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Education and Inspections Bill

I shall speak to the three amendments under my name in this group, Amendments Nos. 248ZAD, 248ZAE and 248ZAF. I have some residual concerns about the process proposed in this part of the Bill. These are probing amendments that I hope will bring clarification of what the consequences and achievements of such a part of the Act would be as it becomes an Act. What is the added value of the office being structured in this way? Is there a potential deficit? I stress also the points made in the previous speech about the importance of independence for Ofsted and clarity of purpose and governance. I suspect that these clauses of the Bill will add to neither independence nor clarity. This measure could be expensive. Doubtless, as committees and sub-committees multiply, it will become more expensive because they all have to be fuelled and the expenses covered. Ofsted has happily moved ahead in its management arrangementsto include independent members of the senior management group within Ofsted. I think that these independent members have given considerable value and provided what this part of the Bill ideally sets out to provide. They have been a valuable addition and this model of governance has served Ofsted well. As for additional value, could it be that weare to use the blessed words ““accountable”” and ““accountability””? Those words usually appear at this stage in such a debate. Her Majesty's Chief inspector is accountable. He or she is accountable to Parliament, and is rightly held to account by Parliament through, for example, the annual report, the Secretary of State and the Select Committees.All of those operate well and in a way that teststhe independence and clarity of vision of the inspectorate. That is happening—accountability is there. If there be any doubt, there are more than 25,000 schools in England, each of which has a complement of teachers who regard it as a sacred duty to keep an eye on Ofsted. So there is an informal form of accountability. I believe that accountability is there and clear and should properly continue to be exercised by Parliament. Is there then the risk of a deficit in these departures? I believe that there is, and I think that the risk is that the office, constituted as it is in the Bill, will perhaps raise issues about both the professional and independent judgment of the chief inspector and his or her colleagues. What precisely is the office meant to add and what will it do? According to the Bill, it will ““determine strategy””. The Government properly determine policy. If a body such as this determines strategy, what is left for the professionals in the organisation who have served us very well not only in exercising government policy and criticising it but also in determining the strategic ways in which it can be carried out? If such a body were excluded from determining strategy and perhaps reduced to advising, as my amendment suggests, I think that there would be a consequence which shows the danger in the proposals: mission drift. I think that that will happen anyway. I think that the body in question will suddenly find that it sits in a position where it can ask more questions—I am tempted to say ““x”” fool questions—than it reasonably should, and that will provide a bad air to efficient organisation within Ofsted. There will be a layer of bureaucracy between the inspectorate and the exercise of its judgment in practical ways. Does it have to go back to the body in question—in monthly meetings, six-weekly meetings, three-monthly meetings? Does the chief inspector have to go back to that body before making sometimes very urgent practical decisions to ensure that it is in line with strategy and strategic priorities as set out in the mind of the office? My view is that this element of the Bill will at best add little to the activities of Ofsted. As it stands, however, it could confuse the lines of accountability and the professional responsibilities of the inspectorate and the chief inspector by adding another line of accountability. I know that the schedule spells out in some detail who does what, but I do not think that it adds up to a clear line of responsibility or a clear line of accountability. For example, the office can make appointments but only through the action of the chief inspector. That seems rather convoluted, and there is a series of similar examples in the Bill. I would ultimately wish that these clauses be excised, but I suspect that that is too much to hope for. However, if they are to remain, I hope that they can be modified to make plain where independence, professional judgment and accountability lie, which is quite clearly with Parliament rather than, effectively, a quango.