Written question asked by Keith Simpson (Conservative) on Thursday, 4 November 2004, in the House of Commons. It was due for an answer on Monday, 15 November 2004. It was answered by Geoffrey Hoon (Labour) on Monday, 15 November 2004 on behalf of the Ministry of Defence.
Ministry of Defence
- Question
- To ask the Secretary of State for Defence, who the members were of the Defence Crisis Management Organisation in the lead up to the conflict in Iraq in 2003; on what date and for what reasons the Defence Crisis Management Organisation ruled that mobilisation of forces for Iraq could not begin before the political process had run its course. - (Holding answer 9 November 2004).
- Answer
-
Mr. Keith Simpson: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence (1) who the members were of the Defence Crisis Management Organisation in the lead up to the conflict in Iraq in 2003; [197197] (2) on what date and for what reasons the Defence Crisis Management Organisation ruled that mobilisation of forces for Iraq could not begin before the political process had run its course. [197196] Mr. Hoon: [holding answer 9 November 2004]: The Defence Crisis Management Organisation (DCMO) is responsible for the strategic level planning and execution of military operations, including operations in Iraq, and acts as a channel for operational briefing to Ministers and Chiefs of Staff. The DCMO comprises both civilian and military personnel and is made up of elements of Ministry of Defence Central Staff, the Permanent Joint Headquarters (PJHQ), single-Service front-line commands and other relevant Departments. We do not release names of officials under Exemption 12 of the Code of Practice on Access to Government Information (privacy of an individual). The DCMO provides advice to the Chiefs of Staff and Ministers on a range of issues, including mobilisation and other military preparatory measures. Final decisions on these issues are made by Ministers. The Prime Minister stated on 24 September 2002 that there had to be genuine preparedness and planning to take action against Iraq if diplomacy failed and it proved impossible to bring Iraq into compliance with UN Security Council Resolutions by diplomatic means. It was made clear in a Commons Debate on 25 November 2002 and Defence Questions on 9 December 2002 that the Government was undertaking prudent preparations and planning in the event that military action was required. The decision to start mobilising reserves was made by Ministers in early January once it became appropriate to do so in order to further military preparations, and a call-out order under the Reserve Forces Act 1996 was put before Parliament. The decision on the participation of UK forces in military action against Iraq was made following the Parliamentary debate on the 18 March 2003 on Iraq's continued non-compliance with UN Security Council Resolution 1441 and the Parliamentary vote in favour of military action to enforce the UN Resolutions.
Secondary information
- Type
- Written question
- Reference
- 426 c1046-7W;426 c1050-1W; 197197;197196
- Session
- 2003-04
- Subjects
- Armed forces Defence Armed conflict Deployment Membership Iraq conflict Defence Crisis Management Organisation
- Link
- View this Written question on www.publications.parliament.uk
Librarians' tools
- Timestamp
- 2016-09-21 19:25:03 +0100
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- http://data.parliament.uk/pimsdata/Hansard/PARLIAMENTARY_QUESTION_904810
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