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Syria in 2026: Interim government and Kurdish integration

In December 2024 Bashar al-Assad, president of Syria from 2000, fled and a rebel offensive captured the capital, Damascus. This brought Syria’s 13-year civil war to an end. However, the political transition remains disputed, and some violence and fighting continued into 2026.

Ahmed al-Sharaa, leader of one of the major rebel forces, Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham, was declared Syria’s transitional president in January 2025 and an interim constitutional declaration came into effect that March.

This briefing sets out the nature of Syria’s transitional government, the meeting of the interim parliament in June 2026, and steps to integrate autonomous Kurdish groups and Druze communities into the new interim government, over which some tensions have remained.

Who are the major actors in Syria?

Territorial control continued to be disputed into 2026

While Assad has been removed from power, and new authorities led by the leader of the Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) group have been established, the integration of rebel groups into a single armed force remains ongoing and the country began 2026 with extensive fighting in Kurdish areas.

In addition, the interim government has not had complete control over its own forces. This lack of control contributed to the extensive violence in coastal areas in March 2025, in which Alawite minorities were targeted. In July 2025 there was also extensive fighting involving Druze groups in Suweyda.

In January 2026 the interim government extended its control and Kurdish forces agreed to integrate

While the interim government has sought to unify all militias and armed groups within a single structure, the process is ongoing for the Turkish-backed Syrian National Army (SNA), and integration of the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) had stalled until a new agreement was reached in early 2026.

The Middle East Institute’s Building Syria’s new army (June 2025), and section 2 of the Commons Library briefing on Syria after Assad (updated July 2025) provides an overview of the three major armed groups. There are also small separate Druze and Alawite armed groups.

As shown in the map below, after fighting in January 2026 between interim government forces and the SNA with the SDF (see below), interim government forces now control the majority of Syria. This includes the major population centres of the capital Damascus and second city, Aleppo.

Previously, the SDF had controlled a much larger area in the Syrian northeast. Under the ceasefire and integration agreement reached in January 2026 (see below), these areas are now being integrated into the central Syrian state.

Source: Institute for the Study of War, Assessed control of terrain in Syria, 12 February 2026 © Institute for the Study of War and American Enterprise Institute’s Critical Threats Project. See updated maps on the Institute’s website. 

Islamic State/Daesh remains active

While holding extensive territory in Syria from 2014 to 2017, Islamic State/Daesh activity is now low, with the group’s activity centred on Africa. In July 2026, the UN estimated that the group retains around 3,000 fighters in Syria, and assesses it is focused on “hit-and-run attacks” in urban areas.

While Islamic State activity has fallen in 2026, detained Islamic State fighters and families remain in camps in what were SDF-controlled areas (see the above map). UN agencies are intended to take over the management of camps housing families of those associated with Islamic State.

In July 2026 the UN said that around 3,000 prisoners remained in the camps (many have been transferred to Iraq), though the US also estimated that up to 200 detainees escaped in the January 2026 fighting (see below). Around 15,000 to 20,000 people, mostly women and children believed to have family links to Islamic State, were also displaced and remain unaccounted for. The US has reiterated its call for governments to repatriate their citizens from Iraq and Syria.

Who are Syria’s interim leaders?

Syria’s interim government is led by the leader of Hayat Tahrir al-Sham  (HTS), a group formerly designated as a terrorist group with ties to Al-Qaeda. Foreign governments, including the UK, have now removed this terrorist designation.

Developments within Hayat Tahrir al-Sham

Since Assad’s flight, an interim government has been declared in Syria, led by the HTS leader, Ahmed al-Sharaa. HTS was one of the opposition groups which captured Damascus in December 2024. It had previously governed the Idlib province in northwest Syria.

HTS has its origins in Al-Qaeda although it says it broke from the group in 2016. Its leader, Ahmed al-Sharaa, had participated in the insurgency against US and UK coalition forces in Iraq in the 2000s.

Many observers consider the HTS leadership and Sharaa to have evolved significantly since the group was first established, while acknowledging its human rights violations when governing Idlib (PDF).  

De-listing of Hayat Tahrir al-Sham as a terrorist group

In November 2025, the UN Security Council removed the terrorist designation against Sharaa. Sharaa subsequently visited the UK in March 2026, meeting the then Prime Minister Sir Keir Starmer and King Charles III. This followed visits to capitals in the Arab Gulf, the United States, Russia, France and an address to the UN General Assembly in 2025.

