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Rail Engineering (Jobs)

I will explain, but first I will give another example of what I found among ex-Jarvis workers. We met workers who are now touring the country picking up days of work. These are skilled engineers, but some of them are unable to afford proper accommodation because they are now agency workers on low wages and are having to sleep in cars and vans so that they can pick up a day's work wherever they can. Let me explain what happened, because lessons need to be learned from what happened for the future of rail engineering in this country. Jarvis's bankruptcy did not need to happen. It was forced into administration because Network Rail deferred renewals work to comply with the Office of Rail Regulation's decree that it needed to make a 21% saving over the five-year control period 2009 to 2014. Jarvis's bankruptcy was not the result of the recession. Despite the cash-flow problems, it had £100 million-worth of work on its order book. My hon. Friend the Member for Islington North (Jeremy Corbyn) referred to the fact that Network Rail refused a rescue plan from the administrator for Jarvis's rail division. The administrator put forward a proposal for a £19 million investment to cover the running costs and wages for a couple of months of operation, which would have enabled the staff of Jarvis to be transferred in an orderly way to other companies that were picking up the Jarvis contracts. That was rejected by Network Rail, and the Government refused to intervene and use their legal powers under the Railways Act 2005 to treat Jarvis's work as an essential railway activity, as that would have allowed them to step in and protect the work and the workers themselves. We now know from freedom of information requests that the Government knew months in advance of Jarvis's imminent crash. The lesson is that we must never again allow the failure of one company to put railway engineering at risk in this way, because the results of this fiasco are horrendous. One year on, the majority of the ex-Jarvis workers are still on the dole and Network Rail is re-letting former Jarvis contracts to agency labour. We are discovering exploitative wages and conditions. Even if ex-Jarvis workers have followed their work, they have moved across to inferior terms and conditions. There is now a fear about the commitment and quality of the work being done by the agency work force. The irony is that we now know from Deloitte, which communicated this to Jarvis's creditors, that the book value of the rail debts that were written off was £10.7 million, and the vast majority of the amount that was written off was owed to Network Rail. If we add to that the cost of redundancy, which fell on the taxpayer because the staff were not transferred under TUPE, and the drain on the staff funds of the benefit payments for the unemployed workers, we find that the overall cost of allowing Jarvis to collapse into administration in this way outweighs the £19 million cost of the rescue plan that the administrator proposed. It was a false economy not to accept the rescue plan, and it had a tragic outcome for the workers. There is also a longer-term cost that threatens the future of the rail industry and safe transport, because we are undermining the rail engineering skills base that we developed over two centuries. One of our concerns is that we have a demoralised work force, many of them unemployed, and that insecure work is being offered to agency workers with no stable future. We seem also to have undermined the attraction of a career in rail engineering, thereby jeopardising the recruitment of a future generation of rail engineering workers.