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Proceeding contribution from Stephen Dorrell (Conservative) in the House of Commons on Tuesday, 7 June 2005. It occurred during Debate on bill on Finance Bill.


Finance Bill

The hon. Gentleman has shot his own argument out of the water. There is a sense in which one can draw a parallel with the planning system—planners are given advance clearance on how the authorities will use their power in the absence of planning consent to tell someone to take down a development that he might otherwise have contemplated putting up. The position in tax law as it operates is that, too often, taxpayers have to make their arrangements blind and ignorant of how tax law will be applied in the given set of circumstances that they are creating. People putting up a building have certainty when they do so that they have finally got planning consent before it goes up. That is exactly the sort of certainty, in advance of people organising their affairs, that should be available to taxpayers, but too often is not because of the Revenue’s resistance to the principle of advance and binding clearances. That is the first point. The second point is more mechanical. I am delighted, for two reasons, to see my hon. Friend the Member for Grantham and Stamford (Mr. Davies) back in his place. The first, and most important, is that I am delighted to see that he is smiling and clearly feeling better than he was earlier. The second is that I want to refer to some of the things he said about the way in which the Red Book has evolved over the years. If I may say so to my hon. Friend, I always think that we make a stronger case in politics when instead of saying that standards have slipped and that we want to go back to a previous golden age, we chart a way forward to the re-establishment of principles that I agree are very important. Those principles are the certainty and high quality of the information that should be available to the House in making decisions about the public revenues. The Red Book published in March contains two tables on the revenue effect of measures that the Chancellor plans to take. Two lots of measures are listed as protecting the tax revenues. Those on page 186 total just over £1 billion of full-year revenue effect. Those on page 188, which were announced prior to the Budget, constitute a revenue effect of about £1.2 billion. In planning the public finances, the Chancellor assumed that those various measures to combat tax avoidance would protect the public revenues to the tune of about £2.25 billion, but the House has no external way of checking the numbers that the Government produce. There is a suspicion abroad that every time there is a hole in the public finances, the Chancellor goes around the Treasury looking for a series of anti-avoidance measures that will allow the figures to look better than they otherwise would—to the tune of £2.25 billion this year—and that we never close the loop. We never know whether the anti-avoidance measures raise any money or, if they do, whether it comes close to the sums that are claimed for them. Although more recently the out-turns have come closer to the forecasts than they have done previously, there is a suspicion that one reason why there were significant gaps between forecast and out-turns is that the claims made for the anti-avoidance measures were never lived up to in practice. That is relevant to the problem as it relates to anti-avoidance, but it is also part of a much bigger problem. One of the proposals by the Conservative party in the last Parliament was the need to strengthen the information that is available to Parliament, independent of the Government, on the likely course of events in the public finances—something akin to the Congressional Budget Office that serves the American Congress, giving it advice, independent of the Government, of the likely effect of both revenues and expenditure, and therefore of the likely scale of public borrowing. My right hon. and hon. Friends on the Front Bench described that as an independent fiscal projection committee. I hope that they follow that through. There are two parallels in our system. The first is the National Audit Office, where a structure exists to provide advice to the House through the Comptroller and Auditor General and the institution of the Public Accounts Committee. We could establish a similar organisation to provide to the House an independent view of the likely course of the public finances. The second parallel is the claim that is often—in my view, rightly—made by the Government that they improved the quality of macro-economic decision making by making the Bank of England independently responsible for monetary policy. I am not in favour of taking the fundamental Budget judgments away from the Chancellor. What I am in favour of is giving to this House, which is supposed ultimately to control the purse strings and to be the source of parliamentary power, an improved quality of information on the likely course of public revenues, the likely level of Government expenditure and the likely impact of individual Budget measures. The proposal surfaced in the last Parliament, but in truth it has been talked about for much longer. If we are looking for ways—as we should be—of strengthening the accountability to Parliament of Ministers, it would be a huge step forward if Parliament had its own source of information about what the Government publish in the Red Book. That is why I linked the proposal to what my hon. Friend the Member for Grantham and Stamford said. One way of achieving that is, as he suggested, to go back to an independently produced Red Book, if such a golden age ever existed. Another way—in my view, preferable—is to give Parliament a stronger source of independent advice with which to challenge Ministers and to hold them to account.


Secondary information

Type
Proceeding contribution
Reference
434 c1176-8 
Session
2005-06
Chamber / Committee
House of Commons chamber
Subjects
Accountancy Capital gains tax Corporation tax Income tax Gift aid National income Public expenditure Lump sum payments Public sector debt Tax avoidance Taxation VAT Stamp duties
Legislation
Finance Bill 2005-06
Link
View this Proceeding contribution on www.publications.parliament.uk