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North Korea: Nuclear Test

My Lords, I, too, thank the noble Lord, Lord Alton, for initiating this debate. I apologise to him, because owing to the rather rapid collapse of the earlier debate I missedthe first part of his remarks. I was very interested in the second part, and I deeply apologise. One of the most attractive of the many attractive attributes of the noble Lord is that he never gives up hope in his fellow human beings. The visit that he paid, along with the noble Baroness, Lady Cox, to North Korea, illustrated once again that his faith and belief that human beings can be changed and can be made to think again about what they do has borne rich fruit, because he is one of the few of us who has had access to North Korea and has met in North Korea a good many of its citizens. That was unexpected from the point of view of those of us who see it as entirely a hermit kingdom. It goes to show what a long way hope and faith will carry one. I pay due tribute to him for that characteristic and for having taken that chance. We have heard some interesting speeches. I refer at outset to the original arrangement—the so-called ““agreed framework””—that established the organisation KEDO, to which a number of noble Lords have referred. Two things lead from it. First, we were reminded by the noble Lord, Lord Selsdon, that many of the countries of Asia, particularly north Asia, with which we are dealing in this debate, have a very strong sense of history. That strong sense of history has been largely lost in western Europe and the United States, and often we therefore know very little about the background and the tradition of the countries with which we are dealing. North Korea is a good example of a country that has for long periods been isolated from the rest of the world, dependent on itself and not familiar with the ways of diplomacy. One of the things that we can read from the story of the KEDO agency and the original arrangement that was made in 1994 is that it is essential to remember that countries have this very long sense of history. It is also essential to remember—and it is not unfair to make some criticism of the Bush Administration in this context—that democracies often quite rapidly change course, particularly in the United States, between one Administration and another. The path that had been consistently, conscientiously and rather slowly pursued by President Clinton’s Administration was suddenly broken off in 2001 by the Bush Administration. We can fully understand the change in policies between different democratic parties that are elected to government, but doing so is not altogether easy for a country with the kind of tradition that North Korea is part of, and it can be put down to intentions that to this day North Korea clearly believes that the American Administration have towards it. Tragically, one of the things that we have to learn is that cutting off diplomatic relations with another country is never very wise. We have of course the example of North Korea, but also of Iran, as countries with which the United States has cut off bilateral relationships. That often means that the level of knowledge and information is suddenly reduced, sometimes with serious consequences for the ability to build solutions. I also remind colleagues that it was the nuclear posture review of January 2002, one of the earliest reviews conducted by the Bush Administration, which listed North Korea as a possible target. I want to look for a moment at the attitude of the neighbours, because it is of crucial significance to our debate. As a number of noble Lords have said, South Korea is desperately vulnerable to an attack by North Korea. The fact that so many conventional weapons in North Korea are targeted at Seoul, a very large urban area, has had a major impact on the so-called sunshine policy pursued by South Korea, which it is extremely reluctant to abandon. I take the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Hannay, about the significance of South Korea in supporting the current sanctions. All of us can also understand why South Korea is keen to strike a balance between what it is asked to do internationally and the risks to its own population. It may be more difficult for South Korea to take that risk than for us to advocate that it should do so. Its position is extremely difficult. In that respect, we have not yet mentioned the so-called sunshine policy’s effect on the two mid-Korea projects relating to the industrial and tourist areas, which have been established between the two Koreas and would be put at risk by the sanctions. There are real questions about whether they should be affected, given the South Korean attempt to try to build bridges with North Korea, which in its situation is extremely understandable. China has behaved in a constructive way, so far at least, in this episode. Not only did it back United Nations Security Council resolution 1718, surprisingly and very strongly, but I understand that the most significant single factor in persuading North Korea to back away from continuing enrichment without returning to the six-power talks was the final decision by the Banco Delta in Macau to refuse to continue cash transfers of an illegal nature to North Korea. Without them, North Korea