Both the United States and United Kingdom have de-listed HTS as a proscribed terrorist group. Announcing its decision in October 2025, the UK Government said the action reflected the re-establishment of diplomatic ties to discuss combating Islamic State, migration, regional security, and human rights. It says it “no longer assesses HTS to be an alias of [Al-Qaeda]”. The government will keep this decision under review.

Syrian criticism of Hayat Tahrir al-Sham and Sharaa

While Sharaa’s international standing has changed significantly, his new government is not without local criticism.

In addition to violence affecting minorities and the uncertain status of Kurdish and Druze populations, in 2025 BBC Monitoring analysts noted a continuing campaign of criticism by Jihadist groups against his governance and that this opposition may, in time, pose a risk to his support base. Criticisms include Syria joining the global anti-Islamic State coalition in November 2025.

In 2025, increasing protests in favour of greater autonomy were also held in Alawite and Druze areas, following earlier sectarian violence.

Kurdish groups in Syria also criticised the constitutional declaration issued in April 2025 as “obstructing a democratic transition”, as well as the interim government’s response to the earlier sectarian violence.

What is the status of the interim parliament?

A transitional parliament met for the first time in June 2026, though Druze areas in the south have not participated in the selection of its members. Kurdish groups have been among those expressing discontent at their low share of representation. The parliament is intended to be in place for 30 months and to help draft a new constitution.  

Provisions for a parliament

The March 2025 constitutional declaration provides for the establishment of a “People’s Assembly”. Much power remains with the president. A third of the members were appointed by the interim president, with the remainder selected by local committees.

One of its roles will be to help draft a permanent constitution for Syria. The constitutional declaration expects the new constitution to be in place by 2029, and elections held within 30 months under a new election law.

Selection of members

In October 2025 meetings to select two-thirds of the 210 parliamentarians by local electoral colleges were held. There were an estimated 7,000 electors. Factors cited for the absence of fuller elections include security concerns and the high number of displaced Syrians.

Only six women and a small number of minorities were selected. This included four or less representatives from Kurdish, Alawite, Turkmen, Ismaili and Christian communities. Women made up 14% of the 1,500 candidates.

In July 2026, the interim president appointed the remaining 70 members. This included 15 women, bringing total female representation to 10% of MPs. A small number of Alawites, Ismailis, Kurds, Turkmen and Christians are also among Syrian parliamentarians. Kurdish leaders have described the resulting parliament as unrepresentative.

The parliament met for the first time on 12 July. It elected a Christian woman as one of two deputy speakers.

The UK Government welcomed the meeting of the parliament and said it “stands ready to support the efforts to strengthen Syria’s institutions”. The EU said that Syria’s political transition will partly depend on “the Assembly’s ability to pave the way towards an inclusive political system”.

Kurdish and Druze participation was delayed

Areas outside interim government control, including the Kurdish-controlled northeast and Druze areas in the south, did not participate in the selection in 2025 due to tensions with the interim government, and their 10% share of seats in the parliament remained vacant.

Selections in the Kurdish northeast took place in May 2026, in which six Arabs and five Kurds were chosen. Several Kurdish parties rejected the vote (PDF) and said the region should have more than 11 seats in the interim parliament.

Elections in Druze areas have not taken place as it remains in dispute with the interim government, with some violence in August 2026. The interim president has instead appointed two members.

Analysis of the results and future risks

Analysts do not expect rapid democratisation in Syria as it emerges from its civil war and have highlighted risks because of continued discontent among Druze and some Kurdish communities.

Analysis by the International Crisis Group thinktank argues the parliament’s potential importance lies less in holding Sharaa to account (as its powers are weak and he appointed many of its members) but rather in channelling discontent through formal public channels. However, it highlights a particular risk of the parliament taking extensive action against lower-level officials of the Assad-regime, arguing it would “generat[e] new grievances for the state”.

The Chatham House thinktank has argued that the relative lack of power for the parliament, and the delayed or non-participation of Druze and Kurdish areas, risks undermining its legitimacy as interim authorities seek to govern.

Analysis by the Royal United Services Institute also notes that while many parliamentarians will be at least sympathetic to Sharaa, most came from groups and localities not associated with HTS-ruled Idlib province during the civil war. It said the participation of Kurdish groups may potentially further the ongoing reconciliation process between the HTS and SDF.  

