decided should be exceptions—the Orkney and Shetland seat, the Western Isles seat and now the Isle and Wight seat—and the exceptions from the parity rule that would be determined by the Boundary Commissions. It might be helpful if I set out the Government’s objection to the amendment. The Government’s proposal, as I have indicated, is for a 5 per cent range on either side of the UK electoral quota. That, of course, means a band of 10 per cent. We believe that that band has a clear rationale. It is the closest that we can get to achieving equality; I think that everyone recognises that absolute equality and no flexibility whatever would not be a proper way of proceeding. We believe that a 5 per cent range on either side is a way in which we can achieve equality in the weight of the vote and an equal say for voters in the outcome of a general election and at the same time allow the Boundary Commissions, particularly the Boundary Commission for England, to continue their practice of using wards as the building blocks of constituencies. Let us remind ourselves that wards are drawn up with local factors in mind. We have had many debates about their importance in this regard and it would be unfortunate not to mention in this final set of debates Professor Ron Johnston, who has been quoted considerably. We will give him another airing. In his contribution in his first evidence session before the Political and Constitutional Reform Committee, he noted that much local political activity and engagement is based on the ward structure. The secretary to the Boundary Commission for England, in his evidence to that same committee, said that under the rules in the Bill it would be possible to allocate constituencies using wards in the majority of cases. While an absolute prohibition on splitting wards would not be appropriate, not least because in some cities the wards are so large that it might make more sense for local communities to be divided, we accepted arguments made in this House that the commissions should be explicitly empowered to take wards into account. Indeed, we tabled an amendment to that effect. As I indicated, wards offer a clear rationale for striking a balance between the competing principles of one elector, one vote and local flexibility at 5 per cent of the quota. The figure of 7.5 per cent lacks that objective rationale and would increase the variation that was permitted, compromising more the principle of equally weighted votes in doing so. In particular, it is worth remembering that a 7.5 per cent variation on either side would not resolve the issue of the exceptional constituencies that has been raised in a number of our debates. It would not preserve the Argyll and Bute constituency and it would not guarantee the Tamar as a border, the borders of historic counties or the Isle of Wight comprising whole constituencies. In debates, your Lordships concluded that there was a special case for treating the Isle of Wight as an island constituency. At the time, the Government expressed a different view, but we have now recognised the strength of cross-party support and have brought forward provisions to treat the island in a manner that is consistent with other island exceptions in the Bill. Therefore, Parliament, as I have indicated, has concluded that the Isle of Wight is a special case. We believe that that is the right approach. The alternative approach before us would place the decision in the hands of the Boundary Commissions and open the door to further variations in a way that could cause practical difficulties for the review. We do not agree that the use of discretion will be as unusual as perhaps some of those who support the amendment think it might be. The noble Lord, Lord Pannick, sought to reassure us on this point on Report and has drafted the amendment with the benefit of his considerable expertise and in such a way as to protect commissions from successful judicial review. However, that is not the same thing as limiting the use of the discretion, as those who have practical experience of the way in which reviews operate and of the role played by political parties would testify. The flaws in the 1986 legislation and the merits of the rules in the Bill as drafted were set out clearly in the British Academy report on the Bill. Those experts, who have the benefit of many years of practical experience in these matters, said that, "““the rules set out in the Bill are a very substantial improvement on those currently implemented by the Boundary Commissions (they have a clear hierarchy and are not contradictory)””." Our concern is that, at a stroke, the clarity and fairness of the rules would be undone by this amendment, since theoretically there could be 600 claims for exceptional local ties. Even if there were not 600 claims, one could still anticipate a considerable number. In at least one part of the debate yesterday in the other place, one could already hear some of the arguments that were beginning to be worked up. Local ties are genuinely important to communities. That is why, within the 10 per cent range that is provided for in the Bill, the Boundary Commissions can take them into account, as they always have. However, we all know, and the evidence is clear, that these are the means by which parties disguise arguments in their electoral interests. As we know from Professor Ron Johnston’s evidence to the Political and Constitutional Reform Committee in October last year, these inquiries were ““dominated by political parties”” and, "““very largely an exercise in allowing the political parties to seek influence over the Commission’s recommendations””." There is also the risk of complex and often unknown knock-on effects; I think I described some of them when we debated this on Report. The knock-on effect of flexibility is applied, and not necessarily to the immediately neighbouring constituency. Again, I reference Professor Johnston, who has many years of experience in this. When studying the practical impact of the rules in the 1986 Act, he noted that it would be a problem, especially if the Boundary Commission proposed constituencies for an area within the 5 per cent constraint and then someone came up with an extremely compelling argument for 7.5 per cent, and that the knock-on consequences could ripple right through a region, indeed right through a country. He said that the Boundary Commission would then have to re-jig all the constituencies in that region, which would undoubtedly delay the process. Would they make the deadline? To those who argue that the same argument applies to a 5 per cent band of tolerance as it does to 7.5 per cent, I would say that that is true up to a point, but the Government propose from the outset that all areas will be treated the same and that the options for boundaries in a specific locality will therefore be available to all those involved. If a change is made, particularly at later stages, under our rules it would still fall within the original 95 to 105 per cent range, but that would not be the case if a knock-on effect arose from a tolerance of up to 7.5 per cent in exceptional circumstances, because by doing that the envelope would be made smaller in some respects and the other constituencies would have to fit into that smaller envelope. There is also an important distinction of principle to be made. The amendment asks the commissions to create a special band of electors who are outside the rules that apply to everyone else and whose votes might therefore carry more or less weight than elsewhere. That stands in contrast, as I have indicated, to the approach that has been put forward by the Government, which ensures that the overwhelming majority of UK parliamentary constituencies are treated on an equal footing, except those exceptions that Parliament has decided—the ones originally in the Bill and the one proposed by this House on the Isle of Wight, which has been accepted by the Government and voted for in the other place. In conclusion, I believe that our House has had the opportunity to consider the amendment put forward by the noble Lord, Lord Pannick. It has been an important issue. The noble Lord, Lord Pannick, I think, would acknowledge that quite a lot of effort was made to see whether we could find a way forward. In that respect, a considerable amount of work was done—not only during the passage of the Bill through your Lordships’ House—in response to your Lordships’ clear views. The other place has also now had the opportunity to consider this amendment. A clear view has been expressed in the other place. Members of the other place have considered this and there were majorities of 67 and 71 respectively rejecting these amendments. The other place has expressed a clear view on these matters, which relate to its function and its membership. Your Lordships’ House asked it to think again. It has done so. I therefore urge caution before we ask it to consider the issue once more. I beg to move. Amendment B1 to Motion B Moved by