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Corruption

My Lords, I am glad to follow the noble Lord, Lord Brennan, in those sentiments, and I congratulate the noble Baroness, Lady Williams of Crosby, on raising an extremely important issue in Parliament. I emphasise the words ““in Parliament”” because this is where it ought to be raised. The key point that I am making in this debate concerns the Attorney’s position as the law officer of the Crown who is accountable to Parliament. The Attorney came to us on 14 December and raised the position that the noble Baroness has correctly set out. Not surprisingly, it has come under a good deal of criticism. It has been questioned by a number of members of her party, and there have been interesting discussions. I listened to the noble Lord, Lord Garden, on the ““Today”” programme and on previous occasions. At some stage, a judicial review case is to be brought against the Attorney by the Campaign Against Arms Trade. The OECD has expressed concerns, as the noble Baroness indicated. African leaders have been raising the matter. It is a matter of huge and important public interest. However, some suggest that the role of the Attorney should be changed in some way on account of this—and that is what I wish to resist very strongly indeed. A great strength of our constitution is that it is pyramidal in shape and that in the end, everything can be held to account in Parliament. That obviously does not apply to judgments that the Law Lords reach in their wisdom—until Parliament changes the law, that stands; but the question of the prosecuting authorities and the way that they are superintended by the Attorney-General, which is the issue raised immediately by this debate, most certainly should involve parliamentary accountability. When he comes to consider any prosecution, the Attorney-General has to consider two questions, as do the prosecuting authorities in accordance with the code for Crown prosecutors,. First, he has to consider whether there is sufficient evidence to give rise to a realistic prospect of conviction. Some commentators talk about the balance of probabilities on the criminal standard of proof before a British jury. The second question is whether it is in the public interest to prosecute. It is perfectly proper that that question should be considered and there is no doubt that questions of national security are of public interest—of very important public interest. In this case, doubt is thrown over whether this really is a matter of national security or of commercial convenience. It is entirely proper for that to be tested here and in public—indeed, as it is being tested. The Attorney-General was right; and I have some sympathy for him, because he has been candid enough to tell us that his position in these circumstances was by no means comfortable—and that has been the position of Attorneys-General down the decades and centuries. It is one of the strengths of our constitution that the Attorney’s position should be uncomfortable from time to time and that he should have to answer. The Attorney-General is not the Prime Minister’s Attorney-General. He is Her Majesty’s Attorney-General, appointed under the Great Seal, just like a judge. He acts as guardian of the public interest, which is not the party-political interests of his party, but the interests of the public in the widest sense. A balance had to be struck here. The matter needs to be and it is being questioned; but issues arise, such as the strength of the evidence. I must confess that I was struck, because the Attorney stated that he had spent two, three or even more days looking carefully into the evidential strength here. As I understand it, this case was not decided by the director of the SFO on evidential grounds—we have been told that it was decided quite clearly on public interest grounds; none the less, the fact that the evidence to the Attorney apparently seemed to be weak in regard to anything that happened after 2002, when the 2001 Act came into force, was a factor to be borne in mind. Then we have been told, as the noble Lord, Lord Brennan, reminded us, that there was consultation with Ministers, right up to the Prime Minister, and close consultation between the director of the Serious Fraud Office and our ambassador in Saudi Arabia. Those consultations were perfectly proper, but I do comment on their manner. There has been a change. The Government and the Attorney should take note that there are dangers in ““sofa government””, as it has been described. In my years as a law officer and when I was PPS to Sir Michael Havers previously, and when my noble friend Lord Mayhew of Twysden was Attorney-General, these consultations were carried out in an extremely strict and formal way. I have some worry that that has been relaxed. That may be said to be more modern, but great care and formality in these matters are extremely important. I would be interested to hear what the noble and learned Lord the Attorney-General has to say about that aspect. My fundamental point is, as I say, that these matters can and should be answered in Parliament. The notion that you should pass the role of the Attorney-General off to some public official, be it the individual directors—the director of the Serious Fraud Office or the Director of Public Prosecutions—or some other public official, does not fit with our parliamentary system. It would reduce our accountability and the strength of our democracy, and we should resist that.