has seen the creation of an effective financial sanction on it that embraces both so-called legitimate trade and illegitimate trade, with grave consequences for North Korea. It was almost certainly China’s influence that led to the Banco Delta ending its cash transfers to North Korea, so—I am not certain of this—we probably owe to China the effect of that on North Korea, which has been greater than any other of the sanctions so far proposed. We have also not talked much about Japan. It is of crucial significance what attitude it takes towards the possible reform of its constitution proposed by the new Administration there, and whether it moves away from being a non-nuclear power by conviction, if I may put it that way—a country like Germany that is simply determined not to go back to the traditional military attitudes that survived there until and shortly after the Second World War. The noble Lords, Lord Alton and Lord Hannay, referred to a denuclearised Korean peninsula. We must not see a move towards a nuclear Japan at this time, and want to do nothing that might encourage it. That means putting the emphasis on a denuclearised Korean peninsula, not the other way round. I cannot put too much emphasis on that. The noble Lord, Lord Hannay, referred to the possibility of instability in north-east Asia and of the proliferation of nuclear weapons in that region. Japan is key to holding that situation, and we must take its considerations profoundly in mind as well. Last of all among the issues that confront us, I want to refer to one that my noble friend Lord Garden mentioned as his fifth major concern about threats. I would move it much higher, though I defer to his greater knowledge. I believe that the single greatest short-run threat is that North Korea, which has proved itself on many occasions an utterly irresponsible trader in the field, might be one of the sources of nuclear weapons and technology for some of the most dubious and frightening groups, if not states, in the world. North Korea has shown no scruples about to whom it sells its nuclear technology and knowledge. There is no reason why it will show any such scruples in future given the parlous state of its economy, which means that its nuclear technology is among the few things that might be exportable to the rest of the world. That brings us up hard against two really difficult questions. I am sure that the Minister will address them so far as he is able; I fully understand that there are probably great limitations at present in what he can say. The first is the issue of how far one can maintain sanctions against trade from North Korea to the outside world, and what that will entail. What it will entail is already partly being met by China, which has begun inspections of lorries and trucks passing from North Korea across its border. That is a very recent development. The bigger question is whether there should be some form of naval intervention in trade from North Korea through the seas, and particularly whether that might be escalated to a naval blockade, as is suggested in Washington. A naval blockade will almost certainly involve the United States Navy, as the one that would be capable of carrying it out. I raise that simply as a question, but it is a difficult aspect of the whole relationship between North Korea and the outside world. The second point in that respect, which I want to talk about very quickly, is whether the whole question of North Korea as a trading nation in nuclear matters has not to be part of what the noble Lord, Lord Hannay, spoke about—a much wider approach to proliferation. That brings me to the last part of what I want to say. If we believe that we have to take a much larger approach than simply dealing with North Korea one day, Iran another day, and some country as yet unknown on a third day, we have to look at our systematic response to nuclear proliferation and, as he pointed out, the gradual breakdown of the nuclear non-proliferation treaty. If that treaty is to be shored up, it will require much more imaginative and far-reaching steps than we have taken. I come back to the issue raised in this House last week, and by me much earlier—whether we do not need a major international push towards the supply of low-enriched uranium from guaranteed, internationally monitored and controlled sources. That does not mean China, the United States or Russia, but the International Atomic Energy Agency as the one and only international body that all the different countries respect and most of them belong to. That means that we have to see support from the United Kingdom Government and many other Governments for, as the noble Lord, Lord Hannay, briefly mentioned, the proposal for a substantial fuel bank to supply low-enriched uranium suitable only for civil energy to those countries that are willing to engage in it. It will make it clear that any country that retains highly enriched uranium will be under very strict monitoring by the IAEA for that reason alone and associated with it there should be an attempt to try to cut off the supply of fissile energy materials. In conclusion, we have to take this matter far beyond the individual case of North Korea, serious though that is, because we are now looking at a slide towards proliferation that must be stopped if the world is to be saved.