---

The Riots

I am pleased to have the opportunity to speak on a subject that has rightly attracted a great deal of attention and comment. I congratulate the hon. Member for Croydon Central (Gavin Barwell) on securing the debate, and on his speech, which demonstrated a thoughtful, serious and insightful analysis, almost all of which I agree with—I hope that that does not embarrass him. The three issues that I intend to cover are the causes of the riots, the immediate response by the police, emergency services and other public authorities, as well as the general public, and longer-term considerations, including measures that might help to prevent a repetition. I shall start with the causes, and the factors that contributed to the worst outbreak of civil disturbance that the country has experienced in at least 30 years. In the immediate aftermath of the riots, we heard some over-confident and sometimes simplistic analyses of the causes. The hon. Gentleman rightly illustrated the fact that the extent to which people wanted to blame it entirely on criminality, or entirely on social and economic factors, was wide of the mark. Clearly, some people involved were criminals with previous convictions, and some of the activity was straightforward criminality. The extent to which many criminals descended on a retail parade in Charlton when they received a message that it was unprotected and open seemed to suggest straightforward criminality. It was certainly an orgy of looting. That leaves the question of why the outbreak of theft should have occurred on that particular occasion. What was the trigger that prompted the multiple incidents in London and other cities during the period 6 to 9 August? Similarly, it is too simplistic to attribute the riots only to social and economic factors, even if it remains true that in general the more deprived areas bore the brunt of the rioting. In my constituency, Woolwich probably has the greatest deprivation, and it was the epicentre of the rioting, whereas more affluent areas such as west Greenwich were largely unscathed. In trying to understand why the riots occurred, I spent some time reviewing the evidence, including some revealing CCTV footage from Woolwich town centre. I watched it with our police borough commander, Richard Wood, and I suspect that I went through a similar process as did the hon. Gentleman, who undertook a similar review of the evidence with his borough commander. The CCTV evidence from Woolwich makes it clear that the incidents that occurred in the early part of the evening of 8 August, while groups of youths were gathering in and around General Gordon square, which is the heart of Woolwich town centre, could be categorised generally as antisocial behaviour. However, from around 8.15 that evening, the mood changed, and within a short time a police car had been attacked and set on fire, a public house had been looted and set on fire, and a large-scale riot had begun to take root. It caused extensive damage to other premises in General Gordon square, as well as adjoining Powis street and further away on trading estates along the Woolwich road into Charlton as far as the Greenwich peninsula. In my view, the change from a potentially problematic display of antisocial behaviour to a full-blown riot occurred when the group of young people who had gathered in the area realised that the police did not have the numbers or capability to stop them. Within a very short time, from their understanding, the police were powerless to prevent disorder, and the situation in Woolwich and the surrounding area was out of control. I want to stress four specific points. First, the London borough of Greenwich had not suffered the disturbance that had affected other areas, such as Tottenham and Lewisham, on the previous days, and there had been no serious incidents or riots early in the evening of 8 August in Woolwich, so under existing procedures—within the Metropolitan police in London and more widely with other police authorities—for mutual aid, some officers were withdrawn from the borough of Greenwich to provide assistance elsewhere. That is why police numbers in Woolwich were inadequate to cope with the riot when it took place. I want to make it clear that that was not a local failure, but it reflects on the arrangements applying throughout the Metropolitan police area because there were simply insufficient police to contain the riot when it kicked off in Woolwich. Secondly, I referred to the people gathered in and around General Gordon square as youths. That does not mean that they were predominantly young people. Yes, some juveniles were involved, and some young people under 18 were arrested and charged, but in my judgment the majority of those involved were over 18, and were probably in the age bracket 18 to 25, although some were older. There were some shocking images of people who should have been exercising a mature influence clearly egging on other rioters and benefiting from the chaotic situation. Thirdly, those involved in the riots, and those who were consequently charged with criminal acts, came from different ethnic backgrounds. The Greenwich and Woolwich constituency is a diverse community with representatives of many different ethnic groups. That diversity applied equally to those involved in the rioting. It is not the case that one single ethnic group was responsible or even disproportionately involved. Fourthly, those involved in rioting did not seem to come disproportionately from one location, one part of London or one particular type or tenure of housing. It is important to understand that.