---

Nuclear Deterrent

With permission, Mr Speaker, I should like to make a statement on our nuclear deterrent programme. The House will be aware that we have been considering the next stage of investment—called initial gate—in the programme to deliver a successor to our current nuclear deterrent. This is the point in the Ministry of Defence's procurement cycle at which we decide on broad design parameters, set out our plans for detailed system assessment and order any long lead items that might be required. Taking this action enables us to be sure that we will make the right decisions at the key investment stage, at the main gate, which for this submarine programme will be in 2016. I am announcing today that we have approved the initial gate investment and selected a submarine design that will be powered by a new generation of nuclear propulsion system—the pressurised water reactor 3—that will allow our submarines to deliver our nuclear deterrent capability well into the 2060s if required. At this milestone in the project, I think it is useful for me to remind the House of this Government's policy on the nuclear deterrent. The first duty of any Government is to ensure the security of their people. The nuclear deterrent provides the ultimate guarantee of our national security, and for the past 42 years the Royal Navy has successfully operated continuous deterrent patrols to ensure just that. I pay tribute to the crews and support staff who ensure the continued success of deterrent operations, and I extend that tribute to the families of all those personnel, many of whom are regularly away from home for long periods. We assess that no state currently has both the intent and the capability to threaten the independence or integrity of the United Kingdom, but we cannot dismiss the possibility that a major direct nuclear threat to the UK might re-emerge. We simply do not know how the international environment will change in the next few years, let alone the next 50 years; and as this House concluded in 2007 when it voted on whether the UK should start a programme to renew the deterrent, the time is simply not right to do away with it unilaterally. That is not to say that if the time is right we will not move away from nuclear weapons at some time in the future. Our long-term goal remains a world without them, and we are doing all we can to counter proliferation, to make progress on multilateral disarmament, and to build trust and confidence with nations across the globe. In this spirit, as part of the value-for-money study we reviewed carefully how we manage our deterrent programme, and concluded that we could take significant steps to demonstrate our commitment to disarmament: by reducing the number of warheads carried on each deterrent submarine from no more than 48 to no more than 40; by consequently reducing our overall stockpile of nuclear weapons from no more than 225 to no more than 180 in due course; and by giving a stronger assurance to non-nuclear weapon states in compliance with the nuclear non-proliferation treaty. The value-for-money study delivered £3 billion of savings and deferrals over the next 10 years. The coalition agreement reflected both coalition parties' commitment to a minimum credible nuclear deterrent, but also the desire of the Liberal Democrats to make the case for alternatives. As Secretary of State for Defence, I am absolutely clear that a minimum nuclear deterrent based on the Trident missile delivery system and continuous at-sea deterrence is right for the United Kingdom and that it should be maintained, and that remains Government policy; but to assist the Liberal Democrats in making the case for alternatives, I am also announcing today the initiation of a study to review the costs, feasibility and credibility of alternative systems and postures. The study will be led by Cabinet Office officials overseen by the Minister for the Armed Forces. A copy of the terms of reference of the study will be placed in the House of Commons Library. As I have said, the Government have approved the initial gate for the nuclear deterrent successor programme. We have now agreed the broad outline design of the submarine, made some of the design choices—including the propulsion system and the common US-UK missile compartment—and the programme of work we need to start building the first submarine after 2016. We have also agreed the amount of material and parts we will need to buy in advance of the main investment decision. We expect the next phase of work to cost in the region of £3 billion. That is a significant sum, but I am confident that it represents value for money for the taxpayer, as every aspect of the programme has been carefully reviewed by MOD, Treasury and Cabinet Office officials. It will fund the programme that we need to conduct to make sure that we can bring the submarines into service on time. Overall, we assess that the submarine element of the programme will still cost within the £11 billion to £14 billion estimate set out in the 2006 White Paper, but these costs were estimated at 2006 prices, of course, and did not account for inflation. The equivalent sum today is £20 billion to £25 billion at out-turn, but it is important to recognise that there has been no cost growth in the programme since the House first considered the findings of the White Paper. Between now and main gate we expect to spend about 15% of the total value of the programme. That is entirely consistent with defence procurement guidance. The cost of long lead items is expected to amount to about £500 million, but it is not true to say that large parts of the build programme will have been completed by main gate. Although we are ordering some of the specialist components, that does not mean that we are locked into any particular strategy before main gate in 2016. I would like to focus for a moment on the matter of nuclear safety. There has been some ill-informed comment suggesting that our nuclear propulsion systems are not safe. That is simply not true. All our nuclear propulsion plants meet the stringent safety standards set out by the defence nuclear safety regulator and the Health and Safety Executive. However, we are developing a new design of submarine, and it is right that we take advantage of the opportunity that that affords to advance our policy of seeking continual improvement of nuclear safety. A new propulsion plant allows us to do that while also giving us the opportunity to improve the availability of propulsion systems and lower through-life support costs. I have announced a major step forward in this programme. We have some of the finest submarine builders in the world, and the approval of the next phase of work in the programme will secure the jobs of the highly skilled and professional work force already involved in it, as well as providing further opportunities for the engineers and apprentices of the future. However, both my Department and industry will have much to do to deliver this programme and to ensure both that we continue to maintain the sustainability of the submarine industry and that we improve performance and drive costs down through more efficient and inclusive working. I am confident that all sides will respond to this challenge. This is a programme of great national importance, so today I am placing in the Library of the House a report that sets out in detail the work that has been completed so far, the key decisions that I have presented to the House today, and the work that is required over the coming months and years. I believe that the decisions we have taken on our nuclear deterrent programme at initial gate are the right decisions for the country and that, as a result, future generations will continue to benefit from the security we have been so fortunate to enjoy.