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Corporate Manslaughter and Corporate Homicide Bill

My Lords, first, I want to clarify how the Bill will operate. Having looked at what has been said before on this amendment and, to some extent, having listened to what the noble Lord has just said, I think that there may be a misunderstanding. As the Bill stands, the offence is not limited, in its application to public authorities, to employer and occupier duties. It is important to emphasise that the relevant exclusion here is Clause 3(2), which states: "““Any duty of care owed in respect of things done in the exercise of an exclusively public function””," unless it is an employer or occupier liability issue. What does ““exclusively public function”” mean? It does not mean whenever a public body is operating. That is not how the term is defined. It is defined in the Bill as, "““a function that falls within the prerogative of the Crown or is … exercisable only with authority conferred””," by that prerogative or by or under a statutory provision. That certainly does not mean a public authority acting just with statutory powers; it refers to things that can be exercised only with statutory powers. Let us take education as an example. Educationis not an exclusively public function, even though it is carried out by many public authorities. Healthcareis not an exclusively public function, although it is carried out by many public authorities. Those things can be carried out by private bodies without statutory backing or in the exercise of the prerogative, so the exclusion would not apply in those cases. Members of the public who, sadly, suffer as a result of a public body carrying on that sort of activity would notbe excluded from the protection of the Bill. The exemption is limited to cases where it is an exclusively public function. We discussed one such function in relation to the previous amendment: the holding of people in custody can be done only by virtue of statutory authority; it cannot be done otherwise. Carrying on military action can be carried out only either under the prerogative or by statutory authority. Those are the limits. When public bodies carry on general commercial activities, for example, or activities such as healthcare or education, then, so long as a duty of care exists—I hope that no one is talking about trying to extend the existing duty of care as it stands in the law of negligence—the Bill as it stands will cover that. That is a very important difference compared with how the Bill has been seen. I give way to the noble and learned Lord.