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House of Lords: Reform

My Lords, our debates today and tomorrow are taking place ostensibly because the Government’s view is that they need to ensure that this House is, "““fit to meet the demands and expectations of this century””," as the White Paper puts it. The White Paper also asserts: "““The legitimacy and authority of the second chamber continue to be called into question””." There could many reasons for wishing to reform this House—manifesto pledges, certainly; awkward headlines, perhaps—but public clamour for increased legitimacy and authority in this House really cannot be prayed in aid. By the standards of this House, I am a newcomer. It is 22 months since I ceased to be an elected Member in the other place. In those 22 months, much may have changed, but I can only say that in the 18 years when I was there I received no letter criticising the functioning of this House, no demand for improved legitimacy or increased authority and no suggestion that the House of Lords is unfit for purpose. Nor did I receive demands from my constituents that they should be given more opportunities to elect more politicians at an increased cost to them. Indeed, to say that they took the opposite view would be to understate the position. However, there is increasing dissatisfaction with the democratic process. Other noble Lords have mentioned turnouts at parliamentary elections, which hover at around 60 per cent. In European and local elections, they are nearer to 30 per cent. A lot of reasons are given for that apathy—some have been rehearsed today—but one is undoubtedly the wholesale and, on occasion, somewhat unthought-out constitutional change introduced by this Government since 1997. There has been a proliferation of non-elected bodies with budgets but no accountability. Regional development agencies, partnerships and assemblies are answerable to no one. In addition, power has been devolved to the Scottish Parliament and the Welsh and London Assemblies. Devolution in itself has virtues, but not if it is embarked on with no clear idea of the consequences, especially for the clarity of accountability, which is the essence of the democratic process. As Dr John Reid said: "““There is no route map for it and no textbook that we can consult””.—[Official Report, Commons, 27/7/99; col. 103.]" Quite so. The cumulative effect of that hasty, even if enthusiastic, approach to devolution has been to obscure, but not to enhance, accountability. In London, for example, people are asked to vote for a borough councillor, two kinds of London Assembly member, the mayor, a Westminster MP and an MEP. Yet people in London still do not know to whom to turn for a hole in the road, which is the acid test of accountability. Constitutional change for the wrong reasons, or without careful thought for the consequences, does not enhance the democratic process if accountability is blurred. That is exactly what we are being asked to consider today. That there is dissatisfaction with the state of our democratic process is undoubted, but is it to reform of this House that we must look to make it better? The Government have made it clear in their pronouncements on these matters that they believe that the primacy of the House of Commons is of paramount importance—it is interesting to note that the primacy appears to apply to one of the votes there last week, but not entirely to the other, but there we are. If that is the Government’s belief, they should begin by asking themselves whether what they have done to the House of Commons since 1997 has contributed to that primacy—for example, the truncating and stifling of debate by rigid timetabling, the announcement of important measures, such as the independence of the Bank of England, not to Parliament but by press conference, and the habit of sofa government. If they wish to take sensible steps to correct the democratic deficit, they could do worse than begin with the House of Commons. However, if the Government are determined to proceed with reform of this House—and I accept that there are manifesto commitments—they really must consider the consequences for our democracy and for people's understanding of it first and not afterwards. Moreover, they should begin by setting out clearly what they believe should be the functions of this House, and its constitutional relationship to the House of Commons, once there are elected Members in it. If they really want to confer elected legitimacy on this House, they have to realise that the PR system is simply appointment by another and a more opaque system; they must accept that a single 15-year term of office would confer absolutely no accountability on the elected Member; and they must get real and understand that, if people are elected to this House, by whatever means and in whatever proportion, they will eventually challenge the primacy of the Commons, because that is what happens. Before the Government ask themselves whether any of the above would actually improve the House of Lords, they should ask themselves what complaints they have received about its current functioning—apart perhaps from appointments to it—the effectiveness of our committees, the standard of debate, our very often non-partisan approach, and the expertise on which we can call from within the House to inform what we do. These qualities could be lost in the rush to confer some kind of legitimacy on this House. The only justification for any constitutional change is that it will strengthen the democratic process by enhancing accountability and people’s confidence in the system. We were urged earlier by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer, to have as our priority in these deliberations the interests of our country and our democracy. We should think long and hard before taking this House, our nation and our democracy to an unknown destination.