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Hidden Credit Liabilities: Role of the FCA

That theme runs through many of the reports that we have had from constituents about the failure of the FCA to protect them—to ensure that regulation was implemented to protect them. There were also elements of almost turning a blind eye and collusion, and that is the reason for the anger that people feel.

Let me press on because the figures that we have heard in the past need to be challenged. As I said, many people thought that they had failed themselves, but in reality tens of thousands of businesses were deliberately targeted. Internal reports confirm that not 16,000, as claimed by the FCA, but 3 million customers were placed in NatWest’s non-core division, effectively a waiting room before being pushed into the notorious global restructuring group, or Lloyds’ equivalent business support unit.

There are so many examples, but I will give just one. Steve and Joan Finch spoke movingly at our summit last November. They took out what was meant to be a simple fixed-rate loan from Lloyds bank to buy Bredbury Hall hotel. Alongside that loan, the bank added the credit liabilities of a derivative, a swap, with a starting hidden credit liability of £1 million, rising to £3 million. Those undisclosed arrangements generated £179,000 in secret up-front commissions. A further £1 million was taken in fees when the bank processed the case through its so-called business support unit, widely criticised as an asset-stripping mechanism.

The business ended up there because undisclosed credit liabilities created a loan-to-value risk of 136%, against a permitted maximum of 70%. Despite being a thriving business, Bredbury Hall was manoeuvred into administration. Stephen Finch was bankrupted and the family had to raise £600,000 to pay off vulture fund Cerberus, to which the loan had been sold, to save their home.

Suspicious of what had happened, the Finches contacted Greater Manchester police with evidence of all three offences that had been committed under the Fraud Act 2006. The police took the matter seriously and investigated, but when they asked the FCA for technical assistance, the FCA refused, so last June the police closed the case, citing three reasons: lack of FCA assistance, insufficient resources for a complex investigation, and concern that examining the case would oblige them to investigate numerous similar ones.

There are so many other cases. One of the cases I have dealt with involved reading the last letter of a man who committed suicide in the hope that his insurance would pay out to save his family home. Many whistleblowers have courageously come forward. In fact, that is what led to the creation of BankConfidential. I will cite just one example: Mark Wright, a former Royal Bank of Scotland manager. One of our former colleagues, Norman Lamb, supported him. Mark provided internal evidence of the bank deliberately defaulting customers to improve capital ratios and targeting customers for debanking and insolvency. He even named the person who taught trainees how to forge customer signatures on bank documents. Mark experienced incredible levels of personal stress, and I congratulate him on his courage in coming forward, but the FCA failed to act.

The failure of the system to reform or to deliver justice and compensation to victims has been the outstanding theme of our discussions and debates as an all-party group. Numerous schemes, inquiries and reports were meant to deliver meaningful reform and provide victims of banking misconduct with access to justice and redress. We have had the Foskett panel, the Swift review of interest rate hedging products, the Cranston review, the Tomlinson report, the Project Lord Turnbull report by Sally Masterton, the parliamentary commission on banking standards and various Treasury Committee inquiries. The truth is that they have had little effect: victims remain out of pocket and meaningful reform still has not happened.

The result is that trust in the system has now been shattered. The FCA’s Financial Lives survey shows that less than half the public trust the financial sector and its regulatory framework. That is a damning indictment, and it is problematic particularly among SMEs, where we need business confidence to stimulate growth in our wider economy.

Let me conclude. The all-party group, having consulted so many experts, victims and constituents, has come to the conclusion that the only way forward is some form of royal commission or equivalent inquiry to address the deep structural flaws in the system and the widespread injustices that remain unresolved. We need to establish what happened and who was responsible; otherwise, there is a real risk of history repeating itself, and we cannot stand by and allow that to happen.

In the short term, we are demanding at least a specific inquiry into hidden credit and the role of the FCA. That inquiry must be fully independent, well resourced and—if it is to have confidence in it—judge led, and it must be granted statutory provision under the Inquiries Act 2005.

This all arose because many of us, as individual MPs, were approached by constituents who have suffered. We must remember that it is ordinary people who have been the victims of this tragedy, and some of them are with us in the Public Gallery. They have kept the flame of hope for justice alive, and I urge them to maintain their efforts and to continue to inspire us with their righteous indignation and justified anger. However, I do not want to be here in years to come—as we were in 2016—dealing with the same problems and with a system that is not fit for purpose, with more victims making representations to us. I hope today that the Government will accept there is a need for an independent inquiry, that we can present the evidence to it and that we can successfully reform the system to protect our financial services and, more importantly, the people—our constituents—who rely on them.