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Europe in the World (EUC Report)

My Lords, it has been an interesting debate, all the more so for the varied responses today. I thank my noble friend Lord Bowness for calling it. His expertise and experiencein European affairs and his work on countless committees in your Lordships’ House have set a high standard. I have no doubt that the noble Lord, Lord Roper, will be a very distinguished successor. I thank also the committee for its hard work in bringing the report together. The content of the Commission’s communication Europe in the World—Some Practical Proposals for Greater Coherence, Effectiveness and Visibility leaves much to be desired, yet it is hugely valuable to be given insight into the workings of the Commission. What appears important is how the European Union sees itself in the world. Ironically enough, both the Commission’s communication and the report before us expose the unnecessary confusion of roles, particularly with respect to European security and defence policy. Although the EU has been expanding its role in the world for some time, operating European security and defence policy missions across the world, from the western Balkans to Aceh in Indonesia, those efforts have been undermined by duplication of effort and poor co-ordination. I was interested to read that the Commission acknowledged that, stating in its communication that, "““the impact of EU’s policy is weakened by a lack of focus and continuity in its external representation””." That is a good reason why the European Union should not seek to supersede member states’ foreign policy. There is clearly much scope for improving the internal management structures of the Commission and the Council and for better communication between the two bodies. We recognise fully the viability of the role that the EU can play in international terms; take, for example, the ongoing resistance to the proliferation of nuclear weapons, technology and material. Yet, the report makes it clear that internal decisions on nuclear proliferation have obstructed the flow of information and the pursuit of action. What must be avoided is attempting a united foreign policy merely for the sake of presenting a united front. Take, for example, the words of the Finnish president, who, after last summer’s crisis in Lebanon, stated that action was difficult because there were, "““real differences of opinion between Member States””." It is right that, where there is agreement, member states should be able to enhance the impact of the united weight of their opinion by speaking with and through the EU. We would not deny that there has been success in the field. The EU intervention in Macedonia, mentioned by my noble friend and by the noble Lord, Lord Harrison, and others is a good example of where EU intervention can contribute to foreign policy where there is consensus between member states. Paragraph 36 of the report refers to the EU speaking with one voice, but at no point does it define the practical limits of its external activities. It must not be forgotten that those practical limits exist. The extent to which the EU can involve itself in foreign policy must be limited to the extent to which member states agree on any given point of that policy. There are and always will be real differences between member states. That is natural and must be respected. We believe that ultimate authority over foreign policy must remain with the member states seeking to find consensus—where there is none, it is not only a fruitless task but a wasteful one. My noble friend Lady Hooper mentioned the importance of the Assemblies of the Council of Europe and the WEU, and we should forget the important work thatthey do. This report turns the spotlight on the real impetus in Europe behind the so-called common foreign and security policy, which is referred to daily by EU Ministers and is an essential means of securing Europe’s influence on the world stage. Indeed, we can see the inversion of the purposes of foreign policy no more clearly than in the EU’s handling of Darfur. In a situation where NATO had already pledged to provide support for the African Union mission in Darfur, France, in the summer of 2005, insisted on parallel EU involvement. That resulted in a duplicating of resources and separate, simultaneous airlift operations and a period of distracting prevarication. What is more, the structure of EU foreign policy bodies duplicates NATO—the European Defence Agency, the EU Military Staff and the EU operational planning capability, to name but a few from a long list. We welcome the acknowledgement in the report that the current treaties are adequate and that a constitution is not required for the EU to act effectively. We actively encourage the EU in its work in the world, where that work is well placed, well considered and is achieved on the basis of real, not imagined, consensus. Yet, the proposals included in the Commission’s suggestions all point to the same thing: the Commission is set on ushering in the constitution by the back door. While we do not object to double-hatting—for example, in the dual roleof High Representative and External Relations Commissioner—it is vital to preserve the existing, discrete boundaries within each of those roles. The High Representative must not, for example, become bound by the Commission, in his capacity as High Representative. The High Representative must have a mandate from member states. I would be grateful if the Minister could reassure the House that, in his capacity as attendee at, for example, the Relex group, the High Representative would be clearly briefed on his role and that there was no possibility of his taking on the mantle of, effectively, a European Foreign Minister. There is clearly a need for foreign relations to be more effectively and efficiently co-ordinated, and double-hatting might be the answer. However, this must be pursued with great care and reserve. The noble Lord, Lord Wallace of Saltaire, made some good points about the wisdom of this country sharing offices and staff with other members in some co-locations. Role sharing may be a way of improving the workings of the EU, but it is important that there are safeguards to protect the existing boundaries between the Commission and the Council. My honourable friend in another place, Graham Brady, asked the Minister whether Her Majesty's Government would make it clear to Chancellor Merkel that the EU constitution was not acceptable to Britain and that a referendum would have to be held on any new treaty containing significant elements of the constitution. The Minister rather skirted around the issue, and I would be grateful if he could give some firm answers to those questions today. We on these Benches believe in a positive vision of Europe, a Europe that is outward looking, not inwardly obsessed. Yet, while a consideration of Europe in the world is still fuelled by the importance of the cause of ever-closer union, I have little hope.I refer to the excellent summary by my right honourable friend William Hague in June of last year: "““Those who wish the EU to supersede its Member States as a foreign policy actor have as their prime aim not the furthering of our common interest but the increase of the EU’s power. Many of the advocates of that goal seem more interested in creating a counterweight to the United States than the propagation of our common values of freedom and democracy””." The title of the Commission’s communication on which the committee’s report is based gives it all away. It is entitled ““Some practical proposals for greater coherence, effectiveness and visibility””. It is the latter aim among the three that concerns me. The EU should focus on transparency rather than visibility.