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Woolwich Barracks

I believe that it is not right for three main reasons.

The first is that I question why the Department’s approach to Woolwich station has altered so dramatically over such a short period. It is worth recalling that it was only in 2009, in the defence estate strategy that preceded this recent one, that Woolwich station was designated a core site. Sadly, no detailed justification for that designation was given at the time, so it is impossible to know the detailed reasoning that underpinned it, but it seems reasonable to assume that there were solid strategic grounds for it.

As a core site, Woolwich station has been the recipient of significant investment over recent years. The Woolwich development project announced in 2009 provided for new and refurbished accommodation. A new, purpose- built, state-of-the-art equestrian training facility and accommodation centre was built to accommodate the King’s Troop following its transfer from St John’s Wood in February 2012. Even now, funding is in the pipeline to comprehensively remediate and reinstate the King’s Troop external exercise area on Woolwich common, following its use in the 2012 Olympic games.

I simply ask the Minister, what has changed about Woolwich in the past few years to so fundamentally alter the thinking of officials in his Department in relation to the future use of the site and to license the Government to write off the significant investment that has been ploughed into it over the past few years? It will strike many of my constituents as little more than an asset-stripping exercise driven by an analysis of rising land values in London rather than an exercise driven by the requirements of our defence estate.

The second reason relates to the first. I am not entirely convinced that the strategic case for selling off Woolwich barracks is as watertight as has been presented. In the correspondence we have exchanged over recent weeks, the Minister has assured me that the Department’s estate optimisation strategy was formulated with military advice provided by each of the front-line commands. I have no reason to question that assurance, but I do question whether the advice received was sufficiently wide in scope and, specifically, whether the Department, along with other Departments, has assessed the value of the site as a strategic resilience location outside zone 1.

Our security services have had incredible success in foiling terrorist attacks on the British mainland, but the threat to the UK from terrorism remains severe. Last night’s tragic events in Berlin are a timely reminder, if one were needed, that we can never be complacent. Lord Harris’s recently published independent review into London’s preparedness to respond to a major terrorist incident makes it clear that, while the involvement of the military in the event of a prolonged attack or a move to the critical threat level was once seen as a last resort, it is now integral to the planning process. In such

a scenario, the military could now be deployed under Operation Temperer, which would allow for the mobilisation of up to 5,000 troops to increase the operational capacity and capability of specialist counter-terrorism and armed police. If they were called on, those troops would require accommodation, and there is a case for looking at Woolwich—as a strategic location outside zone 1 and close to the River Thames—as a site that can provide that necessary resilience. While I do not expect the Minister to comment publicly on such a sensitive matter, I would urge him to satisfy himself on this point by looking again at whether there is strategic value in retaining Woolwich barracks as a resilience location in response to a major terrorist incident or a comparable civil emergency.

The third and final reason is that the closure of the barracks will have a detrimental impact on my constituents and on a local community whose very history and identity are intertwined with our armed forces.