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Occupational and Personal Pension Schemes (Automatic Enrolment) (Amendment) Regulations 2012

My Lords, as I was strolling to this Committee this afternoon, a noble friend stopped me and asked where I was off to. When I advised him that I was off to deal with some statutory instruments, he said to me, ““I hope you sit quietly and say very little, as we do in the Commons””. I gulped quietly as I held in my hand my 10 minutes of detailed script. I did not know whether to feel admonished or what. I told myself that our role is to scrutinise, so I hope that noble Lords will bear with me and allow me to go through the issues that I want to raise and ask questions on. As the Minister has said, these regulations set out the alternative quality requirements. I acknowledge the amendment made by the Government to Section 12 of the Pensions Act 2011, and I accept that considerable work and thought have gone into drafting these regulations. Nevertheless, I remain anxious because, as the Minister has said, the main purpose of the alternative quality requirement test is to give an easement to good employers with good DC pension schemes to encourage them to retain those schemes. This makes good sense and one would not want to undermine the continuation of good existing provision. That sits full-square with the public policy intentions. However, the alternative quality requirements—and this is what makes me anxious—should not enable bad employers to leverage self-certification to avoid their responsibilities. On the form of certificate showing that the alternative quality requirements are satisfied, the requirements, particularly the facility to use the alternative test for part of the scheme or only for some jobholders, give rise to the potential to leverage the regulation to reduce auto-enrolment costs, for example where high and low earners are grouped together and/or where non-basic pay makes up a very significant proportion of earnings. I welcome the requirement in the regulations on employers to provide information of both the names and the roles of the relevant jobholders where the certificate relates to only some of the jobholders, because they should assist in identifying bad behaviour, particularly as the Secretary of State has a responsibility to review the strength of the alternative certification test. I would welcome the Minister confirming that the findings from the Secretary of State's review of the alternative certification requirements will be published prior to the wider 2017 review of the pension reforms as a whole. I also ask the Minister about trust-based scheme with trustees and rules. Will the trustees bear any responsibility on the matter of whether the employer's scheme or part of the scheme can satisfy the alternative quality requirements? If the answer is yes, will that also apply to trustees of multi-employer schemes and master trusts? As for the renewal of the certificate, the employer has to assess on renewal whether during the past or future certification periods, the quality requirements were or will be met. Where an element was not met—in the past tense—the employer must consider what action needs to be taken to ensure that does not happen in the future. That requirement is welcome for future certification periods, but my question to the Minister is this: if it is revealed that a jobholder who should have been auto-enrolled was not auto-enrolled, or where some one receives an employer contribution lower than it should have been under the relevant quality requirements, will there be a legal requirement on an employer to notify the jobholder and to make good their employer contribution? On the alternative requirements themselves for money purchase schemes and likewise for other schemes, I remain concerned that the first and second tests provide for pensionable earnings to be equal only to basic pay. For good employers, where basic pay makes up a significant proportion of earnings, a minimum of 4 per cent of employer contribution is clearly going to be a good base load. However, where basic pay forms a significantly lower proportion of their earnings, I remain concerned about abuse, particularly when that is taken with the explicit acceptance that there can be a 10 per cent shortfall in contributions for those who lose out. I welcome the fact that a scheme is not to be treated as meeting the relevant quality requirements where the regulator is of the view that there are no reasonable grounds to do so and the regulator can issue compliance notices on employers where there is a shortfall in contribution payments or a failure to meet an alternative test. When the regulator issues a compliance notice on an employer, and a relevant jobholder during the certification period has since ceased to be employed, will the employer still have to make good any shortfall in respect of that now ex-employee or ex-jobholder? As to the definitions in the regulations, the definition of basic pay lists all those payments and allowances that can be disregarded. The assumption is in the drafting that these additional payments are paid in addition to basic pay, so it is straightforward to disregard them. Sometimes such allowances are given in substitution of basic pay, so if you have salary substitution, basic pay is forgone in exchange. The employer meets the cost of an expenditure, resulting in savings in NI and tax, often for both parties. The use of salary substitution has grown exponentially and we see it being applied to such varied items as pension contributions, the provision of cars, computers, bicycles, and childcare vouchers, to name a few. In such situations it would not be unusual for an employer to have pay records that track two basic pay entitlements for a jobholder: one that applies post-salary substitution; and one that applies when salary substitution ceases or when pay rises are awarded. Will the Minister say whether consideration has been given to how the definition of basic pay will apply in certification requirements when an employer uses salary substitution? With regard to giving a certificate and its retention and disclosure, the regulations—clearly a good thing—allow for a relevant jobholder or a recognised independent trade union to request and receive a copy of that certificate within six years after the end of the certification period. Does the relevant jobholder have to be a jobholder at the time of making the request, or is it sufficient to have been a relevant jobholder during the certification period? If a request is made during the certification period, must that request also be met by the employer? I welcome the decision to extend the coverage of the new employer duty to seafarers and offshore workers. I read the impact assessment in detail, which sets out clearly the complexities that had to be dealt with and how the regulations have sought to address those. I am very pleased that that decision was made. I take this opportunity to refer to the Automatic Enrolment (Miscellaneous Amendments) Regulations 2012. It is a negative instrument but it addresses the important matter of the schedule of information to be provided in a notice from the employer to defer automatic enrolment to the end of a waiting period and in respect of the automatic enrolment information provisions generally. As all of us who believe passionately in pensions recognise, automatic enrolment turns inertia into a positive, and anything that undermines that beneficial inertia will undermine persistency of savings. How the opt-out procedures operate in practice will be pretty key to the success of the reforms and participation rates. It is clear, which I can see from my own experience, that good employers will take the opportunity of auto-enrolment to review positively their pensions proposition for the new generation of employees. There is clearly plenty of evidence there. Subtleties in the employer behavioural response to regulation, particularly negative behaviour, always surprises policy-makers. They always miss some key behavioural responses. Jobholders in high-turnover occupations will be particularly vulnerable to the subtlety of employer responses to these regulations. For example, nothing in the regulations prevents employers giving several reminders of the opt-out dates to jobholders during the waiting period, and clearly the implicit intent is to increase opt-out rates. The impact assessment helpfully refers to the DWP's intention to issue a template for generic and tailored information to be provided by employers. If the information provided to jobholders is significantly different from the template, will that be considered a breach of the regulations? At the end of the waiting period, if a worker is not eligible for automatic enrolment but subsequently becomes so, an employer can apply a second waiting period of three months, a facility that, as my noble friend Lord McKenzie has previously observed, tips the balance too far in favour of employer easement at the cost of the saver. These regulations allow employers flexibility in choosing the re-enrolment date, so where a jobholder is not eligible at the re-enrolment date but subsequently becomes so, will the employer still be able, yet again, to add a further three-month waiting period before auto-enrolling that individual? I hope the answer to that question is no because the short-term worker argument cannot apply in that situation because we are in the era of re-enrolment. As it is a three-year anniversary, I hope the administrative systems will be in place, but I can see an endless series of three-month waiting periods running through first staging and the subsequent re-enrolment period.