Commentary by the Arab Centre Washington DC argues that while Syrians “may not expect rapid democratisation, […] they expect visible relief”. In 2026, uncoordinated protests have been held across Syria, driven by issues such as prices and inflation, employment, land rights, and ensuring accountability for human rights violations. This has included protests in Idlib, the area that HTS controlled during the civil war.

The protests make the issues of sanctions, sectarian violence and humanitarian aid paramount for future stability (see the separate Library briefings on religious minorities and the humanitarian situation in Syria).

What is the situation for the Kurds in north‑east Syria?

Since Assad’s fall in December 2024, Kurdish leaders in the north-east have sought to maintain their autonomy against the demands of the interim government for a unitary Syrian state to be created. Following fighting in January 2026, Kurdish leaders have agreed to political and military integration and its armed forces has disbanded.

Interim government seeks unified state and army

As interim president, Sharaa has said Syrian “unity is a red line”, and that all armed groups must come under central control.

Integration agreements have been signed with the Turkish-backed Syrian National Army (SNA) (though some with opposition) and the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) (first in March 2025, then reiterated in October 2025, and under further deals in January 2026).

Talks on Kurdish integration struggled in 2025

Talks on the SDF integrating into the single Syrian armed force by the end of 2025 stalled, resulting in Turkey reportedly threatening military action.

Turkey argues elements of the SDF were linked to the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) in Turkey, with whom it reached a ceasefire agreement with in 2025, with the PKK agreeing to disarm. The PKK is a proscribed terrorist group in Turkey, as well as the UK and US.

The interim Syrian government and Turkey are also against Kurdish requests to maintain their autonomy within Syria, in the self-declared Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria (AANES). This was established during the civil war. Many of Syria’s oil fields are found in the region.  

Kurdish leaders had criticised the political transition since 2024, saying they want a secular state with less power for the interim president and greater protections for Kurds. They committed in the March 2025 agreement to several steps to integrate the region with central authorities, though issues such as wider regional autonomy and Kurdish rights were unresolved.

Fighting in early 2026 and integration deal reached

In January 2026, fighting between the interim government forces and the SDF occurred in Aleppo (displacing around 150,000 people) and across north eastern Syria. In a rapid change of control, by mid-January interim government forces held many of the region’s strategic points, oil fields, and camps holding Islamic State fighters and their families.

On 18 January 2026 a new 14-point agreement was announced between the SDF and interim Syrian authorities, which was supplemented a further text of 30 January.

Under the agreements, a “phased integration process” of the Kurdish military and governance structures into the interim government will occur. Many of the areas ceded to the interim authorities have both Arab and Kurdish populations (PDF). The 14 points include:

• the SDF ceding territorial control over Deir al-Zour and Raqqa provinces
• integrating the Hasakahprovince (retained by the SDF) into the central government
• Kurdish-led forces becoming part of a singleSyrian armed force
• all non-Syrian PKK fighters to leave the country
• oil fields and external borders to be administered by the interim authorities
• Kurdish language and other cultural rights to be protected

Kurdish reaction and progress on implementation

In August 2026, the leader of the SDF, Mazloum Abdi, said that the “process of integrating our military, security and administrative institutions into the national institutions […] has […] been completed”. He said the focus would now be on “cement[ing] our people’s rights in the constitution”.

Actions to implement the January 2026 agreement include the below:

• Kurdish participation in delayed elections to the Syrian parliament in May 2026. However, the Democratic Unity Party, which shares power in the autonomous Kurdish administration, boycotted the vote. As noted above, some Kurdish groups have said they are underrepresented and their seat allocation should be increased.
• the dissolution of the SDF as an independent military force in August (the future of female Kurdish units remains unresolved).
• an interim government declaration that Kurdish is a national language. Kurdish leaders were critical of this, saying the commitments must be implemented through a permanent constitution. There were some protests in Kurdish areas in August 2026. Talks on the Kurdish education system are ongoing.
• new interim government guidance toallow stateless Kurds to apply for Syrian citizenship (some Syrian Kurds having been stripped of citizenship under earlier Syrian governments).
• the release of some SDF detainees by interim authorities as part of an ongoing prisoner exchange

Analysis of the agreements and future risks

Analysis by International Crisis Group notes these were “difficult terms” for the SDF and argues it would be in the interim government’s “best interests” to “implement the integration terms […] as generously as possible” for Kurdish groups. The Berlin-based European Center for Kurdish Studies also notes that Kurdish integration could “help dilute the Islamist character of Syria’s new government”.

