The Ministry of Defence regularly and routinely monitors our waters to protect UK interests, contribute to domestic maritime security, and act as a deterrent against potentially malign activities.

The deployment the hon. Member refers to was conducted in support of Defence aims, not in support of the Home Office

As far as I am aware, the only engagement the Ministry of Defence has had with a renewable energy developer concerning the management of wind turbine interference in the vicinity of the Eskdalemuir Seismic Array is regarding borehole sensor technology.

The Department has considered this proposal and has supported a technical investigation by experts from the Atomic Weapons Establishment to assess their feasibility. However, the MOD's safeguarding decisions are based on scientific evidence and operational requirements, and any proposed mitigation must be shown to be effective and reliable before it could be taken forward.

The MOD continues to work closely with DESNZ to safeguard the Eskdalemuir Seismic Array while supporting the Government's clean energy ambitions.

The Ministry of Defence (MOD) has worked closely with the Department for Energy Security and Net Zero (DESNEZ) over onshore wind deployment in the vicinity of the Eskdalemuir Seismic Array, which supports the United Kingdom's obligations under the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty. As part of this work, the MOD supported experimental testing of alternative technologies and has considered assessments undertaken by specialist technical advisers and independent seismology experts.

DESNZ has recently consulted on a revised approach to managing onshore wind turbine interference in the vicinity of the Array. The MOD and DESNZ have also commissioned an independent scientific review of alternative technological solutions.

Previously, evidence made available to the Department has not demonstrated that proposed alternative technological solutions provide viable mitigation for operational use. The consultation responses and independent scientific review are currently being considered and DESNZ will publish a government response reflecting the outcome of both processes soon.

The current methodology used to assess the impact of wind turbines on the Array's ability to detect underground seismic events has been developed using specialist scientific advice and remains the basis for safeguarding decisions. The methodology itself was retained as part of the revised safeguarding approach published in March 2026 following public consultation.

Monitoring equipment at the Eskdalemuir Seismometer Array is continually reviewed to ensure it meets national requirements and the requirements of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty Organisation International Monitoring System.

There is currently an ongoing independent review of mitigation proposals for reduction of seismic ground vibration received at the Eskdalemuir seismic array and the effect on the detection capability of the array, commissioned by the Ministry of Defence and Department for Energy Security and Net Zero. This includes a review of borehole emplacement and digital signal processing approaches.

The Career Transition Partnership (CTP) provides Service leavers with tailored career support, training and access to employers, including opportunities within Scotland’s renewable energy sector.

Service leavers can work with a CTP Career Consultant to develop a personal resettlement plan and access relevant vocational training. This includes Global Wind Organisation Basic Safety and Basic Technical Training to support routes into the wind energy sector.

CTP also works with employers and industry partners to create employment pathways and delivers annual employment fairs in Edinburgh and Elgin, connecting Service leavers directly with recruiting employers.

Between 2019 and 2024, the Ministry of Defence's approach to air defence was based on maintaining and developing the UK's layered air defence capabilities, including Typhoon aircraft and Type 45 destroyers, rather than a dedicated Iron Dome or Integrated Air and Missile Defence (IAMD) style concept.

Since 2024, the Government has placed greater emphasis on homeland IAMD. The Defence Investment Plan provides a further £790 million for dedicated homeland air and missile defence, focused on strengthening foundational capabilities through enhanced command and control, sensing systems, new radars, counter-drone capabilities and layered responses.

The Department continues to mature these capabilities and engage industry and NATO Allies. Capable and effective air and missile defence for the whole United Kingdom can only be delivered through a layered, NATO-integrated approach, rather than through a single standalone system.

The Strategic Defence Review (SDR) (published on 2 June 2025) and the National Security Strategy (published on 24 June 2025) were aligned in recognising the importance of transformation through warfighting readiness, a strengthened NATO, innovation by learning the lessons from Ukraine and industrial resilience. This was further developed through the Defence Industrial Strategy (published in September 2025) and the Defence Investment Plan (published in June 2026). An internal Defence plan ensures that Defence transformation aligns with the strategic priorities in the National Security Strategy, and these other documents, to provide central direction to the Department to implement.

Following publication of the National Security Strategy, the Government agreed an implementation framework to monitor progress over the course of this Parliament and across all involved departments. This framework is classified but the Ministry of Defence is fully engaged.

The Ministry of Defence applies established security, classification and information-sharing procedures to data collected from military space assets. Data shared with allies is governed by appropriate agreements and transmitted through secure systems, with access and handling controls proportionate to its sensitivity.

The Department has not incurred any additional costs from the use of higher-blend SAF at RAF Northolt in any financial year since 2022-23. The Department also has no plans to spend on higher-blend SAF or associated infrastructure at RAF Northolt.

No value for money assessment has been undertaken, as the use of higher-blend SAF at RAF Northolt has not resulted in any additional cost to Defence when compared with conventional aviation fuel.

The UK remains steadfast in its commitment to maritime security in the Middle East and to supporting regional stability alongside our regional partners.

The UK is supporting multinational maritime security efforts in the Red Sea and Gulf regions, working alongside international partners including US-led Combined Maritime Forces.

The UK is also co-leading planning efforts with the French on the Multinational Military Mission that will support safe transit for commercial vessels in the Strait of Hormuz. As part of this, the Royal Navy’s modernisation programme has delivered an autonomous mine countermeasures capability operating in the region, which continues to innovate at pace.

The Ministry of Defence keeps this matter under continual assessment as part of the wider approach to maritime security and the protection of Critical National Infrastructure. The UK works closely with allies and partners to monitor and understand threats to undersea infrastructure and strategically important sea lines of communication.

The Government continues to invest in capabilities to improve our ability to deter, detect and respond to threats in the maritime domain, including up to £330 million of funding to enhance the security and resilience of critical undersea infrastructure.

HMS Protector did not deploy to the 2025 to 2026 southern summer season due to undergoing a period of prolonged essential and mandatory maintenance to ensure the viability of the vessel into the future.

HMS Protector was unable to sail to Devonport under her own power due to propulsion defects. She has been towed to Devonport to enable further technical work to determine the most effective future course of action for the ship.

I refer the hon. Member to the answer given to Question HL1900 in the House of Lords.

https://questions-statements.parliament.uk/written-questions/detail/2026-07-09/HL1900

The Ministry of Defence continually reviews emerging autonomous and uncrewed technologies from a range of suppliers to inform the development of the Hybrid Navy. Future capability decisions will be taken through established procurement and capability development processes and assessed against operational requirements, value for money and wider Defence priorities.

I refer the hon. Member to the answer given to Question HL1900 in the House of Lords.

https://questions-statements.parliament.uk/written-questions/detail/2026-07-09/HL1900

Airspace in the United Kingdom is the responsibility of the Civil Aviation Authority (CAA). MOD officials work very closely with the CAA to integrate the airspace requirements for military Beyond Visual Line of Sight (BVLOS) drone flying in a proportionate manner to ensure the safety of all airspace users. This can include temporary segregated airspace, notified through the NOTAM system or the Aeronautical Information Circular, or permanent segregated airspace, such as Danger Areas, coordinated with civil airspace users through the formal CAP1616 Airspace Change Process.