Proceeding contribution from Lord Lea of Crondall (Labour) in the House of Lords on Wednesday, 1 March 2006. It occurred during Debate on bill and Committee proceeding on Company Law Reform Bill [HL].
Company Law Reform Bill [HL]
moved Amendment No. 308:"Page 181, line 13, at end insert—" ““( ) Where the company is not a small company, the directors shall appoint a remuneration committee to prepare proposals to be put to the board in respect of the directors’ remuneration report.”” The noble Lord said: This is the opportunity for the noble Lord, Lord Hodgson, to put into practice what he has just been talking about. The case in substance is for remuneration committees to have regard to the views of the rest of the workforce and, indeed, the difference between the huge pay increases in the last few years at the top of the scale relative to the position of the average or, may I say, median. The median is the point for the rest of the workforce. The average would embrace the large increases at the top. If the noble Lord, Lord Hodgson, is saying, ““We don’t want any laws about this, but it is highly desirable that remuneration committees should meet with an open forum of representatives of the rest of the workforce to justify what is happening to remuneration””—which is not the only thing that those committees discuss—that would be a step forward. The last pay statement summarising the position of Britain’s 350 largest companies shows that directors’ pay increased by 18.1 per cent last year. That compares with 4 per cent for the index generally—18 per cent versus 4 per cent. That sort of ratio has gone on year after year. What is the justification for that? I draw the Committee’s attention to an interesting article on the United States by Samuel Britton—not exactly a left-wing firebrand—in the Financial Times on 10 February. He looks at the way in which the median worker has not benefited at all from the increases in the so-called average, because the increases were all at the top. In the past decade in the United States, the pay of chief executive officers rose by 100 per cent, while that of occupations that are supposed to be part of the new economy, such as maths and computer science, rose by less than 5 per cent. He was reluctantly driven to reflect tacitly the view of the US commentator that he was reviewing in his article, that a lot of that is down to,"““mutual pay determination by an exclusive cabal of chief executive officers””—" the phenomenon that, and again I cite his article, is easily summarised as,"““if you scratch my back I’ll scratch yours””." We all have innumerable conversations. Those of us who do not sit in boardrooms obviously cannot give the inside story, but those who do often say that the idea that the chairman and the board on the remuneration committee are expected to ensure that all these people are kept in the top echelon of other boards—and there are interlocking directorships—has reached a position where there is extreme concern that it is not sustainable. The director of investment affairs of the Association of British Insurers said on 16 December that there were,"““detrimental consequences if the premium commanded by executives rises too far above general levels of pay in the economy . . . It can’t go on for ever without something snapping””." He goes on to highlight the role of pay consultants in ratcheting up the system through comparability in a way that of course would be totally out of order if it were attempted by anybody else. That is to be combined with the perception of a very interesting body in this regard—the CIS, the Co-operative Insurance Society. It gives a lot of advice to people asking questions of boards. It says that remuneration committees are becoming increasingly innovative when it comes to maintaining executive pay growth,"““often regardless of performance””;" and that boards are making renewed efforts to avoid what is seen as a growing backlash against excessive pay with discretionary bonuses and ex gratia payments,"““which do not require prior shareholder approval, increasingly replacing performance related pay””." While share incentive packages require prior approval, the CIS said that many companies have remuneration packages that are listed only in part in the small print of remuneration reports, or that companies refuse to disclose precise performance targets because of ““commercial sensitivity””. I made some of those points at some length because clearly we have the problems of structure and of justification, which are meant to be related to performance. It is an opportune moment to take stock of all this, because it has been some years since we had the series of reports from Greenbury onwards, with the combined code and so forth. Greenbury said that remuneration committees should be sensitive to the wider scene, including,"““pay and employment conditions elsewhere in the group””," but it is clear that that is not happening. One of the reasons for that is that there is no basic structure of consultation or forums where it could happen. That is why the amendments all have essentially the same aim. Information must be published about the ratio of directors’ and others’ top pay to that of everybody else. That must be easily and transparently provided; it is the absolute minimum. We all know that it will be like going to the dentist and having a tooth out without anaesthetic, but it is much better for it to be looked at now rather than face the consequences of not going to the dentist in the first place.
Secondary information
- Type
- Proceeding contribution
- Reference
- 679 c178-80GC
- Session
- 2005-06
- Chamber / Committee
- House of Lords Grand Committee
- Subjects
- Disclosure of information Audit Accountancy Company law Companies Directors Absent voting Liability Donors Expenditure Members Political parties Public companies Public records Meetings Voting methods Shareholders Rules of procedure
- Legislation
- Company Law Reform Bill (HL) 2005-06
- Link
- View this Proceeding contribution on www.publications.parliament.uk
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