Chatham House analysis argues that diplomats must now support “processes that turn these openings into durable agreements”, otherwise there is a risk of long-term instability, the think-tank citing post-2003 Iraq or post-2011 Libya as examples of this. It has also argued that the agreement “defers rather than resolves conflict”, with future tensions likely over issues such as who appoints officials and how oil revenue is shared.

Analysis for Al-Monitor notes that the SDF’s weakening will be of concern to Israel, which has sought a decentralised Syrian neighbour post-Assad.

The US and UK have called for a Syrian-led transition

The United States has been the main partner to the SDF in combating Islamic State/Daesh and continues to maintain troops in the AANES into 2026.

However, US policy had increasingly shifted away from supporting the SDF and towards strengthening the interim government.

In January 2026 Tom Barrack, the US special envoy for Syria, said that “the original purpose of the SDF as the primary anti-ISIS force on the ground has largely expired”, with interim authorities now committed to containing the group. Previously, in 2025, he had said that the US administration will “not support a separatist outcome” for Syria but also that a new “architecture,” short of federation, will give minorities more autonomy.

In April 2026, the US completed handing over its major military bases to the interim government.

In 2026, the UK Government has welcomed the January ceasefire and called for a “resumption of negotiations to deliver a lasting political settlement”. It says any political transition must be “inclusive”. The government has also called for a “robust transition plan for securing and managing the [Islamic State/Daesh] camps and detention facilities”.

What accountability mechanisms are in place?

The first public trials against Assad-regime figures began in April 2026. However, there are concerns that Syria’s legal system is not sufficiently robust and there is continuing debate on how to ensure accountability for all civil war-era actors, not solely those who were part of the Assad regime.

Human rights violations during the civil war

Tens of thousands of Syrians were arbitrarily detained or forcibly disappeared during the civil war, primarily by the Assad regime, with the Syrian Network for Human Rights estimating the figure at 181,000.

Estimates of the number of people killed during the conflict range from 300,000 to 600,000. The Assad regime is also blamed for the use of chemical weapons on several occasions.

During the civil war, HTS, SNA and SDF were also all accused of human rights violations.

National commissions created and first public trials

In May 2025, the interim authorities established commissions for missing persons and transitional justice. These are tasked with identifying the fates of missing persons, providing legal and other support, and holding perpetrators to account. However, monitors such as Human Rights Watch have noted gaps in the local legal framework. These include not criminalising war crimes or forced disappearance, and not providing for the protection of witnesses.

These concerns have continued into 2026 as the first public trials against Assad regime members began. In August, a Syrian court sentenced Assad and other leading regime figures to death for their actions during the civil war. Most were tried in absentia, with Assad remaining in Russia.

Concerns and criticisms of the accountability process

The Syrian Network on Human Rights has called for a new special court to try “international crimes not covered by current Syrian national criminal law” while a coalition of 27 Syrian civil society groups has said the commissions must hold “all actors” to account, not solely those associated with the Assad regime. A separate statement by 18 groups said violations committed since the fall of Assad should also be within their mandates.

The UK Government has welcomed the establishment of the commissions, and called on the interim authorities to work with the UN and civil society groups to ensure they are “inclusive, comprehensive and transparent”. In March 2026 the then Attorney General offered UK support for Syria’s justice and accountability process. This followed the government’s pledge in 2025 to provide £1.4 million to support transitional justice in Syria.

Legal activity outside Syria

No new proceedings at international courts like the International Court of Justice (ICJ) or International Criminal Court (ICC) have commenced since the fall of Assad. While Syria is not a member of the ICC, the interim authorities invited its prosecutor to visit Syria in January 2025. An ICJ case on the prevention of torture, begun in 2023, continues.

French, Swedish, American and German jurisdictions are currently dealing with cases that involve members of the Assad regime.

In August, Lebanon became the first country to extradite Assad-era officials to Syria since Assad’s fall in 2024.

Calls to apply universal jurisdiction

Syria rights groups (see section above) have called for countries to ensure accountability by prosecuting figures under the principle of universal jurisdiction.

