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Proceeding contribution from James Gray (Conservative) in the House of Commons on Friday, 21 October 2005. It occurred during Debate on bill on Armed Forces (Parliamentary Approval for Participation in Armed Conflict) Bill.


Armed Forces (Parliamentary Approval for Participation in Armed Conflict) Bill

The right hon. and learned Gentleman makes the same point. He and I come from the same school—Hillhead school in Glasgow—and my father was the Moderator of the Church of Scotland, so I know nothing about bishops either. That does not necessarily stop me having a view on the subject. Certain decisions are so grave and important that the Prime Minister must take them himself. He must not compromise the intelligence that he uses to do it. If he did, he would compromise our sources in the field and undermine a variety of things that he needs to do. He must not give warning to the enemy. Indeed, one or two hon. Members seem to suggest that we ought to have a substantive debate on the deployment for war perhaps some months or years ahead of that deployment. They suggest that we should not send troops to Kuwait in the possibility of going to war with Iraq, that we should decide months and months in advance and that we must state precisely to the House how many troops will go where and what they will do when they get there. That would compromise the security of our troops on the ground. The element of surprise is often important and going to war by Executive decision may well be the right thing to do. I wholeheartedly support the principle that lies behind the Bill, but simply doubt whether it would work in practice. If it were passed, only wars that that were popular with the people and popular in the House would be waged. Wars that were necessary and correct, yet unpopular, would never be waged. If the House was evenly balanced, especially, going to war would become extremely politicised. Hon. Members have talked about the morale of our troops on the ground, but I suspect that morale has been undermined—in so far as that has occurred—not because we went to war with Iraq, but because of the parliamentary process that led up to it. It has come about because our troops know that half the people in this House were not in favour of the war and because they feel let down by the elected representatives in this place. If we had done what we did for previous wars and trusted the Prime Minister’s use of the royal prerogative and wished our troops on the ground well, morale would be higher. However, the fact of the matter is that we did not trust the Executive or the Prime Minister. We were misled by the Prime Minister. We had three substantive votes—


Secondary information

Type
Proceeding contribution
Reference
437 c1113 
Session
2005-06
Chamber / Committee
House of Commons chamber
Related items
Subjects
Accountability Armed forces Armed conflict Deployment Democracy Prime Minister Parliamentary scrutiny Treaties Royal prerogative
Legislation
Armed Forces (Parliamentary Approval for Participation in Armed Conflict) Bill 2005-06
Link
View this Proceeding contribution on www.publications.parliament.uk