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Intelligence and Security Committee (Annual Report)

I used the powerful example of the report on the death of Zahid Mubarek, which was published after two earlier investigations, to point out that its recommendations were made after it was claimed that all the lessons had been learned and all the information had been uncovered. I do not know the unknowable but, given the enormity of the 7 July attacks, I do not understand why the hon. Lady and others are reluctant to make a comparatively modest investment in an independent inquiry, which might uncover facts of which we have no knowledge at present. As for the ISC report, I welcome the wording on the regionalisation of the operation of the security and intelligence services, and the fact that the process of regionalisation was accelerated following the July bombings. I was struck by the passage in paragraph 40 which states:"““A vital part of the regionalisation programme will be the Service’s ability to work closely with local bodies, particularly the Regional Intelligence Cells within the police.””" I am surprised that the process of regionalisation does not appear to have happened earlier. It is arguable that excessive centralisation is as unwelcome in this matter as it is in so many other areas of Government policy. It is consistent with the observation made in the Intelligence and Security Committee’s earlier report of the 7 July bombings that the regionalisation of the security and intelligence services helps improve policing at local level and helps the front-line intelligence-gathering function of our police forces. That takes on particular resonance in the week when the Government’s ill-judged attempt to force through police force mergers seems to have hit the buffers. I note that the Home Secretary’s predecessor today branded that development as weak and damaging, but I come to the Home Secretary’s defence, even in his absence. It is a welcome wake-up call that the move towards forced regional police mergers was the wrong way to go. The report helps to emphasise the need to localise both the police and the work of the intelligence services. There was reference earlier to the Committee’s observations on the SCOPE IT system and the serious delays in rolling it out, from April 2005 to autumn 2006, yet the capital cost of that delay has been blanked out in the report. I find it difficult to understand why that cost should not be quantified in the report. I understand entirely that there is plenty of delicate and sensitive information that one does not want to appear in such reports, but I wonder whether there is a security risk in revealing the figure. I do not understand why the security services appear to have sought not to release the costs incurred by yet another delay in a public information technology project. That is particularly apposite hot on the heels of the revelations in the Sunday newspapers, notwithstanding the Home Secretary’s confirmation this evening that he wants to press ahead with the development of the much more ambitious and complex ID card database, that there are pronounced reservations among senior officials about whether that is possible. One official was quoted in the Sunday papers as stating:"““Nobody expects this programme to work. It is basically on hold while ministers rethink their options. It’s impossible to imagine the full scheme being brought in before 2026.””" Another official remarked:"““I conclude that we are setting ourselves up to fail””," and yet another referred to the possibility that the scheme could be"““canned completely””." The fact that there is so much that we do not know about the feasibility of implementing the ID card database affirms the need for much more detail about why the SCOPE IT system has been delayed and the cost that that delay has incurred. The report contains an important section on the work of the Serious Organised Crime Agency, and states that the Committee was told about the difficulties that could arise from the fact that SOCA will be competing with other agencies for new recruits. The Committee is to continue to examine progress and assess the effectiveness of co-operation between SOCA, Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs and other agencies. I endorse the Committee’s observations that competition for resources between SOCA and other agencies needs to be kept under review. Vigilance is required to ensure the best possible operational relationship between SOCA and HMRC in pursuing serious drug investigations and criminal finance work, which are the two responsibilities that have been transferred from HMRC to SOCA. However, there is a quasi-constitutional issue on which the report is silent, and which perhaps lies beyond the remit of the Committee—the apparent lack of direct accountability for the work of SOCA to the House. I urge the Home Secretary and his colleagues on the Front Bench to look once again at improving in any way that they can the transparency of the important and sensitive work of SOCA and the way in which the agency can be held accountable to the House. Finally, in an important section of the report there is reference to the fact that the Home Secretary"““told the Committee that he had commissioned a study into the impact of new technology on interception, including any evidential issues, and that the Committee would have early sight of its findings.””" Although, as I understand it, the study exists, it is a pity that the Committee has not been given early sight of it. We on the Liberal Democrat Benches look forward with some eagerness to hearing the results of the study, because for some time we have argued, as have many others, that the permissibility of intercept evidence in our courts would be an important additional weapon in the fight against terrorism. Earlier this year the senior anti-terror police officer at the Met, Andy Hayman, advocated the use of intercept evidence in terrorist cases. As we know, in 2004 the Newton committee proposed the removal of the bar on intercept evidence as a more ““acceptable and sustainable”” approach to the threat from terrorism than the arrogation of new executive powers to restrict liberty outside the normal operation of the judicial process. We are in a rather anomalous position. According to Liberty, the United Kingdom and the Republic of Ireland are the only countries worldwide that maintain a ban on the use of intercept evidence, yet we accept intercept evidence if that has been gained under the jurisdiction of other Governments. It seems odd that it is not permissible if it has been gained under our own authorisation, but is allowed if it has been obtained under the authorisation of Governments overseas. I hope the Home Secretary will use the study mentioned in the report as a launch-pad to have the debate once again. It has been rumbling on for a long time. I accept that there are a number of practical and legal difficulties, many of which we believe can be overcome. Like all good reports, the ISC report raises as many queries as it poses solutions—queries related to intercept evidence; the merits or otherwise of an independent inquiry into the events leading up to the bombings of 7 July; the importance of the further regionalisation and localisation of the operation of our security and intelligence services; the need to keep a vigilant eye on how the flaws, delays and unquantified costs of delayed IT systems can be remedied; and accountability for the operation of SOCA and other agencies. I repeat my gratitude to all members of the Committee for laying the report before us today.