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Road Safety Bill [HL]

My Lords, I am grateful to all noble Lords who have participated in the debate. I hope that it will be acceptable to the House if I speak relatively briefly to Amendments Nos. 11, 12 and 23. My noble friends have indicated that they are not proposing to push these amendments to a vote. They raise interesting issues which merit a reply from the Dispatch Box but they differ from the substantive issues in the other amendments, which relate overwhelmingly to the length of sentence. Nevertheless, as anticipated, all noble Lords who spoke to the amendments addressed the issue of principle. The noble and learned Lord, Lord Lyell, in particular, both on Report and again today, made a substantial contribution on the issue of principle which I need to address. So I propose therefore to deal with the amendments in that order and to conclude my remarks on the main item of the debate on this group of amendments. My noble friend Lord Simon has been exploring an interesting angle on the operational side of road traffic law with his amendment. It is known that some drivers—probably where they have been drinking alcohol—leave the scene of an accident before the police arrive in order to evade a breath test. This irresponsible and callous behaviour is even more offensive when it is associated with a road death. Under Section 3A of the Road Traffic Act 1988, a person commits an offence if he causes a death by careless driving while unfit through alcohol or drugs or while exceeding the prescribed alcohol limit. The maximum penalty is 14 years’ imprisonment. In keeping with the general provisions concerning drink driving offences, a driver could also be committing an offence under Section 3A if he causes a death by driving carelessly and then refuses an evidential breath test. The same maximum custodial penalty applies—namely, 14 years’ imprisonment. The noble Viscount is proposing a further addition to the offence in Section 3A. His amendment would make a person liable to the offence attracting 14 years’ imprisonment if he causes a death by careless driving and then leaves the scene of the fatal accident or fails to report it. Clause 20 already provides for a new offence of,"““Causing death by careless, or inconsiderate, driving””," with a maximum penalty of five years’ imprisonment. If a person left the scene of the accident he could be open to this charge but the issue, of course, is one of apprehending him. The main difference between my noble friend’s proposal and Clause 20 would be the 14-year sentence in the first case. The 14-year sentence is, however, associated only with causing death by dangerous driving or causing death by careless driving while unfit through alcohol or drugs, or over the prescribed limit, or unreasonably refusing to undergo a breath test. I therefore suggest that in other circumstances, including the ones described by my noble friend, the maximum of five years we have adopted for the new offence under Clause 20 is appropriate. It is right, however, that leaving the scene of an accident or failing to report an accident should be, and is, seen as an aggravating factor. But we should leave that for the courts at sentence to make allowance for that additional factor. I hope that my noble friend accepts that point. My noble friend Lord Berkeley introduced the issue of the way in which driving should be appropriate and the duty to drive appropriately. I suggest that the offence of careless and inconsiderate driving under Section 3 of the Road Traffic Act 1988 covers this ground more than adequately. It specifies that if a person drives a mechanically propelled vehicle on a road or other public place without due care and attention, or without reasonable consideration for other persons using the road or place, he is guilty of an offence. My noble friend’s concept of duty is an excellent preface to a driving manual; it is an injunction which we expect all drivers to follow. But it is a transposition of a statutory provision which we already have in the 1988 Act. We think we are fully covered regarding the obligations of the citizen as driver. I come to the main issues of the debate. As the noble and learned Lord, Lord Lyell, said, noble Lords interested in the Bill had the great benefit of a meeting with the Home Office Minister in another place. It was extremely useful in clarifying minds, and we understood each other’s position. But as the noble and learned Lord accurately reflected in his speech, he is opposed to what the Government are putting forward in principle and is irreconcilable on that point. We defend the principle; it is the product of extensive consultations and representations. We thought it sufficiently significant to put it in the Labour manifesto at the last general election, and we are carrying into law what we promised to do. At the time, we were reflecting widespread concerns about the inadequacy of sentencing when death was caused by careless driving. I accept entirely that it has to be a matter of judgment on the charge between dangerous or careless driving. There are different degrees of dangerous driving. There are certainly different degrees of careless driving. Momentary loss of concentration gives rise to that well-beloved phrase, ““There but for the grace of God go I””, because none of us has been a perfect driver on every occasion we have driven. But the Government are clear that the courts will make a judgment on whether the degree of carelessness is momentary, very limited, understandable, or may have extremely adverse consequences but is not of the same order of that degree of careless driving which sends a car through a red light. That is scarcely a momentary loss of concentration; if we regarded such an action as tolerable, it would be a question not of ““There but for the grace of God go I”” but of ““There but for the grace of God an awful lot of us would be seriously injured and killed if people thought they could approach traffic lights without due care and attention””. Of course, careless driving will have a wide variety of judgments. That is for the prosecuting authorities to judge when they bring the case—magistrates or judges will make that judgment at the time. The Government are indicating that, if the degree of careless driving is found to be at the upper end of carelessness, which indicates that the driver has carried out a reprehensible act that resulted in death, the sentence should be custodial although the charge would be careless driving.