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Defence Reform Bill

I disagree with my hon. Friend. The intention behind the new clause is very straightforward; it does what it says on the can. These plans are not working and a series of things are going wrong, and it merely says, “Let’s pause for a moment to make sure that the plans stand up to scrutiny in terms of viability and cost-effectiveness so that rising costs do not lead to false economies and we are not opening up ever-widening capability gaps.” I am afraid that my hon. Friend is not quite fair in ascribing such a motive to me.

One of the first questions I would like the Secretary of State to answer is why the plan has changed. As we heard from the former Secretary of State in his own words—it came from his mouth, not mine—the original plan was that the Regulars would be held at their current level until the Reservists were able to take their place. That plan has changed. To return to a point that several Members have already made, by the end of last year a good number of the Regulars had already gone—the

final tranche may be next year; we are not sure—and by the end of next year most of the Regular units and battalions will have been disbanded. Meanwhile, the Reservists are not due to reach adequate strength to take their place until 2018, if present plans are met, but there is every indication that, because we are struggling, we will not even achieve that. That was not the original plan, as the former Secretary of State said. It would be good if, for once, we could get an adequate answer to this question, because we have asked it many times in this House and have not got one.

Let me talk about the recruitment problems. Last Thursday, figures confirmed yet again that TA numbers are in decline—not rising, but in decline. We also know that the Army Reserve recruitment targets are being badly missed, as confirmed in a spate of reports, some derived from leaked MOD documents. Figures due last Thursday regarding Army Reserve recruitment were not released in full. It is clear that the required recruits are not coming forward and that computer problems have added to the problems, as confirmed by my hon. Friend the Member for Canterbury (Mr Brazier). As everybody can imagine, there has been no shortage of texts and e-mails about this debate, and I have learned in such messages from the north-east that raw recruits to the Reserve have been told that it could take up to 15 months for them to get into uniform once they sign up. These are the sorts of delays we are talking about and which Parliament has every right properly to scrutinise. As even the Secretary of State may not be aware, the Army Reserve courses for January and February have had to be cancelled in their entirety because of lack of recruits. The fact that the Government are offering significant payments to businesses underlines the reluctance of many businesses, particularly smaller businesses, to let valued and key employees go on more frequent and extended deployments. All that is part of the cycle which in itself is adding to costs.

Our concerns are not just about Reserve targets not being met; we also have deep-seated concerns about the resulting capability and manpower gaps, which are getting worse as we miss the Reserve recruitment targets. Let us take as an example the mobilisation rate. At present, the MOD confirms that the TA mobilisation rate is 40%. In other words, for every 100 Reservists there are on paper, the MOD deems that 40 are deployable. That can be to do with fitness, kit, sickness or all sorts of reasons. In order to make the Army Reserve plans work, the mobilisation rate has to double from 40% to 80%. I see nothing in the plans about how that massive increase in the mobilisation rate can be justified or whether it has been costed. It is a massive ask to go from 40% to 80% mobilisation. These questions need to be answered.

There are also concerns about the plan risking capability gaps. The nature of conflict is changing. Many countries that are not necessarily friendly to the west are increasing their military spending, and war is becoming more asymmetrical. Gone are the days of binary conflicts involving good guys versus bad guys—terrorism has ensured that things are much more complex nowadays—and we need professional, mobile, high-readiness, agile forces that are ready to respond to the threats that we face.

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The encroachment of the Human Rights Act 1998 also puts pressure on the plans, because we will now have to ensure that the same standard of training and

equipment is available to reservists on deployment as is available to regulars. It is not clear whether the extra cost of that has been accommodated, given recent developments—this is a relatively recent ruling. It is no wonder that ex-military chiefs are worried, with many suggesting that strategic thought has been abandoned. These are questions to which we need answers.

Our concern must also focus on the real possibility that rising costs and flawed assumptions could easily lead to false economies. I suggest that the Government have yet to produce a fully costed plan, and that is what lies at the heart of new clause 3. It is clear that costs are rising: the extra resources being poured into boosting Reservist recruitment are an example. In addition to that, and to the extra payments to small and medium-sized enterprises, other rising costs include the £5,000 bonus, the Reservist award, pensions and mental health costs. To the best of my knowledge, none of this has been properly costed. The charity Combat Stress has said that Reservists are twice as likely as Regulars to suffer from some kind of mental disorder, but I am not sure that that kind of extra cost has been fully accounted for in the plans.

We should also question the underlying assumptions in the Army Reserve’s plans. I think the Secretary of State is willing to admit that it costs more to deploy Reservists than to deploy Regulars. I do not think that there is any disagreement on that. It is therefore crucial, in costing the plans, to identify the central case regarding projected usage rates. The lower the rates, the lower the cost will appear, because, as I have said, it costs more to deploy Reservists than Regulars.

Let us look at the figures in the impact assessment. The case for deploying Reservists centres on the figure of 3,000 annual deployments. That sounds somewhat low, given that the original purpose of the plan was to replace 20,000 Regulars with 30,000 Reservists, and that we would be using those Reservists more frequently. Here, however, we have a projected usage rate of 3,000 annual deployments. Of course it will bring the projected cost down if we artificially bring usage rates down.