---

Legal Services Bill [HL]

Before I failed to realise that the noble Lord, Lord Kingsland, had not spoken, I was about to say what an interesting start to our debate this has been. I, too, am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Campbell of Alloway, for not only moving his amendment but reminding us of the range of issues that we debated yesterday. I was reflecting on those with my officials this morning and how important I felt our discussions had been. I was able to consider a number of matters, as I had agreed to do, and look forward to discussing those away from your Lordships' House as well as on the Floor of the House at Report. I intend to try and be the sensitive parliamentarian to whom the noble Lord referred. This fits in with the jigsaw he described to us yesterday that he wants us to put together. I will wait until the final day of Committee to ask whether he thinks that we have completed the jigsaw puzzle in taking forward all these issues. The noble Lord, Lord Kingsland, is right that we have before us a number of amendments that deal with the specifics on appeal. Let me answer the specific amendments, as I would find it helpful to put that on the record, and deal as well with the particular questions that were so succinctly put by the noble Lord. I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Campbell of Alloway, and other noble Lords that judicial review will be the appropriate remedy in instances where approved regulators want to challenge the lawfulness of the board’s regulatory decisions. As it is a public body, the board’s decisions are already subject to judicial review. We have drafted the Bill to allow for this; we do not think that it has to be stated in the Bill because that is the way that it will work. We do not want to set out in the Bill what the judiciary may consider when reviewing the legality of the board’s regulatory decisions. For example, compliance with the European Convention on Human Rights is already a matter for consideration on judicial review. The noble Lord, Lord Campbell of Alloway, knows that well, not least from his distinguished work on the Joint Committee on Human Rights, before which, as Minister responsible for human rights, I have had the privilege to appear. We do not see the need to remind the judiciary of what should be considered in the exercise of their supervisory jurisdiction. We are concerned that putting things in the Bill might inadvertently restrict the ambit of any such review or suggest that other grounds are less valid or are to be accorded less weight. We would not wish to do that accidentally, so we are not drawn to putting such provisions in the Bill. The noble Lord has drawn to our attention a number of important points which he believes may require consideration in judicial review proceedings. I should like to speak briefly about each of those. On proportionality and independence, the board is already under a duty to be proportionate—we discussed this at great length yesterday under Clause 3(3)—and to act in a way that is compatible with the regulatory objectives, which includes encouraging an independent profession. If the board has not complied with these requirements, that would of course form part of a review. I have already dealt with the point about the European Court of Human Rights. Suffice to say, this has already been taken into account and does not need a specific mention in the Bill. I agree with the noble Lord’s sentiment that the quality of legal advice should be kept at the highest standard. When taken together, my view is that the regulatory objectives ensure that the quality of the legal profession and its services, including advice to consumers, is maintained. But we do not think it should be given special consideration over and above other issues. In Amendment No. 139F, the same concerns apply, but to a greater extent, given that it sets out the grounds on which judicial review can be applied for rather than considerations that may be considered. Again, I am not drawn to putting the conditions in the Bill because I do not want to narrow or limit the breadth of judicial review. That would not be beneficial for consumers or for the approved regulators. I do not want to reopen the debate on public interest—we have already debated that at length. Suffice to say, the board has a duty in this regard, and its failure to comply with it could be a ground for judicial review. Similarly, an approved regulator could and should apply to the court for judicial review if the board’s decision fails to comply with the European Court of Human Rights or the tenets of natural justice, however inconceivable that is. I hope that when the noble Lord reflects on the detailed response I have given to the points in his amendments, he will feel that I have covered them.