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Freedom of Speech

My Lords, I too thank the noble Baroness, Lady Knight of Collingtree, for initiating this debate, coming as it does in the context of the imminent enactment of recent legislation to which the noble Lord, Lord Lucas, referred. This House has repeatedly asserted its belief that freedom of expression and its corollary, the right of access to information, is a vital individual right. I would go so far as to say that it is the cornerstone of democracy, since without information and the freedom to use it to secure other rights, governments quickly become unaccountable, and tyranny can and often does follow. History is replete with examples of how censorship is not only a function of the slide from democracy, but also a cause of it. That is why one has to be vigilant about any curtailment of freedom of expression. Yet it is argued, by some of the more popular press in particular, that hate speech should not be allowed. I think we have to go back to first principles and the laws that govern the difficult area of where the line should be drawn between the expression of emotionally strong views and dangerous incitement, and by whom. Here I declare an interest as a former director of Article 19, an anti-censorship organisation. It is the context that determines whether speech is likely to cause criminal action. The famous case of falsely crying ““Fire!”” in a crowded theatre as compared to shouting from a street corner is still relevant. The argument is that in the former case it is reasonable to expect that injury will occur and that in the latter injury would be unlikely. The key feature of the latter example is that there is the opportunity to avoid both the speech and its effects. That landmark US Supreme Court case has been followed by many others that have helped to build jurisprudence that defines hateful or offensive or insulting speech by its effect on the target and the extent to which the intended victim of such verbal assault is able to avoid it. Thus, rather simplistically, almost anything can be said or written if there is a clear choice about hearing or reading it. If one can walk away from Hyde Park Corner, close the book, not buy the theatre or cinema tickets, then why should speech be censored? The exception to this rule occurs when speech, or any other form of expression, occurs within a highly charged context where the speech could itself whip up such strong feeling that damaging action is likely to occur and where those who become emotionally charged have the access and the wherewithal to cause criminal harm. The terrible example of our time is the Rwanda genocide of 1994 where the highly popular local radio orchestrated the mass killing by the Hutus of their more moderate kinsmen and of the Tutsis, a massacre that had been planned for some months previously and that took place in an extremely tense context in which tribal violence, if not common, was certainly within everyone’s living memory. The furore about the offensive cartoons first published in Denmark last year is alarming but presents an interesting example of the limits of our tolerance. The demonstrations in central London by angry Muslims were indeed offensive to many. The placards were extraordinary, calling for the murder of those who insult Islam. But should they be banned, or should the more extreme demonstrators be charged? No one was obliged to attend the demonstration. We may argue that it should not have taken place, but it did, and as far as one can tell it was not an occasion to prepare further criminal action. It was an expression of hurt and anger. Who is to say that that should be suppressed, with possibly far worse consequences? The Abu Hamza case is quite different. Here, young and impressionable men were obliged by tradition to go to the mosque every week and thus to hear outpourings of hate against specific targets in British society. We now learn that Abu Hamza had the wherewithal to provide these young men with the means, either through training abroad or weapons, to carry out criminal actions. That is not free speech; it is criminal incitement and has rightly been judged as such. Alien speech is uncomfortable for all of us, as is the expression of violent emotions, but I believe that it is precisely in such moments of heightened feeling that we must remember the basic right to free speech and look carefully at the context in which it occurs. Above all, by permitting these kinds of demonstrations to take place, Britain is encouraging potential political discourse and solutions in place of violence.