In the UK, this is in place for certain crimes (see the Commons Library briefing) and allows the prosecution and punishment of the alleged perpetrators of certain offences, regardless of their location or their nationality.

Some European countries are applying this—in July 2026, Austria completed its first universal jurisdiction case against Assad regime figures (one of those convicted is now in Syria and appealing the Austrian court decision).

Neither the UK Crown Prosecution Service nor the government have made any statements on applying universal jurisdiction in the case of Syria. In 2026, former Deputy Foreign Secretary, Andrew Mitchell, has argued that the UK should be “exploring every avenue to ensure that justice is served” against Asma al-Assad, the wife of President Assad and a UK citizen (now in Russia).

The government says that, in general, its position on universal jurisdiction is that “investigations should take place close to where crimes occur, allowing for better access to robust evidence and witnesses”.

What are the UK’s views on the transition?

As set out above and in the other briefings in this series on Syria after the fall of Assad, European and North American governments have welcomed the establishment of the new authorities, though stressed they must protect human rights. Actions have included lifting sanctions and de-listing the HTS as a terrorist group.

On the political transition specifically, the UK Government has:

• said there must be an “inclusive political transition”, that protects “the rights of all Syrians, including the Kurdish community”
• welcomed the appointment of an interim parliament, but noted “women remain underrepresented across Syria’s political and security institutions”
• welcomed the SDF’s announcement to dissolve in August, and called for the full implementation of the January 2026 agreement
• backed the constitutional declaration’s provisions on “freedom of expression, freedom of belief and women’s rights” and said it would encourage a greater separation of power between the legislative, judiciary and executive branches in its talks with the interim government.
• said it supports a “negotiated solution for Suwayda” that ensures Syria’s territorial unity but also ensures accountability

Further reading

General situation and background

• Commons Library briefing,Syria after Assad: Consequences and interim authorities 2025, updated July 2025. Sections 4.2 to 4.4 provide more on the actions of the interim authorities, including the constitutional declaration of March 2025. It also provides an introduction to the key local and international actors, and the UK response.
• Commons Library, Syria in 2026. Collection of briefings on minority groups, reconstruction and sanctions, and international response 
• US Congressional Research Service, Syria: Transition and US policy, February 2026
• Project on Middle East Political Science, Syria after Assad, December 2025.

Islamic State/Daesh

• BBC Monitoring,Analysis: No breakthrough for Islamic State in Syria, a year after Assad’s fall, December 2025
• Middle East Institute, The collapse of ISIS in Syria, June 2026
• Soufan Center, Syria’s transition advances amid persistent security challenges, July 2026
• Armed Conflict Location Event Dataset, The Islamic State and al-Qaeda remain a threat in the Middle East, September 2026

Syria’s interim parliament

• Foreign Policy, Syria’s weak parliament still matters, July 2026
• Atlantic Council, Syria’s new parliament can build institutions and trust, July 2026
• Tel Aviv University Institute for National Security Studies, The new Syrian parliament: The beginning of democratisation or merely a facade?, July 2026

Integration of Kurdish areas

• Middle East Institute, How Damascus and the SDF came to blows in Aleppo — and what might come next, January 2026
• Center for Strategic and International Studies, How Syria can succeed in integrating the Kurds, January 2026
• International Crisis Group, Anopportunity for calm in northeastern Syria, January 2026
• Chatham House, What recent developments in Syria mean for the Kurds, February 2026
• Italian Institute for International Political Studies, ­­From autonomy to integration: Northeastern Syria after Assad, June 2026
• Foreign Policy, What remains of Rojava, August 2026
• Washington Institute, After the SDF: What comes next for northeast Syria and US policy, August 2026

Courts and accountability

• International Crisis Group, Curbing reprisalsin Syria, August 2026
• Just Security, The limits of Syria’s first attempt at accountability, August 2026
• Arab Center Washington DC, What are Syria’s political trials for?, August 2026
• Tahrir Institute, Atef Najib’s trial: Syrians deserve a clear transitional justice strategy, May 2026
• Just Security, Syria’s accountability gap: The Najib trial and the case for the ICC, June 2026
• Human Rights Watch, Syria: Mob violence against groups linked to Assad era, June 2026
• Amnesty International, A year after Assad’s fall, the rights of survivors and families must guide transition, December 2025