Proceeding contribution from Roger Berry (Labour) in the House of Commons on Thursday, 22 February 2007. It occurred during Adjournment debate on Strategic Export Controls.
Strategic Export Controls
I welcome the hon. Gentleman’s intervention, as I do not understand the Government’s position either. People have to register births, deaths and marriages and a variety of other things, such as having a TV licence or running a lottery. Trading in arms is, arguably, a serious activity. Evading controls on arms dealing is probably more serious than not paying one’s TV licence, although I recommend that people should pay their TV licence. The hon. Gentleman makes a fundamental point. One effective way of sending out the message that lawful brokering is okay—that is not in question—but unlawful brokering is not, is to have a register of brokers as well as full extraterritorial controls. I welcome the hon. Gentleman’s support on that. I remind my good friend the Minister that our party fought the 2001 general election, in the run-up to introducing the path-breaking 2002 Act, with this commitment:"““We will legislate to modernise the regulation of arms exports, with a licensing system to control the activities of arms brokers and traffickers wherever they are located.””" It did not say ““some arms brokers”” or ““those who are trying to flog long-range missiles, but not those who are trying to flog small arms.”” As tactfully as I can, I remind the Minister and the Government of that commitment. In rather more considered terminology, the Committee concluded, at paragraph 195, that"““no logical case can be made for including some controlled goods within the Government’s extra-territorial control on brokering and trafficking whilst excluding others.””" That is saying the same thing as I said a moment ago, but is not quite as punchy as I tried to make it. The Committee genuinely cannot understand why extraterritorial controls do not exist across the piece. The Government’s response thus far has been that the matter will be considered in this year’s review, but I hope that the Minister will accept today the logic of our argument that it is nonsense to exclude from control brokering in the weapons that are of most use to terrorists and that cause the most damage in areas of conflict around the world. I move to the issue of dual-use goods—goods that might have a civilian or a military purpose. In its report, the Committee refers, as many others have done, to the so-called Land Rover/Otokar case. I shall be brief on this, because many hon. Members present will be familiar with it. The Committee considered the use of Land Rover Defender military vehicles by Uzbek troops during the Andijan massacre in May 2005. According to the Government, and we entirely accept their understanding of the situation, Land Rover did not sell the military vehicles themselves, but sold flat-pack civilian Land Rover Defenders to a Turkish company, Otokar. The company assembled them and the Turkish Government then handed them over to Uzbekistan, where they were used during the Andijan massacre of 2005. The Government rightly told the Committee that"““the UK has no power to control the export of civilian specification Land Rovers.””" That is correct; there is no doubt about that. However, anyone vaguely familiar with the arms trade, even if only from reading the odd newspaper article about it, would have known perfectly well that there was a real risk regarding the use of Land Rover flat-packs that were exported from the UK to Turkey, given that Turkey was clear, at that time, about supporting military transfers to the Uzbek Government. Anyone with the vaguest knowledge of the arms trade would have had bells ringing in their brains. They would have thought, ““Hang on a minute, is it not possible that an export from the UK that has a dual-use””—it could be a civilian vehicle, but could be modified into a military vehicle—““going to Turkey could end up being used by a Government with a questionable human rights record?”” The Government’s response to date has been that they understand that concern, but that when the goods left the UK they did not require a licence—that is true—so there was not a lot that could be done. If Land Rover or any other company had sought a licence for the export of a military vehicle to Uzbekistan at that time, it would almost certainly not have been granted. A European Union embargo was subsequently introduced because the situation was so serious. We must try to take the dual-use product situation more seriously. Our report states:"““We recommend that the Government commission research to establish the extent to which dual-use goods not subject to control are exported from the UK and are then incorporated into equipment which had it been exported from the UK would have been subject to export control. We recommend that the results of the research and the Government’s analysis of the results are published. We further recommend that the work is completed in time to inform the review of the legislation in 2007.””" A simple confirmation from the Minister that that is what the Government intend to do would be helpful, because there is a serious problem. Arms controls can be circumvented in various ways, whether by accident or intentionally—I make no judgment about the Land Rover case. One obvious way of circumventing arms export controls is by having the kind of arrangement that existed in the Land Rover/Otokar case. That leads me on to the closely-related question of incorporation and offshore production. We would argue that it is currently another area where the Government simply do not have the kind of controls that they need. UK companies, like other companies engaged in arms manufacture and export, are increasingly involved in arms production in other countries. That can take many forms: it can be done through a subsidiary, a joint venture or licensed production. If the final assembly takes place outside the UK, our present controls are limited to controls on the transfer of technology. Our report makes the modest recommendation:"““that the Government bring forward proposals for consideration during the 2007 review…to regulate:""a) British companies proposing to license the production of weapons overseas; and""b) exports from overseas subsidiary companies in which a majority shareholding is""held by a UK parent””." The Government’s response to our report indicated that they were not entirely convinced of the need to do that, but they have given a commitment to consider