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Legal Services Bill [HL]

Yes, but I have to refer to it as relevant. I have had a word with the noble Lord. Thank you very much. Amendment No. 139F would subsume Amendment No. 52 because it is applicable only to directions from the LSB under Clause 31. The situation has changed overnight. My noble friend Lord Kingsland raised the issue of judicial review at Second Reading but there was no response to his question. Yesterday, at about three o'clock, I said: "““as matters stand, it””—" the LSB— "““appears to have … absolute discretion, without means of ultimate judicial resolution””.—[Official Report, 22/1/07; col. 898.]" At 10 o'clock it was accepted that the LSB was subject to judicial review, a concession for which I am indeed grateful, so I scrapped my speaking notes. Today, therefore, the question that arises is whether that concession should be in the Bill. Should it be in Amendment No. 139F or Amendment No. 65 or in neither? I am not speaking to the amendment, but merely referring to the dilemma. We now have to address that issue. If that is so, in what form should that amendment be? This is not just a situation in which we can sit back and rely on Pepper v Hart, which is a source of last relief. As appears from yesterday’s debate on the framework within which the LSB operates, it is not at all clear and clarity is highly relevant to judicial review. We must therefore consider, in summary, what we are dealing with. Today, we are in effect dealing with a continuation of what happened yesterday. It was proposed that the structure of the Bill should define the perimeter within which the LSB should exercise its discretion; that the integrity of the approved regulators be acknowledged in the Bill; and that the quality and standards of legal services be maintained, as set by self-regulation, and recognised in the Bill. It was also proposed that a fair balance between the interests of the consumer and the approved regulator be assured; that the LSB should only intervene on the complaint of the consumer after notice has been given to the approved regulator to enable representation; that some acceptable means to that end should be devised; and that the conflict between the regulatory objectives was to be resolved proportionately, taking into account all such obligations of like importance on a balance, if fine, to be tipped in favour of public interest, as spoken to on Clause 1. That could be achieved by a series of piecemeal amendments, or by a trigger clause in primary legislation, requiring the Secretary of State to introduce regulations enabling him to issue and require a code of practice, having full legal efficacy in the civil field, as spoken to by Lord Denning, Lord Elwyn-Jones and Lord Henderson of Brompton, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Cameron of Lochbroom, and other noble Lords in a short debate on 15 January 1986, cols. 1075 to 1104. Such a code could assimilate merely procedural provisions without eroding or overloading the structure of the primary legislation. I do not know how this is to be resolved. It could be a ““multi-approach””: some of the procedural provisions could be dealt with in the code, having legal effect; some provisions would essentially have to remain in the Bill. I cannot entertain how that should be done; in fact, I do not know. It is a difficult matter to resolve, but I do know that it must be done. If the Government were to accept Amendment No. 65, then, subject to the advice of my noble friends Lord Kingsland and Lord Hunt of Wirral, one would have to consider whether these judicial review amendments would be required in the amended Bill, or whether they would be otiose, as the principle would have been accepted. I do not wish to take much more time, but I shall conclude with a word to seek to alleviate the concern of the noble Lord, Lord Whitty, who I am glad to see in his place. I have the greatest possible respect for him, and I have disagreed with him on too many occasions. With respect, the noble Lord seems to be unaware that consumer interests can be contrary to public interests and that if they are, as was explained by the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, they must be subservient to the public interest. That is the first concept that I ask the noble Lord to consider. The noble Lord does not seem to be aware that it is in the interests of the consumer that the quality and independence of legal services set up and maintained by self-regulation should remain as proposed in yesterday’s debate. I hope that, as chairman of the National Consumer Council, the noble Lord will accept that what he said about limiting the potential for intervention cannot and does not affect judgment on the gravity of a complaint from the council about the conduct of the Law Society, which is only one of the approved regulators. I say nothing about the Bar Council because I have too close an interest to declare. The noble Lord, Lord Whitty, entertains a serious misconception. As chairman of the organisation, I respectfully ask him to reconsider his position. I beg to move.