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Iran

My Lords, I follow and adopt the wise and measured words of the noble Lord, Lord Hannay, and particularly the appeal to see ourselves as the Iranians see us. I also congratulate, as have other noble Lords, the noble Lord, Lord Hurd, on his initiation of this debate and on drawing attention to the grave and in some ways urgent nature of the Question. It is a test for us all of the limits of the limits of soft power and hard power. When the Foreign Affairs Committee in another place published its report on Iran in March 2004, we began by stressing the geo-strategic significance of the country, surrounded by volatile neighbours, and with substantial oil and gas reserves and a large population, as well as the positive contribution Iran could make to vital UK interests—the Middle East peace process, the war on terror, Iraq, and the drug supply, on which we have co-operated very closely with Iran. Our conclusions appear today somewhat optimistic in the light of wild rhetoric of President Ahmadinejad and Iran’s conduct on the nuclear issue. But our broad conclusions remain valid. Iran is a powerful country. The balance of regional power, after the fall of Saddam Hussein, has swung decisively in its favour. It makes sense to co-operate in areas of mutual interest such as drug control. Now, however, the nuclear problem puts all others in the shade. Dealing with that issue requires an understanding of the history of Iran, the motivation of its leaders and the complex dynamics of the parallel power structures. In particular, we should ponder where each step that we take along the road may lead, what is our end game and the attendant dangers to regional and indeed world peace. The deal brokered by the EU3 in autumn 2003 was hailed at the time as a triumph of EU diplomacy. Indeed, members of the Foreign Affairs Committee were there at the time of the deal. It certainly bought time in which other key countries, such as Russia and China, came to recognise the dangers. The question remains whether it has been wholly played out or whether parts, such as security guarantees—the attempt to address the real security concerns of an encircled Iran—can profitably be revived. The US for historical reasons has been more sceptical, and its rhetoric, such as ””axis of evil””, and even the later State of the Union message on encouraging internal opposition, has been shrill and counter productive. Ultimately, however, historians may conclude that the West was indeed deluded and that Iran’s aim has been consistent—the development of military nuclear capability. This aim has been fuelled in part by recognition that if Iraq had nuclear weapons the coalition would not have invaded it, and by perceived double standards in the West. Now Iran is emboldened, made more confident by the problems of the coalition in Iraq, by the rise in oil prices which has bought new dependencies from other major countries—new friends in India, China and Russia—and by technical help from Venezuela and missiles from North Korea. What is the evidence of its intention of developing a military nuclear capability? There is the 18 years’ history of Iran’s duplicity; the fact that oil and gas-rich Iran does not need civil nuclear power and the discovery of weapons-grade uranium traces at Natanz with implausible explanations on the Iranians’ part. There is the hampering of IAEA investigations and the rejection, so far, of the Russian offer to enrich uranium in Russia, under Russian supervision. What is the current status of the IAEA initiative for an international fuel bank, under its management, to guarantee supply to countries like Iran? What is the Government’s best estimate of when Iran is likely to have enough material to make a nuclear bomb, and how dangerous would it be if Iran obtained nuclear capability? The rhetoric of their president is alarming, with the intent—and, potentially, the capability—to destroy Israel, together with links with terrorists groups that could lead to those groups obtaining dirty bombs. That would destabilise the wider region, including Saudi Arabia, and undermine the non-proliferation treaty with no consensus for replacement. The key questions are: what is to be done next, and where would different responses lead? The military option—that is, selective strikes on nuclear sites—has been raised. Potentially, that could be technically feasible in the short term. Yet the recipes and research scientists are there, and it would be realised at considerable political cost. Is there any life left in the diplomatic track? It is certainly vital to follow solely the UN route and to keep Russia and China on board. It has been a miracle of diplomacy that they have indeed joined the international consensus. Are there incentives such as security guarantees which could even now divert Iran, which sees itself as surrounded by US forces? Clearly, and to conclude, we need a twin track. We should continue to explore whether there is any realistic prospect of a deal including security guarantees and with enhanced technical and commercial co-operation as rewards. As other noble Lords have said, Russia is the best hope of providing a deus ex machina, the way out of such problems in classical tragedy. At the same time, while recognising the difficulties of reaching a consensus on sanctions—those that we mentioned as being mostly relatively ineffective, such as football sanctions—we should make clear to Iran that there is indeed a price to pay if it fails to respond and that penalties would increase incrementally to international isolation. I conclude that the task is formidably difficult and that we may fail, with frightening consequences for regional and world security.