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Freedom of Speech

My Lords, like other speakers, I thank my noble friend Lady Knight for introducing this important and timely debate. If it would not have been greedy to speak twice this afternoon, I would have liked to put on record my concern about, and abhorrence of, the current excesses in Iran. I declare an interest as chairman of the Cumbrian Newspaper group, which owns seven regional paid-for titles, a number of free titles and magazines, and a number of radio stations. Other speakers have already emphasised how freedom of speech is central to our society, how it is one of its defining characteristics, and that it is axiomatic that all freedoms must be exercised in a manner so as not to deny that freedom to others. In that context, it operates at two slightly different levels: first, at a public level, where the state intervenes to stop racial hatred, civil disobedience and even domestic insurrection and so on; and, secondly, at a private level, through the law of tort, particularly defamation law. Although we live in an essentially plural and secular society, we should all recognise that, in the case of religious belief, some forms of expression not only may be offensive in human terms but are more than that because they attack things that are sacramental and universally sacred. I speak as a practising Anglican, but one, I am afraid, who is no textbook example; rather, I suspect, for the benefit of the right reverend Prelate, I am an example of the ““Wrong Sort””. However, a society where, quite rightly, there is a distinction between Church and state, we must be clear how we deal with this phenomenon. Like the interlocutor of the noble Lord, Lord Dubs, I believe that in the last resort God and the eternal verities can look after themselves. I need them a lot more than they need me. One of the most important questions is how our law transfers these general principles into actual action or lack of it in any circumstance. The problem is that, as anyone who has ever held elected office knows, there is always somebody somewhere out there who objects to everything. That being the case, some test of reasonableness must be introduced into the assessment of the facts—just as in defamation cases in which it is the jury’s job to determine. How else, otherwise, can we in a plural society deal with widely varying susceptibilities and beliefs? Interestingly, as the noble Lord, Lord Plant, said, it often seems that it is those who are most insensitive towards others and most intolerant who become most sensitive in respect of their own susceptibilities. The approach that I have outlined may be a bit rough and ready but it seems to have one universal merit: while it may be rough justice, it is actual justice. If, like me, you have stood for elected office as a Conservative in a strong Labour area, the fact that you happen to be an old Etonian, a hereditary Peer, educated at Oxbridge, a barrister, a farmer and a landowner, is inevitably gratuitously handing over to one’s opponents a number of metaphorical rotten tomatoes free, gratis and for nothing, to be hurled straight back in your face. It may be unfair, but that is life. That is the world we are in and it cannot be any other way. The world is a place of rough and tumble, just as much in the world of words and ideas as of commerce and business. Expressing ideas that others find distasteful in a manner that does not incite or attempt to incite must be a legitimate form of expression. Clearly in that context motive can be a part in defining incitement. Equally, a subsequent publication or issuing of a statement of something already said may have a different characteristic from that of its first publication. History shows us a series of ideas that have become discredited by virtue of public debate: the divine right of kings; slavery; witchcraft; or, perhaps more recently, the concept of hereditary membership of Parliament. There is a further and most important consideration, which anyone considering expressing a view or reporting a story should consider, particularly one that may hurt or upset someone else, even though it may be perfectly lawful to do what is being proposed. That is whether it is in the public interest and responsible to do so. Journalists, it is often said, honour that axiom more in the breach than in the observance. It is certainly an unfortunate perception; and, if true, is evidence of irresponsibility. The wider freedom that freedom of speech encompasses and is a part of, involves responsibility towards others. In the case of the so-called Danish cartoons there should be no law forbidding their publication; but in all the circumstances it is on balance an abnegation of one’s responsibilities to do so. I make no apology for explaining that I asked the Library staff if they could produce the cartoons for me. I have a somewhat old-fashioned view that it is on the whole better to inform oneself before forming a view and expressing it; especially in your Lordships’ Chamber. They did: they obtained them from the net, which, as the noble Lord, Lord Giddens, said, poses a number of interesting problems. What struck me—as other speakers have mentioned—is that I did not think they were high-class or helpful cartoons. However, my point of view, which may be considered excessively libertarian by some, is that if, as I do, one believes that freedom matters a great deal, it must mean that when the push comes to the shove it takes precedence over injured amour propre or hurt feelings.