the matter further. We very much hope that they can be persuaded on this issue. The arguments that I have made thus far are ones that the Committee has been putting forward for a number of years. This year, we examined two issues for the first time, taking an interest in the internet and in arms fairs, for which I give particular thanks to Mark Thomas. On the question of the internet, I had the pleasure of going to Oxford at his invitation to meet students of Lord Williams’s upper school. They demonstrated how easy it was to set oneself up as an arms broker. I recommend that Members of Parliament might wish to consider setting themselves up as arms brokers and seeing what they can buy over the internet. The Quadripartite Committee might even wish to do this, because it might be a way of testing the system. Those youngsters showed me that it was simple to form an arms broking company and start importing things from other parts of the world. The example that springs to mind is instruments of torture. They acknowledged that the UK has legislation that prevents the manufacture and export of certain instruments of torture, so they wondered whether they could get such stuff from somewhere else, and surprise, surprise it is straightforward to do so. They obtained thumb cuffs, wall cuffs and sting sticks. A sting stick is a cylindrical metal piece of equipment that is about 4 ft long and has metallic spikes sticking out of it. It is used to thrash people and is a very nasty instrument, so much so that the Palace authorities would not give us permission to bring one into our Committee for Members to see what young people could obtain on the internet. We had to show the Minister in question the sting stick outside. I suspect that doing so was still a bit dodgy because sting sticks are dangerous weapons, but parliamentary privilege perhaps applied. The important point is that those young people demonstrated how easy it was for anyone to set themselves up as an arms broker and import illegal items into the UK. I am concerned about illegal guns in the UK. It appears that it is easy to obtain guns in the UK in numbers that would surprise. The point that the Committee was making by referring to the internet in the report was that we could see little or no proactive policing of the internet in respect of companies that were promoting business in breach of arms export controls. The report stated:"““that the Government’s response to the challenge of the Internet as an arms emporium is too passive and fails to take account of the role it now plays in promoting and facilitating commerce and exports across the world.””" The Government’s response said that they would consider the issue further and would write to the Committee in due course on the issue. To date, we have not received that letter. We look forward to receiving it as soon as possible. The question of arms fairs arose from the fact that although the brokering of torture equipment is illegal, we received evidence that at the 2005 Defence Systems and Equipment International arms fair in Docklands, TAR Ideal Concepts Ltd, an Israeli company, was openly advertising the supply of electro shock batons and leg irons in its brochure. When that was exposed, it was asked to leave. That was exposed not by our enforcement arrangements, but by Mark Thomas. Why do we so often have to rely on investigative journalists to expose breaches in some of our arms export control legislation? I understand the difficulties of enforcement and I am sure that effort is put into it, but I believe that the advertising literature at the arms fair in Docklands is approved by a Department, so why could such a situation occur? Why could Global Armour, a South African company, offer electro shock weapons in its brochures at the same event? It cannot be that difficult to police arms fairs. I hope that in future they will be policed more effectively. Enforcement is an issue even when the policy is clear. We have a clear policy on trade in torture equipment and so forth. Sometimes the policy is not clear and it is impossible to know exactly what is happening. I shall cite one such example that we raised in the report: exports to Israel. The Committee is confused, but I have never understood it and I shall explain why. In evidence to the Committee, the Government confirmed that the policy on exports to Israel has not changed since 2002. We are told the policy is that:"““no weapons, equipment or components which could be deployed aggressively in the Occupied Territories would be licensed… and the Government did not take into account assurances given by the Israeli Government concerning the end-use of exports.””" I shall not go into the details about why the Government do not accept those assurances any more, but that is the policy. Our report invited them to explain the policy. The Government’s reply simply restated the policy and said that they examine everything on a ““case-by-case basis””. Indeed, the Government are brilliant at responding to any seriously good question that is intended to get to the essence of their policy on arms exports, by saying, ““We rigorously examine each application on a case-by-case basis.”” Of course they are supposed to do that, and I am not suggesting that they should not, but can we please know what the policy is? Do the Israeli Government have one pile of weapons over here, which they say they can use in the occupied territories without any problem? Do they say, ““These weapons are ours, because we got them from Germany””? Do they have another pile somewhere else and say, ““These are the Brits’ weapons. They’re funny, the Brits. Apparently, we can use these weapons in some circumstances, but not others. We certainly can’t use them in the occupied territories. So don’t mix these two piles of weapons up””? Is that what actually happens? A simple yes or no from my very good friend the Minister at the end of the debate would suffice. We would just like to know what is going on.
Secondary information
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- Proceeding contribution
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- 457 c150-3WH
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- 2006-07
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- Westminster Hall
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- Department for International Development Arms trade Department of Trade and Industry Licensing Export controls Revenue and Customs
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